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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
I began this study with the intention of writing about the Filipino side of the 
Philippine-American War (1899-1902). The most popular and important book on the 
conflict, Brian Linn’s The Philippine War, offers a thorough account of the American 
side of the conflict. But, its lack of attention to the Filipino slants its analysis. For one, 
Linn did not make much use of the major primary source for the Philippine Army: the so-
called Philippine Insurgent Records or the PIR. My intended goal was to master the PIR. 
As my research progressed, however, I discovered that a full understanding of the 
Philippine side of the war required more than just reading the documents in the PIR. The 
actions of the Filipinos during the Philippine-American War could not be fully 
understood until they are placed in the broader context of Philippine history as whole. 
Without a broader view were it is difficult to say who became the leaders or soldiers of 
during the war, what they were fighting for, and why the Filipinos acted the way they 
did.1 What was lacking was the indigenous context—an examination of the larger 
Philippine world in which this war took place. Examining the indigenous context avoids 
the common error of assuming that Filipino notions of war resemble those of the 
Americans and that the Filipinos had similar strategic and tactical objectives and 
                                                
1 The “New Military History.” See Wayne E. Lee. “Mind and Matter—Cultural Analysis in American 
Military History.” The Journal of American History, March 2007, vol. 93, no. 4, p. 1118.  
2 
outlooks.2 The Filipinos did not have exactly the same outlook to warfare as the 
Americans because of differences in history and circumstance. The influences on the 
martial thinking of the Filipinos were very different. 
Over time, it became apparent to me that in order to explain Philippine attitudes 
and practices of warfare, I needed to take a long view of Philippine history. My study 
therefore became less focused on the Philippine-American War itself and more on the 
evolution of warfare as practiced by the indigenous inhabitants of the Philippine Islands 
from the 1500s until the early 1900s. The starting point was Philippine warfare at the 
moment of Spanish contact—“prehispanic warfare”—and the end point was warfare as 
practiced by the army of Emilio Aguinaldo the and the Philippine Republic. My goal 
became to explain how the Filipinos got from the first point to the second, since I felt this 
approach offered the best way to understand Filipino strategies and tactics during the 
Philippine-American War.  
The Existing Literature 
A survey of the historiography of Philippine military history will quickly show 
that there are few scholarly works on the topic. This is especially the case when it comes 
to works that deal with the grand narrative, or the grand sweep of Philippine military 
history. Only three scholars have written works that examine Philippine history from 
prehispanic times to the present: Uldarico Baclagon, Carlos Quirino and Cesar Pobre. 
These three scholars have produced solid studies, albeit with some limitations. Pobre and 
                                                
2 John Keegan, A History of War, (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), 21. Ironically, Keegan is guilty of 
this in many of his works. 
3 
Baclagon wrote books geared for the Philippine Military Academy and tend to be 
operational in focus, with a heavy bias towards providing its cadet-readers with useful 
lessons. Quirino’s work, on the other hand, was geared more towards a popular market. 
His Filipinos at War is probably the most popular general Philippine military history 
book, makes use of primary sources, and is eminently readable. But it is an old book, and 
its scholarship is outdated. 
Studies that focus on one war in Philippine history are more plentiful—and the 
vast majority of these studies focus on the Philippine-American War.  
A few Filipino historians have tackled the Filipino side of the war. Luis Camara 
Dery wrote The Army of the First Philippine Republic, a short overview of the topic. 
Teodoro Agoncillo’s epic work, Malolos: Crisis of the Republic (1960) remains the most 
widely read study of the Philippine-American War but it does not focus on the military 
aspects of the war.  
The most extensive study of the Filipino forces remains John R. M. Taylor’s The 
Philippine Insurrection Against the United States, a four-volume set written and 
published in 1903. Taylor was the Army captain who translated, catalogued and compiled 
the mass of captured Filipino documents that eventually became the Philippine Insurgent 
Records and he was also an eyewitness. Taylor therefore had unmatched access to a vast 
body of information. Unfortunately, as Renato Constantino said: “Taylor’s anti-Filipino 
bias and the circumstances under which his work was undertaken detract from the value 
4 
of his work.”3 Taylor was not an objective scholar and his analysis was undertaken with a 
specific agenda: to defend the American presence in the Philippines. He constantly takes 
a negative and frankly racist view of the Filipinos and he is particularly hostile to 
Aguinaldo, who he portrays as a villainous racial inferior who did not know his place. 
What Taylor did not do was take Aguinaldo seriously and he was unwilling to 
acknowledge that Aguinaldo had a strategy that integrated diplomacy, politics and war. 
Taylor’s desire to portray Aguinaldo as an unprincipled savage meant he sometimes 
misrepresented Aguinaldo’s plans or motives. For instance, he claimed that  
There was probably from the beginning among the directing group [of Filipino 
leaders] an irreconcilable difference of opinion as to the proper method of waging war. 
[Antonio] Luna and his partisans were in favor of waging war with regular bodies of 
troops assisted by guerrillas… Aguinaldo was from the first probably in favor of a 
general rising of the Tagalog tribe and their employment as guerrillas.4 
In this study I have used the same documents that Taylor used (the Selected 
Documents of the Philippine Insurgent Records) and have concluded that this assertion is 
largely false. Aguinaldo was equally enthusiastic in his desire to have a regular army 
fighting in a “civilized” European manner. Perhaps Taylor refused to see this since he 
wished to link Aguinaldo to a “people’s war,” a type of conflict which he deplores as 
chaotic and uncivilized. 
                                                
3 Renato Constantino, introduction to The Philippine Insurrection Against the United States by John R. M. 
Taylor, (Pasay City, Philippines: Eugenio Lopez Foundation, 1971), 1: xii. 
4 Ibid., 2:180. 
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Taylor’s The Philippine Insurrection is still a valuable work—he provides details 
of organization, numbers and dates that would have been very onerous to track down. 
However, Taylor’s prejudices are too marked for him to be taken at face value and his 
analysis is often questionable. 
Several other works provide overviews of the war. I have earlier mentioned Linn. 
Also useful are Stuart C. Miller’s Benevolent Assimilation, John Gates’s Schoolbooks and 
Krags, and Stanley Karnow’s In Our Image. Other studies examine specific regions like 
Glenn May’s Battle for Batangas, Resil Mojares’s The War Against the Americans (about 
Cebu) and William Henry Scott’s Ilocano Responses to American Aggression. But the 
fact of the matter is that these fail to place the Philippine-American War into its proper 
indigenous context. A broad view—a full, long-term analysis of the Philippine side—is 
missing. To put it in fashionable terms, Filipinos are not given their due agency. 
The Documentation 
The main cache of primary documents used in this study is the aforementioned 
PIR. In this collection are muster rolls, telegrams, letters, circulars, speeches and many 
other primary sources written or produced by the Revolutionary Government of Emilio 
Aguinaldo. The PIR has been critical in showing the Philippine side of the war. For 
example, it has helped me to debunk the idea, subscribed to by Brian Linn, that the voice 
of the “real” Emilio Aguinaldo, the president of the Philippines at the time of the war, 
was “difficult to discover, for… he seldom revealed his thoughts. Conscious of his 
limited education, he wrote little, and much that is attributed to him, including his three 
6 
somewhat contradictory autobiographical publications, was largely the work of others.”5 
In fact Aguinaldo wrote quite a bit and the PIR has many documents that were penned by 
Aguinaldo’s own hand. There is one document in particular that has proven useful in 
finding the “real” Aguinaldo in the PIR: a piece entitled “Sa Mga Kababayan kong 
Americano” or “To My Fellow Americans.” This was a propaganda piece that we know 
was written by Aguinaldo since he attached a signed note at the end where he instructed 
his secretary, Apolinario Mabini, to translate the piece into Spanish.6 The document can 
therefore be used to identify Aguinaldo’s very distinctive handwriting and from this 
sample it is now possible to show that Aguinaldo actually wrote quite a bit. The PIR 
therefore makes it possible to determine Aguinaldo’s thoughts on governance, war and 
independence. The “real” Aguinaldo is therefore not quite as inscrutable as Linn claimed. 
These documents are a unique window into the Filipino side of the war, but they 
also impose certain limitations on the study.  
The first and most obvious limitation is that the “Filipino” side is largely, but not 
entirely, limited to those people who wrote the speeches, edicts, circulars and muster 
rolls. These were the leaders and the elites that comprised what this study will call the 
“Aguinaldo Government.” Hence, some social groups—like the ordinary soldiers—do 
not have much of a voice. While they will not be ignored, they will be mentioned 
primarily when they interact with the agents of the Aguinaldo Government.  
                                                
5 Brian Linn, The Philippine War, (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 19. 
6 R6F8D3. 
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The second limitation is that these documents are often prescriptive, rather than 
descriptive. This is most important when it comes to military matters because 
surprisingly little in the way of feedback or descriptions from the field have been 
recorded and preserved in the PIR. There are plenty of documents that mandate the table 
of organization for units, pay structures, or even tactical approaches—but it is sometimes 
hard to tell whether these strictures were actually applied. One often has to read between 
the lines.  
Third, most of these documents were generated when the Aguinaldo 
Government’s bureaucratic structure was intact and functioning. As the government 
collapsed, the documentation became decidedly sparser. Sources from the latter half of 
the Philippine-American War, during the so-called guerrilla phase, are fairly rare. At this 
point, the government had fragmented, and many of its leaders were on the run or in 
hiding. The bureaucratic mechanisms were no longer as efficient, if they functioned at all. 
Because of this limitation, I focus on the conventional phase. 
The PIR includes a lot of documentation on the 1898 Philippine Revolution 
against Spain, and even some on the 1896 Revolution. It does not have any sources on 
periods prior to the 1890s, and I am obliged to use other primary sources for those years, 
including various religious chronicles, the Collección de Documentos Inéditos Relativos 
al Descubrimiento, Conquista y Organización de las Antiguas Posesiones Españolas de 
Ultramar, as well as the famous document compilation, The Philippine Islands by Emma 
Blair and James Robertson. 
 
8 
Chapter Summaries 
The first chapter examines the prehispanic and contact periods—both of which 
were important to an analysis of warfare in the Philippines since certain historical factors 
that first emerged in these periods would persist for the rest of Philippine history. The 
geography of the Philippine archipelago, with its many islands that had forested and 
mountainous interiors, had created a fragmented political environment, with multiple 
nodes of power. Until communications and travel were improved, political centralization 
would remain difficult, and even with new technologies fragmentation remained an issue 
that had serious implications for warfare. Localism, or the importance of elites at very 
local levels, began during this period. The importance of interpersonal ties and 
personalism in mustering manpower also had the origins in the prehispanic period. The 
prehispanic period also introduced spiritual prowess in combat, the importance of 
intimidation, and individual heroics to the martial culture of the Philippines. Finally, 
evasion or decampment as a military and political strategy also had its origins in the 
prehispanic Philippines. 
The first chapter will also discuss the early Spanish colonial period. The burden of 
“conquest” fell primarily on Spanish priests and missionaries, whose conquista espiritual 
created a political system that greatly resembled the spiritual-based rule of prehispanic 
chieftains, the datu. The chapter will therefore show how the first two centuries of 
Spanish conquest did not erase the patterns of decentralization, spirituality, and 
decampment that were so important to prehispanic warfare.  
9 
However, the Spaniards’ introduction of even a weak central government based in 
Manila did alter warfare in the Philippines since it introduced military force in the service 
of a state. The introduction of Christianity also gave a degree of coherence or 
commonality to a large proportion of the population of the Philippine Islands. 
Henceforth, there would be a mainstream society—primarily in the lowlands, Christian, 
and nominally ruled from Manila. Decampment remained a viable tactic, although even if 
it was a holdover from prehispanic times, it had changed in its objectives, from a way of 
evading raids from enemy datu to a means of resisting Spanish authority. 
Thus while the Spanish did not necessarily stamp out or radically alter Philippine 
patterns of warfare, they changed the martial culture of the people of the Philippines. The 
Spanish introduced warfare or the use of force directed by a central government, and to 
the minds of many Filipinos, Europeanized warfare would be synonymous with 
centralized warfare.   
The second chapter discusses the profound changes wrought by the 19th century—
when the Spanish so transformed their method of rule that it was tantamount a 
recolonization of the Philippines. The Spanish “rationalized” their colonial government, 
which meant that they strengthened their hold on the Philippines with more organized 
and far-reaching governance. The Philippine economy was also transformed into an 
export-oriented cash-cropping economy. The changes to colonial society created a small 
class of Filipinos who benefited from the new political and economic systems, and who 
were closely affiliated with Spanish culture. These Filipinos had a vested interest in 
maintaining much of the status quo, but they were also eager to gain more influence in 
10 
colonial governance. On the other hand, many poor Filipinos suffered under the new 
system and a few continued to resist. Decampment remained a viable strategy of 
resistance, although the new laws made the decampment criminal and the increase in 
colonial army and police forces made it more dangerous.  
Warfare and resistance during the 19th century therefore continued—albeit in 
altered form—the trends introduced by the Spanish conquest, with some Filipinos 
continuing the tradition of evasion and decampment, and some Filipinos more closely 
adhering to the Spanish government and its centralized form of warfare.  
The third chapter discusses the 1896 Revolution, when the colonial system began 
to break down. A few of the privileged Filipinos grew tired of Spanish domination and 
revolted. But instead of decamping as was traditional, they tried to create the Filipino 
nation and the Revolutionaries therefore chose to stand up and fight rather than 
decamping. The 1896 Revolution initiated almost 6 years of conflict, and it also marked a 
turning point in Philippine military history. Many of the people who led the 1896 
Revolution would also play important roles in the following years of turmoil. 
Specifically, Emilio Aguinaldo rose to prominence during the Revolution, and he would 
subsequently become president of the Republic of the Philippines and generalissimo of 
the Philippine Army during the 1898 Revolution and the Philippine-American War. 
The Revolutionaries were defeated in the 1896 Revolution, a disaster that 
highlighted the weaknesses of the Filipinos when it came to war. The leaders of the 
Revolution had no education in warfare, their soldiers had no training, they had no real 
military organization, and they had no domestic supply of weapons and ammunition or 
11 
and reliable foreign sources. Emilio Aguinaldo took note of these weaknesses in 
developing his subsequent strategies. 
The fourth, fifth and sixth chapters deal with the Philippine-American War 
proper. The trends in warfare for the past 300 years were fully expressed during this 
conflict, and all of them influenced how and why the Filipinos fought. Emilio 
Aguinaldo—now president of a Philippine Republic—wanted to create a centralized 
nation-state, and he had to overcome the problems of decentralization and localism that 
had plagued would-be centralizers in the Philippines for the past 300 years. He also 
decided to work with local elites, the people best positioned to provide him with 
resources for his government and army. These people had benefited from the new 
economy of the 19th century, so Aguinaldo had to make sure to keep this economy 
functioning, which meant maintaining links with the outside world and repressing 
discontented peasants. The strategic issues that cost the Revolutionaries the war in 1896 
remained to trouble the new Republic as well. 
The Aguinaldo Government crafted a grand strategy that aimed at defending its 
sovereignty in the face of internal divisions and external threats. The Republic used the 
threat of foreign intervention or invasion to rally the Filipino populace. Concurrently, it 
tried to head off invasion completely by winning recognition from foreign powers. In 
order to win recognition, it organized its political and military structure along “European” 
lines, which Aguinaldo thought would prove the “civilization” of Filipinos and their 
suitability for self-rule. This strategy ultimately failed, and the Republic went to war with 
12 
the Americans with an army not specifically structured for the kind of fighting that 
actually transpired. 
 
13 
CHAPTER II 
PHILIPPINE MILITARY HISTORY: FROM CONTACT TO THE 18TH CENTURY 
 
This chapter examines the evolution of Philippine warfare from prehispanic times 
and during the period of Spanish colonization. The Spanish conquest altered indigenous 
politics and culture and it is only logical that it should alter the practice of warfare in the 
archipelago. In brief, two traditions of armed combat were created during the Spanish 
colonial period: an evasive, defensive tradition that was evolved from prehispanic notions 
of warfare, and a newer tradition of warfare introduced by the Spanish where armed 
might was deployed in the service of a centralized government. The chapter therefore 
also hopes to show both how the prehispanic form of warfare survived despite the 
changing culture and circumstances of the Philippines and how Spanish methods of war 
adapted itself to local conditions.   
When Aguinaldo and the Filipinos went to war in 1898 and 1899, their martial 
culture did not exist in a vacuum—they were heirs to a continuously evolving way of 
war. Indeed, the Revolutionaries represented another step in the constant remaking of 
both Philippine society and Philippine warfare. Thus, when Aguinaldo speaks of a 
“Modern War” or “Bagong Digma” he was both implicitly contrasting it to “Old War”—
to the traditions that sprung out of prehispanic culture and which adapted to Spanish 
colonialism—but he was also describing a Westernizing tradition that had been present in 
the Philippines for 300 years. This latter was the “Modern War,” and which had become 
associated with European culture and therefore with modernity. Therefore, this chapter 
14 
also serves to place the Philippine-American War into the larger context of Philippine 
military history. 
Prehispanic Warfare 
Until the establishment of the Spanish colonial administration, there had been no 
centralized government that encompassed all or most of the Philippine archipelago. The 
polities that existed were small, scattered settlements of a few hundred families at the 
chiefdom stage of political development.7  The settlements along the seacoast were 
known as barangays in Tagalog, and it is the word that shall be used to describe all the 
lowland, coastal settlements in the prehispanic Philippines.8 These barangays tended to 
be the larger and more powerful polities in the Philippines and the people in these 
barangays lived by raiding and trading—rather like miniature versions of the great 
trading entrepots in the rest of island Southeast Asia.9 The lowland barangays often had 
trading or clientage relations with the smaller settlements that existed in the interiors of 
the Philippine islands. These inland settlements tended to live by swidden agriculture and 
by trading forest and mountain products like rice, gold, game and birds’ nests for iron 
weapons and Chinese porcelain from the coastal barangays.10  
                                                
7 Laura Lee Junker, Raiding, Trading and Feasting, (Quezon City, Philippines: Ateneo de Manila 
University Press, 2000), 3; William Henry Scott, Barangay, (Quezon City, Philippines: Ateneo de Manila 
University Press, 1994), 129. 
8 Scott, Barangay, 4-6. 
9 Junker, Raiding, Trading and Feasting, 19. 
10 Ibid., 221-260. 
15 
Geography was probably a large reason as to why the political environment of the 
Philippine was so multipolar and why none of these prehispanic communities became 
large, centralized polities.11 The coastal barangays had to contend with the archipelagic 
nature of the Philippines, which made conquest or growth by territorial annexation very 
difficult. The inland settlements also had their own problems with geography: the 
interiors of the islands in the archipelago were even less conducive to centralization since 
most were mountainous and heavily forested.12 The Philippine archipelago’s environment 
was therefore not conducive to state formation, and while it might not have been 
impossible—Indonesia and Malaysia managed to develop large, thalassocratic polities—
no barangay ever became a Philippine Malacca or Ternate.  
Adding to these challenges posed by geography was the fact that the prehispanic 
population was rather small, especially in relation to the land’s carrying capacity.13 The 
Philippines therefore had a low population density spread out across forest land that 
needed to be prepared before it could be productive, which meant that labor was more 
valuable than the land itself.14 Quite simply, agricultural land was abundant, but the labor 
                                                
11 Kasaysayan: The Story of the Filipino People, vol. 2, (Hong Kong: Asia Publishing Company Limited, 
1998), 36. 
12 Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, vol. 1, (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 1993), 1-3. 
13 Scott, Barangay, 36; Junker, Raiding, Trading and Feasting, 61; O. D. Corpuz, Roots of the Filipino 
Nation, vol. 1, (Quezon City, Philippines: Aklahi Foundation Inc.), 9. 
14 Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1:129; Benedict Anderson, Language and Power: 
Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1990), 43. 
16 
needed to work it was not.15 As Laura Lee Junkers noted, the easier way of increasing 
agricultural output in an environment with a lot of land and few people was through 
“labor capture,” or by securing more workers somehow.16 People were also useful as 
warriors, craftsmen and sailors. The difficulty in expanding and consolidating power 
through territorial annexation and the high value of labor meant that the goal of 
prehispanic leadership was gaining followers through personal charisma.17 The datu—
chieftains of the barangay—sought to gain followers by getting people to voluntarily 
submit to their authority.18 The datu did sometimes use force or coercion, but it was only 
when a leader had a certain minimum number of followers that it was possible for a datu 
to have the warriors and resources needed to use physical coercion or force to compel 
others to recognize the leader’s right to rule. Otherwise, a cruel or overly repressive datu 
might find his followers simply escaping into the interiors of the islands where it was 
difficult to follow them. Worse, these disaffected people might flee to other datu, who 
would be more than happy to welcome these new followers.19  
                                                
15 The newest study that deals with prehispanic demographics is Linda Newson, Conquest and Pestilence in 
the Early Spanish Philippines, (Honolulu: University of Hawai’I Press, 2009), 251-253 for a summary of 
prehispanic population density. 
16 Junker, Raiding, Trading and Feasting, 21. 
17 Oliver Wolters, History, Culture and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives, (Ithaca, New York: 
Southeast Asia Program Publications, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1999), 29. 
18 Filomeno V. Aguilar, Clash of Spirits: The History of Power and Sugar Planter Hegemony on a Visayan 
Island, (Quezon City, Philippines: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1998), 67. 
19 Ibid., 56-57. 
17 
Interpersonal relationships were the bedrock of prehispanic politics—as Wolters 
said of Southeast Asian leadership: “everything depended on man-to-man relations.”20 In 
the Philippines, leaders and followers were bound to each other by ties of beholden-ness, 
by utang ng loob, a term that can be literally translated as “inner debt” but its meaning 
might be better encapsulated by the phrase “inner gratitude.”21 Utang ng loob implies far 
more than just material debt, rather, it refers to a deep moral bond between follower and 
leader, where both sides have mutual or reciprocal obligations.22 This was not necessarily 
an altruistic bond, since both the leader and the follower cultivated relations with each 
other out of self-interest, but breaking these bonds and failing in these obligations were 
moral sins.  
The datu therefore tried to become the nexus of debt relations—to have as many 
people as possible owe gratitude or utang ng loob to the datu.23  The datu did this by 
becoming the community’s benefactor, by offering followers benefits like feasts where 
rare or expensive foods like rice or meat were eaten, with “prestige” goods like Chinese 
porcelains or imported weapons.24 The datu also provided “leadership” by arbitrating in 
disputes and protecting or advancing the followers’ interests. Finally, the datu provided 
security—protecting followers from bandits or raids and also from bad spirits. 
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In return, the datu got not just his followers’ allegiance; more importantly, he got 
their labor. The datu could then use these followers to farm, to build his boats or houses, 
or use their specialized skills if the followers were artisans or craftsmen.25 As William 
Henry Scott put it in Barangay: “One’s position in the social scale was … measurable by 
the amount he exercised over his own time and labor.”26 
The datu also made use of his followers’ military labor, using these followers as 
warriors or sailors for his raids and skirmishes. Increased labor and military manpower 
consequently meant an increase in the datu’s ability to participate in the prestige 
competition, and it therefore theoretically created a cycle where more followers meant 
more and more political power for the datu.27 
However, the relationship between datu and follower ought not to be idealized—it 
was far from equal, since the obligations owed by a datu to a follower were far less than 
what a follower owed to the datu. As Aguilar put it, the datu’s “services” of feasts, 
governance and defence were “nonquantifiable and overfullfilled giving” that put his or 
her followers in positions where they had to give “infinite expressions of gratitude 
because of their necessarily underfullfilled reciprocal obligation.”28 Indeed, it was 
possible to fall so deeply into debt that a person was enslaved. The condition of slavery 
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was perhaps mitigated by the fact that it was far easier to be freed in debt slavery than it 
was in chattel slavery.29  
All of these power relationships and the language of charisma were expressed in 
spiritual terms—that is, people were attracted to a datu’s spiritual power, or as Oliver 
Wolter put it, his “soul stuff.”30 This reliance on spiritual power was logical in a political 
environment without an “independent physical power base” like a “specialized police 
force, standing army, [or] codified law.”31 So the datu’s power was understood to stem 
from his level of inner spiritual power, what Aguilar called dungan. Dungan was, 
according to Aguilar, “a life force, an energy … that provides the essence of life.” A 
person with a high level of this soul stuff was imbued with “personal attributes as 
willpower, knowledge, and intelligence, and even the ability to dominate and persuade 
others.”32 
In other words, the external marks of power and success implied inner spiritual 
power, so a datu did his best to display “acute intelligence, vast knowledge, indomitable 
willpower, and self-confidence,” and “a robust physique, sharp mind, masterful oratorical 
style, good fortune, bravery.”33 The problem a datu faced was the need for continuous 
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achievement—the datu constantly had to prove prowess and spiritual power, and often 
faced competition from other aspiring “big men.”34 
Because a leader’s charisma was based on spiritual prowess it was technically 
possible for almost anybody to become a datu and gain followers just by displays of 
prowess—this would imply spiritual power, which was all that was needed for 
legitimacy.35 Owning spiritually powerful objects, like talismans or special weapons 
could also give a potential datu an aura of power, to reinforce displays of good 
governance or wealth.  
This kind of charisma-based “theater state” made for a considerable amount of 
instability or “political cycling.”36 Since authority relied on an individual datu’s ability, it 
could disappear with that datu’s death or decline in fortunes: power therefore tended to 
“cycle” from one polity to the other, or from one person to the other.37 Institutional 
stability and continuity was weak because power was not necessarily hereditary, and even 
the descendant of a renowned datu had to prove his or her worth to keep the mantle of 
authority.38 It was therefore quite easy for a barangay to fade in importance if a powerful 
datu’s successor proved unlucky or less talented.  This might, for instance, explain the 
mysterious disappearance of the settlement of Mactan and its chieftain Si Lapu Lapu 
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from the historical record. Si Lapu Lapu was the victor in the celebrated Battle of 
Mactan, which ended in the death of the explorer Fernão de Magalhães. Yet nothing is 
heard from Mactan in the Legazpi Expedition’s records in the 1560s—clearly, Si Lapu 
Lapu’s successors had failed to maintain its prestige in power in the years between 1521 
and the 1560s. 
Rivalry between chiefs was hence very intense, with the various datus doing their 
best to attract followers while simultaneously undercutting the authority of rival chiefs. A 
datu also had to worry about potential upstarts within his or her barangay and there was 
thus a worry that an over-ambitious or over-talented underling could become a threat in 
the future.39 Some historical examples include the rivalry between the Cebuano chief Si 
Humabon and Si Lapu Lapu of Mactan and the rivalries between the three chiefs of 
Manila—Matanda, Soliman and Lakandula.  
The charismatic and personalistic politics of the prehispanic Philippines worked 
against centralization since the datus often found it difficult to exert their influence over 
followers far from the barangay’s center—it was easy for these distant followers to 
gravitate away from the datu’s sphere of authority. One of the members of the Legazpi 
Expedition, Hernando Riquel, claimed that one of the datu of Manila, Soliman had this to 
say on the weaknesses of his authority: 
If I were king of this land, instead of being only the master of my own estate, the 
word I had given would not have been broken. But as this depended on the many, 
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I could not, nor can I henceforth, do more than personally endeavor that my 
subjects and friends keep the peace and friendship that was established.40  
Prehispanic Philippine warfare was very Clausewitzian in that it was very much a 
tool of politics: warfare was one of the means by which a datu could participate in 
prestige competition.41 The objectives and methods of war were closely tied to the desire 
of the datu to attract followers or to deprive rivals of the same. Combat was also an 
excellent way of displaying spiritual prowess—fighting and war were visible 
opportunities to display prowess in the form of bravery, leadership and puissance through 
dexterous weapons handling.42  
Spiritual power played an important role in combat. The spiritual prowess of 
warriors could also be displayed or manifested by such feats as stopping blades and 
bullets with their bodies or striking enemies down from afar.43 Magical talismans—
anting anting—played a very important role here, since anting anting could confer the 
benefits of spiritual prowess to their users. These anting anting could come in many 
forms: medallions, daggers, clothing or amulets were all anting anting. Possessing one 
brought prestige and consequently they were much sought after.  
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In more practical terms, warfare was one way to acquire labor or prestige goods. 
Perhaps for some datus it was the best way to acquire these resources. The Cebuanos 
were generally considered to be more bellicose than the Tagalogs. One likely reason for 
their bellicosity was that they had fewer resources to trade and farm and had to rely on 
raiding more than the Tagalogs did. The signature Filipino tactic for slave and resource 
acquisition was the naval slave-raid or the ngayaw raid. Such a raid was when the datu 
would gather together warriors and warships (known as the karakoa) and assail rival 
settlements.44 This was the most prestigious and rewarding form of warfare in the 
prehispanic Philippines, and a datu’s strength was often measured by how many warships 
he could muster.45  
Warfare could also come in the form of ambushes, skirmishes and other small-
scale actions all aimed at weakening a rival datu’s authority.46 For instance, piracy—
which can be seen as a form of attritional warfare—was as common in the Philippines as 
it was in Southeast Asia as a whole. Piracy was an attractive tactic since it enriched the 
aggressor while simultaneously undercutting the trading capacity of any rivals, perhaps 
even redirecting trade to the pirate’s benefit.47 
Since land in and of itself was not necessarily valued by society as a whole, it was 
not an important target in warfare. Sanguinary pitched battles were too risky and too 
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wasteful in manpower and were consequently rare, although they were not unheard of. 
For the most part, datus only engaged in pitched battle if they felt they had overwhelming 
spiritual and physical advantages, or when they underestimated the power of their 
enemies. 
During battle itself, displaying spiritual prowess in combat was very important—
probably serving as a form of intimidation. Intiidation was a way of showing martial 
ability that spared casualties—important in a culture that valued manpower. Filipino 
warriors therefore liked to swagger and posture, or wear flashy armour. Spanish 
descriptions of engagements during the 16th century are also replete with accounts of 
Filipino warriors throwing or firing projectiles in large quantities.48 Fusillades of 
projectiles not aimed to hit could have been attempts to display combat power and to 
intimidate without actually killing the enemy. Combat itself was therefore an important 
arena of spiritual competition and in Philippine martial culture, externalities like dextrous 
weapons handling, appearance or bellicose behavior clearly mattered. 
There were two possible defensive responses to these slave raids. The first, 
mentioned by William Henry Scott, was to intercept enemy raids with patrols and 
presumably fighting it out at sea.49 The Filipinos had a term for naval, ship-to-ship 
combat—bangga—and the karakoa was employed in such encounters.50  
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The other defensive response was flight: the forested and mountainous interiors of 
most Filipino islands provided excellent sanctuaries since they were difficult to traverse 
without guides and most datu lacked the logistical means to wait for their victims to 
return to their homes or to engage in long sweeps into the bush to chase after them. The 
viability of simple flight also highlighted the limited importance of land in warfare: most 
Filipinos were willing to abandon their homes and their lands when threatened with 
attack.51 Since houses were easily rebuilt and since most goods of economic and political 
value—people and prestige items like porcelain—were portable, it was possible for 
Filipinos to flee into the mountains and not be bankrupted. Some settlements like Manila 
or the cota of Mindanao, did have fortifications, which might imply a greater 
determination to hold them against invaders, but none of them were stubbornly defended 
during the Spanish conquest and after, and the inhabitants chose flight rather than 
resistance. Most likely, these walls were designed to deter weaker raiders, not to prevent 
conquest by determined invaders.52 
Other than flight, it was possible for the ostensible “victim” to come to terms with 
an aggressive datu and essentially become one of that datu’s followers. In many ways, 
this was a perfectly acceptable solution: the weaker datu benefited from the protection 
and patronage of a powerful lord and did not lose much in the way of power or 
autonomy. Such oaths of fealty were known as the casi casi in the Visayas, which was 
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the famous blood compact in which the two datu imbibed a little bit of each other’s 
blood.53 
The Spanish Conquest 
The Spanish Conquest in the 1560s-70s did not initially change too many of the 
Filipino patterns of warfare or politics.54 While the conquest is commonly depicted as a 
process of territorial annexation, the reality involved a considerable amount of 
collaboration and consent on the part of the Filipinos and was far less clear-cut.    
The expedition which finally established a permanent Spanish presence in the 
Philippines was the Legazpi Expedition, which was named after the expedition leader, 
Miguel López de Legazpi. The expedition had been given instructions to maintain good 
relations with the local rulers and attempt a “peaceful” conversion of the locals to 
Christianity. Territorial annexation or even a displacement or the replacement of the local 
political structure was not initially part of Legazpi’s mission. In his instructions, Legazpi 
was supposed to “bring to the inhabitants of those places our Holy Catholic Faith and to 
… bring back some spices and some of the wealth found in those places.”55  
As a consequence of these orders Legazpi, did his best to maintain friendly 
relations with the Filipinos he encountered. For instance, despite some early skirmishing 
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with Tupas, a datu of Cebu, Legazpi expended much effort in trying to secure an alliance 
with the Philippine chieftain.56  
Unfortunately, the Spaniards under Legazpi were conquistadores who were far 
less inclined towards peace. The conquistadores did not come to the Philippines to be 
mere soldiers, farmers or craftsmen—they wanted to become members of the hidalguia 
and become tax-exempt warrior elites living off the labor of an underclass of peasants, a 
way of life with roots in the Reconquista.57 The conquistadores who came to the 
Philippines therefore wanted treasure and gold—loot—or they wanted to be given 
encomiendas that would enable them to live like gentlemen. For the most part, this meant 
that the conquistadores spent their time engaging in entradas, or traveling around the 
Philippines, securing loot, supplies and tribute from the various communities they 
encountered.58 These entradas were violent and were undertaken against Philip II’s 
orders. Legazpi had become increasingly unable or unwilling to limit the violence of his 
followers, and his death in 1572 removed what restraining influence was left on the 
conquistadores.  
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The conquistadores’ methods in acquiring tributes and wealth earned the ire of 
the friars who had come to the Philippines as missionaries. The Augustinian Martín de 
Rada wrote to the king of Spain describing the conquistadores’s methods: 
A captain with soldiers and interpreters goes to a town… They tell the 
townspeople that if they want to be friends of the Spaniards they must pay tribute 
at once. If the people say yes, they stop to work out what each man must give, and 
demand that he give it immediately. Sometimes the people refuse to give what is 
asked; then they sack the town. They also think they have a right to sack if the 
people do not wait for them but abandon their houses. They do all this without 
performing any service for them in return, without telling them for what purpose 
they have been sent by his Majesty, and without giving them any religious 
instruction.59 
Indeed, the Spanish “conquest” was primarily this sort of tribute gathering and the 
conquistadores did not bother to establish permanent presences in most of the barangays 
that they encountered. For the most part, the Spanish were confined to the newly founded 
cities of Manila and Cebu. 
Despite these depredations, the Spanish thought the Philippine Islands to be a 
poor place and it was considered as nothing more than stepping-stone to China or the rest 
of Southeast Asia.60 As a consequence of this attitude, it attracted very few settlers or 
colonists and the secular Spanish presence in the Philippines remained small and isolated 
for a long time. In the very early years of the colony, the numbers of Spaniards was truly 
vestigial: in the 1580s there were only 140 in the entire Philippines—far fewer than had 
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been in Legazpi’s expedition.61 By the seventeenth century, there were only a few 
thousand Spanish, almost all living in Manila or Cebu.62 As late as 1825, a Spanish writer 
complained that the Spanish rule was primarily confined to the coastlands.63 
The small numbers of Spaniards, their confinement in the cities, and their 
relatively limited objective meant that they did not initially have a great effect on the 
Philippine social and political structures that they came in contact with. Instead, the 
Spanish became just one more power among many, with their advantage being their 
perceived military strength.  The Filipinos therefore reacted to the Spanish according to 
their traditional methods of warfare—either by evasion, resistance, or alliances, 
sometimes through a combination of all of three.64   
Filipinos who were initially unaware of the Spanish military capabilities tried 
open resistance at first, but the Spanish eventually impressed the Filipinos with their 
military prowess. Perhaps the loud Spanish cannons, the big ships, metal armour, 
firearms and steel swords made the Spanish seem like very spiritually powerful warriors 
to the Filipinos. The Spanish also fought with more determination and aggression than 
was common in Filipino military culture—charging to close quarters and risking 
casualties. For example, in the case of both the Cebuanos under Tupas and the people of 
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Manila under Soliman—the Filipinos first tried to fight the Spanish, but after being 
defeated, they learned to avoid head-on confrontations. 
Once the Filipinos recognized Spanish martial prowess, they reacted according to 
tradition and decamped—they avoided direct confrontations by abandoning their 
settlements. Whenever the Spanish entrada approached, the Filipinos would leave their 
homes and flee to the hills and forests. Sometimes they would ambush and skirmish with 
the Spanish: the first Spanish casualty in the Legazpi Expedtion was the victim of a 
Philippine ambush. Even indigenous settlements with fortifications, like the walled 
settlement in what is now Manila, were abandoned in the face of Spanish aggression.65 
Eventually, most Filipinos chose to avoid the Spanish and previously populous 
settlements like Sugbu in the Visayas were depopulated as a result of Spanish contact.66 
The first bishop of Manila, Domingo de Salazar, was moved to complain to Philip II that 
areas around Manila, like Tondo, had been abandoned by the Filipinos because of the 
abuses of the Spaniards. He noted that the Filipino chiefs who remained were forced to 
pay for the tributes of their departed followers from their own resources.67 
Theoretically, the Spanish behavior ought not have been unfamiliar to the 
Filipinos—their demands of tribute, wealth and labor in return for submission and 
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ostensible protection should have made them seem just like any other men of prowess.68 
Unfortunately, the Spanish were generally not good overlords. As Martín de Rada 
indicated, the Spanish promises of alliance often proved hollow since they demanded 
gold and loot without offering anything, even protection, in return. In his letter of 
complaint to Philip II, Rada described how an anonymous Filipino shouted to some 
Spaniards “What did our fathers do to you, or what debt did they owe you, that you now 
come to rob us?”69 Indeed, the Filipinos tended to regard the Spaniards with hatred and 
suspicion and thought of them as “usurpers, faithless pirates and shedders of human 
blood.”70 This behavior may have been what provoked resistance or flight in the majority 
of the Filipinos. 
The Filipinos did not just flee, however: they also continued their practice of 
asymmetric or indirect warfare.71 The conquistadores were perhaps emphasizing 
“dishonorable” tactics when they complained that the Filipinos employed “ambushes and 
traitorous stratagems” and killing those Spaniards who were unwise enough to go off on 
their own. But such acts were in keeping with the prehispanic Filipino culture of war, 
which included forms of indirect warfare.72   
                                                
68 Sitoy, A History of Christianity in the Philippines, 192, for Spanish claims of extending protection in 
return for submission. 
69 Schumacher, Readings in Philippine Church History, 23. 
70 Rosario M. Cortes, Pangasinan: 1572-1800, (Quezon City, Philippines: University of the Philippines 
Press, 1974), 72. 
71 Sitoy, A History of Christianity in the Philippines, 199-201. 
72 Schumacher, Readings in Philippine Church History, 25. 
32 
However, some Filipinos did collaborate with the Spaniards—and they benefited 
from the association. This collaboration happened very early in the conquest: Tupas and 
the datu of Manila all chose to ally themselves with the Spanish and quickly began to 
press their new allies for military aid.73 For instance, Juan de Salcedo may have launched 
some of his entradas at the instigation of his local allies.74 The datu of Cebu, Tupas, also 
began to pressure Legazpi for military aid, which put Legazpi in an awkward position 
since he did not wish to antagonize any natives but could also not afford to appear weak 
to his native allies.75 The Filipinos even tried to tie the Spanish more closely through 
marriage, a common technique in cementing alliances in prehispanic politics.76 
Indeed, the bulk of manpower in the entradas were Filipinos and it is hard to 
imagine these ostensibly Spanish expeditions succeeding without Filipino guides, rowers, 
navigators and logistical support. According to Pedro Chirino: 
Not only did they [the friendly Filipinos] provide sustenance; they also served as 
guides in the exploration and subjection of the other islands as far as that of 
Manila, which was their center and capital.77 
Noelle Rodriguez theorized that Juan de Salcedo’s expeditions to Mindoro and 
Luzon were probably thought of as ngayaw raids by his Filipino allies. They certainly 
benefited from these expeditions since Salcedo shared the loot and slaves he gained with 
                                                
73 See also Blair and Robertson, The Philippine Islands, 10:43. 
74 Rodriguez, Juan de Salcedo Joins the Native Form of Warfare, 162. 
75 Cushner, The Isles of the West, 83; Martin J. Noone, The Islands Saw It: The Discovery and Conquest of 
the Philippines, (Ireland: Helicon Press, 1982), 355-356. 
76 Pedro S. Chirino, Relacion de las Islas Filipinas, trans. Ramón Echevarria, (Manila: The Historical 
Conservation Society), 238. 
77 Ibid., 238. 
33 
his Filipino allies. To the Filipino warriors, Salcedo acted much like a particularly 
successful and warlike datu.78  
This state of affairs could not last since it conflicted with the original aims of the 
Spanish crown and aroused the ire of the Spanish missionaries who had accompanied the 
Legazpi Expedition. These missionaries did not object to the Spanish presence in the 
Philippines per se—what they were against was the violence of the conquistadores and 
they also believed that the encomenderos were not living up to their duties of protecting 
the indios or providing them with Catholic instruction.79 The Spanish concern for the 
justness of their claims to the Philippines involved more than legalese: there was a 
genuine concern that Spanish authority in the archipelago had to be legitimate. The 
Spanish appealed to the Church in the belief that Episcopal blessing would legitimize the 
Spanish empire.80 The Philippines was hence affected by the campaigns of priests like 
Bartolomé de las Casas and Francisco de Vitoria. These prelates argued that the Spanish 
conquest was violent and cruel, and because the conquistadores did not convert the 
natives the Spanish rule in the New World was illegitimate. The only way to legitimize 
the Spanish presence in the Philippines was to give primacy to the evangelizing mission, 
with the secular colonial governments only working in support of this spiritual 
endeavor.81 The Philippine-based priests Diego de Herrera, Martín de Rada and Domingo 
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de Salazar clearly echoed the anti-conquistador sentiments of the New World 
advocates.82  
These debates in Spain had a direct impact on the subsequent interactions between 
the Spanish and the Filipinos. This was so because the very Catholic Philip II reacted to 
these priestly complaints by attempting to put the Spanish conquest of the Philippines on 
what he felt was a more legal and moral footing. The clerics in the Philippines sent 
reports and complaints, like the long letter sent by the Manila Synod in 1582 that strongly 
condemned the violence of the conquistadores.83 Philip II reacted to these priestly 
complaints by trying to rein in violent behavior and limiting the secular Spanish presence, 
although given the limited numbers of Spanish immigrants coming to the Philippines, this 
law may simply have reinforced an already existing trend.84  
Whether due to circumstance or design, the Spanish presence in the Philippines 
would come to be primarily religious and as a result, the missionaries of the various 
religious orders would often be the only Spaniards the Filipinos ever saw.85 In 1594, 
Philip II issued a cedula or a decree to the governor-general of the Philippines, Gómez 
Pérez de Dasmariñas, wherein he announced the dispatch of “one hundred religious” to 
the Philippines. These were from the priestly orders: Jesuits, Augustinians, Dominicans, 
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Franciscans and, later, Recollects.86 Each of the Orders was given a section of the 
Philippines in which to operate and this system would continue without much change 
until the end of the Spanish colonial period.87 Because the Spanish equated conversion to 
Christianity with acceptance of Spanish rule, the missionaries were therefore also Spain’s 
main agents of conquest.88 
The missionaries gave the Spanish king an acceptable way of maintaining a 
permanent presence in the Philippines and the missionary endeavor was therefore a blend 
of religious and secular ideas of conquest.89 This was still conquest in that the Spanish 
maintained political, military and economic control over the Philippine Islands, although 
now this secular presence was to support the missionary endeavor: 
For the execution of his [the King’s] mission he can send men to give security to 
the ministers of the Gospel, and to protect the recently converted Christians, and 
to do in their land whatever should be necessary for the temporal government in 
order to obtain this spiritual end, which is free conversion to the faith and the 
preservation in it once it is accepted.”90 
In other words, the religious conquest of the Philippines entailed a close 
association of the crown and the church—a combination that would persist until the very 
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end of the Spanish colonial era.91 This clerical domination of the Philippines was not a 
disadvantage at first since the missionaries probably turned out to be far better 
“conquerors” than the conquistadores.  
To begin with, both the missionaries and the Filipinos had a very similar 
understanding of power—that it was underpinned and legitimized by spirituality. What 
underlay this shared understanding was a fundamental similarity in the Spanish and 
Philippine worldviews. As Aguilar has argued: 
At the time of the conquest, the indio and the Spaniard shared an intrinsically 
similar worldview founded upon a solid belief in a nonmaterial yet palpable 
reality, particularly in a decentralized preternatural domain populated by spirit-
beings with power to affect and even determine worldly affairs. With that spiritual 
realm humans communicated through words and actions performed by individuals 
possessing specialized sacral knowledge, hence the mediating role of priests and 
shamans.92 
The friars’ conquista espiritual hinged on the Filipinos’ voluntary acceptance of 
Christianity and its attendant culture. There was a stress, for instance, on translation, and 
the friars did their best to learn the local language. 93 The goal was to avoid baptisms 
undertaken despite lacked understanding of Christian dogma.94 Perhaps no better 
example of Spanish efforts at translation was the Doctrina Christiana, published in 1593, 
and which laid out Christian doctrine in Spanish and Romanized Tagalog.  
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The friars also relied on charismatic methods to entice the Filipinos into 
converting.95 Most dramatically, the friars often directly challenged Filipino belief by 
“challenging” sacred groves, idols or mountains. The friars’ goal was to show the evil or 
weakness of these spiritual items—whose power the Europeans attributed to the Devil—
and the supremacy of the Christian God.96 The friar-chronicler Marcelo de Ribadeneira 
gave an example of this approach in his Historia del Archipielago, when a certain Fray 
Pedro Ferrer climbed what could only have been Mayon volcano in Camarines to prove 
the Filipinos wrong. The Filipinos believed that the mountain was a site of great spiritual 
power, and none dared climb it for spiritual and practical reasons. Some Filipinos tried to 
accompany Ferrer up the mountain, but only one made it up to the summit with him. The 
arduous trip impressed the populace—it was an act of spiritual power and a superhuman 
feat, and led to many conversions.97 The friars also challenged the catalonan and 
babaylanes, the native priests and priestesses. They frequently burnt the anito used by 
these persons or challenged their “magical” powers.98 
Not surprisingly, the Filipinos came to look upon the friars as men of spiritual 
prowess. How could they not? The friars displayed many of the qualities of men of 
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prowess.99 For instance, they displayed great bravery in venturing into hostile territory on 
their own. They were charismatic speakers who talked to the Filipinos in local languages. 
They claimed to be in communication with powerful spirits. Finally, they possessed items 
of great power, like crosses, Bibles or holy water.   
For instance, flooding had forced the Jesuit Pedro Chirino to relocate his church 
to higher and drier ground. Unfortunately this ground was also the town cemetery and the 
Filipinos at first refused to move there. But when it came time to dismantle the old 
church and move the last items from it, including the cemetery’s cross, suddenly all of 
the villagers made haste to join Chirino in the new village, not even waiting for houses 
for their families, but crowding in the few houses that had been built. When Chirino 
asked why they had suddenly rushed to the new village, he was told that “they were 
suffering from the nightly haunting of demons in the village where they lived because it 
was without church or cross, and none dared sleep in it at night.”100  
The friars acted like men of prowess in other ways. Like datus, they held feasts 
where they shared their food with their followers.101 The friars often defended the 
Filipinos from the depredations of the conquistadores and the secular government and 
invaders.102 One Recollect, Fray Pedro de San Agustín, was so versed in military matters 
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that he successfully organized and defended his parishioners from the famous Sultan 
Kudarat of Magindanao, thereby earning the nickname “El Padre Kapitán.”103 
Despite their charismatic approach, the Spanish missionaries’ proselytizing efforts 
bore fruit only slowly. One major obstacle to these efforts was the dispersal of the 
Filipinos. This dispersal was a result of pre-existing settlement patterns, but it was 
exacerbated by the fact that decampment continued to be the typical Filipino response to 
aggression. As Martín de Rada ruefully noted, the “adults were prone to taking off for the 
hills” whenever they knew the Spanish were around.104 The small number of Spanish 
friars available for missionary work further slowed the pace of conversion.105 
The solution was to gather the Filipinos into more compact settlements, into 
towns and villages. This was the reducción, the “reduction,” that aimed at resettling 
Filipinos so they lived “bajo de las campañas” or “under the bells”—literally, under the 
bells of the local church.  The Filipinos resisted this resettlement. The Archbishop of 
Manila, Miguel García Serrano wrote to Philip II: 
Although it is impossible to deny that the natives would be better instructed and 
would live in more orderly ways if the small villages were to be reduced to the 
capital, making one or two settlements of each benefice, they consider it such an 
affliction to leave their little houses where they were born and have been reared, 
their fields, and their other comforts of life, that it could only be attained with 
difficulty, and little fruit would result therefrom.106 
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The Filipinos were very slow to convert and accept the reducción, and until well 
into the early 17th century the numbers of Filipinos living in them was quite small.107 The 
missionaries eventually succeeded in attracting and resettling larger numbers of Filipinos 
into the new poblaciónes, but it was the slow work of decades, if not centuries. 
For those Filipinos who did live in the new towns and villages, the Spanish began 
a process of acculturation. The missionaries defined conversion as cultural change, and 
they deplored what they saw as the violence and immorality of prehispanic culture.  For 
starters, the Spanish disapproved of the lack of urbanism in Philippine culture, equating it 
with backwardness.108 They also claimed that the lack of a centralized government or 
ruler created opportunities for the datus to become petty princelings oppressing the 
ordinary people.109  
The friars tried to stamp out slavery, the Filipino cultural institution that they 
found the most repugnant. The Spanish had great difficulty in understanding Filipino 
slavery because of its marked differences from European concepts of slavery.110 The 
Spanish seem to have objected to the alipin sa gigilid or “household slaves” the most 
since these resembled chattel slaves, although the Spanish also disliked and consequently 
abolished debt bondage and, more crucially, slave-raiding.111 The abolition of slave 
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raiding and debt bondage removed perhaps one of the most important sources of a datu’s 
captive labor and thereby removed some of their most important sources of power.  
Yet even if the former datu of the prehispanic Philippines may have lost some of 
their sources of power, they generally benefited from collaborating with the Spanish. The 
Spanish colonial authorities turned the datu into principales, a position of authority and 
privilege that was bounded by law or which was a “juridical designation… whose 
position was largely an effect of legal sanctions originating outside the barangay.”112 The 
principales had become office holders essentially working for the Spanish authorities as 
cabezas de barangay and with the honorific of don or dona added to their names.113 
While these datu-turned-principales were subject to Spanish authority (and could be 
punished for transgressions) their new positions were guaranteed by the power of the 
Spanish colonial government and were also now hereditary.  The barangay was solidified 
and stabilized as a geopolitical unit, instead of being an expression of the datu’s 
charismatic power.114 While this did not eliminate the relevance of spiritual prowess or 
charisma in Philippine power relations, it certainly changed local social dynamics. For 
one, leadership or elite status had become more exclusive since membership in the 
principales class was now largely hereditary.115 Functionally, this created a group of 
Filipinos beholden to the Spanish status quo and with an interest in preserving it.  
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Remontado 
Decampment or flight from the Spanish remained an important form of resistance. 
The continued viability of flight stemmed from two factors. First, the mountains and 
forests of the Philippines continued to offer admirable sites of refuge. Second, the 
Spanish pattern of conquest and rule, with its stress on centralizing and gathering 
populations, meant that simply staying away from the towns and villages created by the 
reducción placed a Filipino outside the Spanish power structure. 
This state of affairs turned the human geography of the Philippines into a physical 
expression of political and social space. Towns and villages represented Christianity and 
acceptance of Hispanization and rule, whereas living in the mountains and forests far 
from these towns represented continued attempts at independence. In the early part of the 
Spanish colonial era, the Filipinos living away from the villages kept up the prehispanic 
Philippine culture. Chirino, for instance, noted that when the Jesuits founded towns and 
villages began to attract more and more Filipinos from the hills, those who stayed away 
were usually catolonan, or the native priests.116 
The various Filipino rebellions against Spain were the most dramatic 
manifestation of how flight away from the Spanish towns and villages to the mountains 
represented a rejection of Spanish authority and were a form resistance. A few examples 
will support the point: 
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A tribe in Cagayan called the Mandaya had twice attempted to escape en masse 
from the new villages where the Dominicans had resettled them, and they finally 
succeeded in the third attempt, sparking what was known as the Mandaya Revolt in the 
1620s.117 The immediate cause of the revolt was the abuses of the local alcalde-mayor 
and commandant of the fort overseeing the newly settled Mandaya, one Sargento Mayor 
Don Marcos Zapata, who had maltreated the wife of one of the tribe’s principalia by 
forcing her to pound rice.118 The Mandaya almost immediately fled to the hills, but before 
they abandoned their settlements they first slew and desecrated the bodies of some local 
Spanish priests and also destroyed the relics in the church—an explicit display of how the 
Filipinos linked Spanish rule with Christianity and its representatives.119  
At about the same time, the Recollects in Mindanao found themselves dealing 
with a rebellion in Caragas, Mindanao in 1629. The cause of the revolt was unknown, 
although it might have been instigated by the Muslims of Jolo. The Caragans were only 
marginally Christianized and the rebel leaders specifically targeted priests and Christian 
symbols in a sign of defiance. For instance, a rebel chief named Mangabo  
Took a holy crucifix, and, breaking off the arms said: “God of the Castilians, fight 
with me; come let us see whether you are as brave as I.” And drawing his varalao 
or cris, he struck it crosswise through the face, and cleft it... Then he threw down 
                                                
117 Blair and Robertson, The Philippine Islands, 32:147. 
118 Blair and Robertson, The Philippine Islands, 35:47-48. 
119 Blair and Robertson, The Philippine Islands, 32:149-150 and 35:51. A few Mandaya stayed faithful to 
the Spanish and, perhaps equally tellingly, went to great efforts to protect one of the priests. These 
Mandaya also relied on decampment, fleeing with the priest away from the rebels. 
44 
another holy crucifix of greater stature, and cut it into bits with an ax, defying it to 
fight.120 
The Caragans then abandoned their villages and roamed up and down the area, 
attacking other priests or friars and attempting to incite other groups to revolt. They were 
eventually suppressed through a combination of military action and negotiation. 
The 1620s must have been a very bad decade for the Spanish since in 1622, 
another revolt broke out in Bohol and Leyte. According to Murillo Velarde,  
The divata, or demon, appeared to some Indians in the woods…and commanded 
them to quit the gospel ministers and the Spanish vassalage, and take refuge in the 
hills; and to build him a chapel, where he would aid them and give them whatever 
they needed to pass their lives in happiness and abundance, without the 
encumbrance of paying tribute to the Spaniards or dues to the churches.121 
This revolt was stirred up by two former babaylanes, the Visayan equivalent of 
catalonan or native priests, who had never joined in the reducción and had been 
wandering the countryside, maintaining their ancient faith. They promised the Filipinos 
that the rebellion would receive supernatural aid: mountains would rise up to fight the 
Spanish, they would be resurrected by diwata if slain, and that Spanish musket bullets 
would be ineffective.  
The rebels desecrated rosaries, crosses, and other religious symbols before 
burning churches and then fled to the hills. The Spanish sent an armed expedition—
composed mostly of other Filipinos—against the rebels, and this force eventually 
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managed to eventually subdue the revolt. In the mountains, the Spanish found another 
temple to the diwata and a redoubt where the rebels had retreated.122 
A final example was the 1645 revolt by Bancao, a chieftain of Leyte.123 Bancao 
had been chief of Limasawa and he had also been one of the first Filipinos to welcome 
Miguel López de Legazpi and convert in the 1560s. But he decided to become an apostate 
in his old age.124 The rebels had also desecrated religious symbols and harassed Spanish 
priests, chasing them away from their villages. Bancao claimed that the revolt would 
succeed because of magical aid: that merely saying the word bato would turn the Spanish 
into stone, and that flinging earth or clay at the Spanish would do the same. The rebels 
immediately fled to the hills with the arrival of a Spanish expedition sent to quell the 
uprising. The expedition—which included many Filipinos—chased the rebels up into the 
hills where they found a shrine set up to worship a diwata.  
These revolts had some similarities: they were rejections of Spanish authority by 
Filipinos, but tended to be localized or specific in their grievances. None had anything 
approaching nationalistic overtones. The Filipinos would begin their revolts by attacking 
priests and religious symbols, underlining their understanding of Spanish authority as 
being represented by the local Spanish priest and based on spiritual power. Attacking the 
Christian symbols therefore represented an attack on Spanish power, perhaps weakening 
it and its hold over the Filipinos. The Filipinos would then invariably flee from their 
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villages, either at the outset of the revolt or upon contact with the expeditions the Spanish 
would send to quell these revolts. Up in the mountains, the Filipinos would often still 
have shrines and priests to their old religions, physical proof of their rejection of 
Hispanization and Hispanic authority in the form of a rejection of Christianity. Finally, 
the leaders of these revolts tended to be from the principalia, or the “principal men” of 
the local communities, either former datus or native priests.125 
The Spanish responded with a combination of the carrot and the stick. First, the 
friars sanctioned the use of force against apostate Filipinos. Once the Filipinos had 
accepted Spanish authority and Christianity, then any form of rebellion or resistance 
could be legitimately quashed using violence through arms. Secondly, the bulk of the 
manpower in these expeditions were other Filipinos. Thus, despite their use of force, the 
Spanish friars continued their attempts at negotiation, and many of these revolts were 
diffused by a combination of negotiation and repression.  
Decampment as a form of resistance did not always assume the dramatic form of 
rebellion. Very many Filipinos either simply refused to live in the new towns and 
villages, or left after living there for a while, or lived far away from it. The Spanish called 
those who escaped from the reducción the remontados, “those who returned to the 
mountains” and a term that also neatly highlights the role of mountains as a source of 
Philippine resistance.126The remontado included the pagan groups who had never been 
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Christianized or subjugated, but it also included apostates or those who wished to escape 
Spanish rule: 
In these forests and hills live many people of different tribes mixed together, 
Christians and pagans. Some are there because they are attracted to the mountains 
from which they came. Others are fugitives from justice. Many likewise to live 
there at their ease and be free from paying tribute and from fulfillment of other 
obligations laid on them.127 
The image of the remontado as a pagan and the mountains as zones of primitivism 
or “uncivilization” seems deceptive, however. Perhaps there was never a sharp divide 
between “civilized towns” and “savage forests”—the Filipinos of the towns and villages 
retained much of their prehispanic culture, and created a syncretic Christianity, while not 
all of the remontado were reprobate apostates. More than being sanctuaries for paganism 
or remnant prehispanic culture, those living in the mountains probably represented an 
attempt to reduce contact or escape from as much of Spanish authority as possible. This 
can be seen by the fact that there were substantial numbers of Filipinos who lived 
between the remontados and the town dwellers. This frontier population of Filipinos was 
difficult to count and proved an endless source of headaches for both Spanish civilian 
authorities and priests. For one, it was difficult to extract taxes, tribute or labor form 
them.128 For another, it was difficult to keep these frontier Filipinos orthodox, since they 
often did not see any Spanish priests for religious instruction. The friars had to rely on the 
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visita, the occasional “visit” from a priest, to keep such people in the faith and there were 
communities that did not even have this minimal contact.129  
In a sense, the colonial-era Philippine political environment was not so different 
from the prehispanic political map. The power and authority of Spain was dependent on 
the charisma and influence of the friars, and Spanish authority therefore radiated 
outwards from the towns and villages where it was at its strongest right by the church. 
The Filipinos who wished to associate themselves with the Spanish logically tried to 
position themselves close to the center of power, hence why the principalia or native elite 
built their houses close to the church.130 The priestly power—so dependent on sermons, 
sacraments and his personal example—was therefore as rooted in spiritual charisma and 
personal attraction as the datu’s power had been and the friar’s power and influence 
faded as one traveled away from the church. This greatly resembled the mandala ordering 
of states of prehispanic Philippines and of the rest of Southeast Asia—which was best 
illustrated by Benedict Anderson, who likened the political power of a chieftain to the 
light of a lamp, strongest at the source, weaker at the periphery, where it might even have 
to contend with the power of neighboring chiefs.131 
Over time, the Spanish missionaries made a good deal of headway in stamping 
out paganism except among the most isolated of people in the hinterlands. Even 
remontado or rebellious Filipinos no longer rejected Christianity as such but they 
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continued to decamp and flee to the hills as a way of removing themselves from Spanish 
authority. The Dagohoy Rebellion of 1744 is an excellent example of this phenomenon. 
This was the longest-running revolt in colonial history, ending only in 1829, or 85 years 
after it first broke out. Dagohoy was a cabeza de barangay, who had taken umbrage at 
the fact that the local Jesuit priest had denied his brother a Christian burial.132 Dagohoy 
and about 3,000 followers fled up into the hills of Bohol in the Visayas after killing some 
Jesuits and there they successfully held out for almost a century. Despite their killing of 
the Jesuits, the rebels later asked for and received baptisms and confessions from 
Recollects sent to pacify them—they never rejected Christianity. The rebels did deny the 
Recollects’ attempts to have priests sent up to the mountains, and they continued to 
maintain themselves outside of Spanish authority. 
Collaboration and Syncretism 
Despite their suppression of slave-raiding, the Spanish never completely 
eliminated all forms of warfare and combat in the Philippines. The Filipinos initially kept 
up their practice of indigenous martial arts. Pedro Chirino writing in 1604 described the 
Filipinos as still using swords, spears and shields and that those who lived near the sea 
still carried out piratical acts.133 As lately as 1594, he described a skirmish between 
Visayans and Negritos, where the Visayans enslaved the latter in retaliation for a 
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murder.134 Likewise, Antonio de Morga described Filipinos as still using spears, swords 
and shields in 1609—some forty years after the Spanish conquest.135 
The Spanish made use of native martial skills which meant that while Filipinos 
could no longer openly employ arms and armed force on their own initiative or for their 
own political ends, they could still legally practice combat in the service of Spanish 
causes. The Spanish continued to use native warriors in their expeditions, letting the 
Filipinos ply their martial skills—on land and at sea—in fights against rebels, Muslims 
from Mindanao, or against Spain’s European enemies.  
However, the Spanish seemed to have disarmed or suppressed native martial 
abilities enough that the Visayans began to suffer from raids from the Muslims of 
Mindanao.136 The Spanish were constantly reporting depredations against “friendly 
Indians” and were compelled to occasionally attack Mindanao in an attempt to stop these 
raids. Alternatively, the Spanish eventually trained Filipinos to fight in European styles. 
No in depth research has yet been done in this area, but in 1636, Governor Hurtado de 
Corcuera wrote to Philip IV indicating that he had started training Filipinos to fight in 
what appears to be in a European manner. 
I ordered two hundred Pampangos to be enrolled into two companies, so that now 
there are the six hundred necessary guardsmen. The Pampangos are in place of the 
two hundred Spaniards who went [to Ternate]. Seeing that said Spaniards are 
lacking, there is nothing but to appeal to the Pampangos; they are being 
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instructed, and are managing their arms in a manner that makes me very well 
satisfied with them.137 
Corcuera also noted that the alcalde-mayor of Cebu had armed and trained the 
Cebuanos with firearms and pikes, so they could form a militia to fight off the Moro 
raids.138  
By the 18th century, some Filipinos had been trained and integrated into the 
regular Spanish army. When the English arrived in 1761, among the garrison of Manila 
were 80 native artillerists.139 It says much of the Europeanization of Filipino combat 
culture that they were trained and entrusted with valuable and destructive cannons.   
The Filipinos therefore had a continuing martial tradition under the Spanish aegis. 
What this meant was that the native attitudes and ideas on war and combat had a chance 
to syncretize with Christianity and the imported Spanish culture. Spiritual prowess 
continued to be regarded as important in battle and items like anting anting continued to 
be used. What changed was that Catholic ideas or items like crosses, rosaries, holy water 
or Latin prayers would become part of the spiritual arsenal. Instead of deriving their 
power from sacred groves or prehispanic gods, Filipinos would claim that saints and 
scapularies rendered them bullet proof, or that angels would fight for them. For instance, 
in 1650, Filipinos living in a village called attributed the efficacy of their fort to rosary 
prayers.140As shall be examined later, this syncretism of prehispanic martial culture with 
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Christianity and Hispanization would be dramatically displayed in the uprisings in the 
19th century. 
Conclusion 
Few studies of the Philippine-American War discuss it within the context of 
Philippine military history. This oversight is unfortunate, since ideas that had their origins 
in the prehispanic period persisted until the Philippine-American War. For example, the 
idea that spiritual prowess was important to the exercise of political power has persisted 
for centuries, and leaders like Aguinaldo were believed to have supernatural abilities. 
Another important example of a prehispanic trait of Philippine culture was the tendency 
of its political situation to tend towards multi-polarity or division. There were several 
reasons for this tendency towards fragmentation: the difficult terrain of the archipelago, 
the differences in language, or the differences in religion were perhaps the most salient 
such reasons. What this chapter hoped to show, however, was that these prehispanic 
trends or ideas were also influenced by contact with Spanish culture. Philippine culture, 
martial or otherwise, did not remain static even if it did retain many elements from its 
past. 
In the area of military history, what is important to remember were the two forms 
of armed combat. The first was perhaps the last remnant of prehispanic warfare: 
decampment or flight into the forests and mountains of the interiors of the islands in the 
Philippines. This style of resistance persisted because of the geographical and political 
similarities between the Spanish colonial system and the prehispanic system. Flight away 
from the Spanish friars or soldiers was a good way of escaping their authority, and so the 
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remontado came into being. Decamping did not always involve combat—but it 
frequently did, since the remontado often had to contend with the Spanish forcibly trying 
to re-integrate them into the mainstream of colonial society. This style of warfare or 
resistance was therefore inherently decentralizing and it served to emphasize the 
multipolar tendencies inherent to Philippine culture. Finally, because the remontado style 
of resistance took people away from the Spanish cultural agents, it also encouraged a 
return to prehispanic beliefs. 
The second form of armed combat was introduced by the Spaniards, and this was 
violence deployed in the service of a centralizing government. Native Filipinos 
collaborated with the Spaniards from the very start and during the colonial period, many 
of them joined the Spanish colonial forces. Eventually, Filipinos were trained in Western-
style combat, which also became associated with centralizing or Hispanized culture. 
However, the Filipinos combined many aspects of prehispanic combat culture with 
Hispanized martial styles—for instance, the Filipinos would later produce anting anting 
that they believed made the wearer bulletproof. 
The prehispanic period and Spanish colonial period therefore produced two 
contrasting styles of warfare: a decentralizing one and a centralizing one. And despite the 
dramatic changes that would occur in the 19th century, these trends would only be 
strengthened. This was the background of Aguinaldo’s comments on “Bagong Digma.” 
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CHAPTER III 
COLONIAL TRANSFORMATION  
 
The last century and a half of Spanish colonial rule brought great changes to the 
Philippines. These changes were a result of Spanish transforming the Philippines from “a 
subsidized [Christian] mission establishment into a profitable dependency.”141 The 
Spanish also tried to “rationalize” their colonial presence, strengthening the government 
in Manila and extended the reach of the apparatuses of bureaucracy. While the Spanish 
presence was once limited to priests and a few fortified outposts, it now began to spread 
and more Filipinos came into contact with the colonial system. The reopening of the 
Philippine economy to international trade further changed the social structure, since it 
created opportunities for some Filipinos and problems for others. These changes were so 
wide-ranging that they represented what was practically a “recolonization” of the 
Philippines.142 
Despite the many economic, social and political transformations, the dual trends 
of decentralization and centralization would persist. What did change was that the 
Philippine notions of warfare and resistance were bifurcated largely along class lines.  
                                                
141 David R. Sturtevant, Popular Uprisings in the Philippines, (USA: Cornell University Press, 1976), 32. 
142 Fradera uses the term to refer to Spanish policies in 1882-1891, but it can be reasonably be applied to 
the entire century and a half prior to the American colonial period. Josep M. Fradera, “The Historical 
Origins of the Philippine Economy,” Australian Economic Review (vol. 44, no. 3, 2007), 307-320. 
55 
This bifurcation was a result of changes in the colonial social structure: a small 
number of Filipinos benefited from the new colonial system and, consequently, they 
tended to support the Spanish colonial government’s efforts at centralization and 
economic rationalization. These Filipinos can rightly be called elites due to their high 
degree of wealth, education and political influence. The Filipino elites came into conflict 
with the Spanish but their mode of resistance tended to be “conservative” in that most of 
these elites did not wish to break away from Spain or upset a colonial system from which 
they benefited. The elite forms of resistance were therefore initially non-violent and 
limited to agitation for political reform or change. 
Unlike the elites, the poorer Filipinos, like the farmers and peasants, had a 
continuing tradition of violent or armed resistance against Spain. The poorer Filipinos 
kept up the traditions of decampment because they often benefited less from the new 
colonial system and were therefore more willing to engage in the remontado form of 
resistance, which was inherently decentralizing. The remontado tradition therefore 
acquired a dimension of social protest.  
Opportunities for Some: Elite Filipinos in the 19th Century 
As described in the previous chapter, the Philippines had been a very distant 
outpost of empire, largely neglected by Spain and not worth much economically to the 
empire. Ironically, the Philippines probably had more external trade links prior to the 
Spanish conquest than afterward, since the various barangays had been in commercial 
contact with other Southeast Asian communities or with major civilizations like China. 
The Spanish had eliminated much of this trade, and the Filipinos had been forced into 
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becoming subsistence farmers. Their main contribution to the colony’s upkeep had been 
tributes to the crown and to the friars.143 The only other Spanish economic activity of 
significance was the Galleon Trade, which was the transshipment and sale of Chinese 
goods arriving in Manila to Mexico. However, even the galleon trade was not enough to 
pay for the Manila government’s expenses.144 The Philippines was therefore not a place 
that attracted Spanish colonists or generated much economic activity, and this was likely 
one of the reasons for the very limited Spanish secular presence in the Philippine Islands. 
It would be a fallacy to think that prior to the late 18th and 19th centuries that the 
Philippine economy was stagnant, with no trading going on at all, but what trade there 
was tended to be small in scale and not geared towards the maximization of profits.145 
This state of affairs came to an end in the last half of the 18th century. The main 
catalyst for change was the capture of Manila by the British in 1762, an event that 
highlighted the vulnerability of the distant colony since it also spurred the revolt led by 
Diego Silang and one by the Chinese in Manila. These crises “forced the Spaniards to 
rethink their political and economic position in Asia,” which essentially meant a re-
                                                
143 Phelan, The Hispanization of the Philippines, 93-104; Cushner, Spain in the Philippines, 101-126; 
Abinales, State and Society in the Philippines, 60-64. 
144 Leslie E. Bauzon, Defecit Government: Mexico and the Philippine Situado, (Tokyo: Centre for East 
Asian Cultural Studies, 1981) offers the best summary of the Philippine colonial government’s financial 
dependence on Mexico; see also John Bowring, A Visit to the Philippine Islands, (London: Smith, Elder & 
Co., 1859), 326. 
145 Kasaysayan 4:7; Norman G. Owen, Prosperity without Progress: Manila Hemp and Material Life in the 
Colonial Philippines, (Berkley, California: University of California, Berkley, Center for South and 
Southeast Asian Studies), 57-59. 
57 
evaluation of the Spanish position in the Philippines.146 The need or desire to change 
Spanish policy towards the Philippines was given further impetus by the loss of 
practically all of Spain’s Latin American colonies in the early 19th century—a disaster 
that also spelled the end of the Galleon Trade.147   
The Spanish tried to make the Philippines more profitable by opening it up to 
foreign trade and by developing its internal economy. It was Governor José Basco y 
Vargas (1778-87) who first tried to increase government revenues, liberalize trade and 
expand the Philippine economy.148 Many of Basco’s ventures failed or were only 
marginally successful but in the main, he was responsible for transforming the 
Philippines into an important supplier of agricultural products to the world economy.149 
Several agricultural products in particular—sugar, Manila hemp, coffee and tobacco—
became very important to the Philippine economy and accounted for the vast majority of 
commodities exported by the colony.150 The fact that the new Philippine economy relied 
primarily on exporting cash crops had a profound influence on Philippine society and 
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history: wealth and power came to depend on ownership of land, control of labor, access 
to capital and access to foreign markets.151  
Remarkably, it was not necessarily the Spaniards who benefited the most from 
these economic opportunities. While more Spaniards did migrate to the Philippines, they 
usually assumed some position in the colonial bureaucracy and did not engage in much 
trade or farming.152 Additionally, most of the Spanish traders and merchant houses that 
were in the Philippines did not thrive when exposed to the vicissitudes of the 
international economy. The export of Philippine agricultural products and the importation 
of manufactured goods were eventually dominated by foreigners.153  English and 
American merchant houses in particular became the Philippine economy’s main conduits 
to the outside world. Not only did they export and import goods, they also had access to 
foreign capital and could therefore loan money or act as investors and insurers. The 
foreign merchant houses became absolutely indispensible to the Philippine economy—
much to the disgust of the Spaniards. 
On the local level, it was Filipinos, either indio or mestizo (usually Chinese 
mestizo), who took advantage of these new economic opportunities. As Alfred McCoy 
has written, the late colonial Philippines was unique in that it had an “indigenous planter 
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class.”154 These landed Filipinos were not necessarily members of the old principalia, or 
the descendants of the datu and who held their status by heredity and control of local 
political office. Rather, the new elite gained their status through wealth, primarily 
through their control of land.155 It was also possible to participate in the new economy by 
working in a clerical capacity for either the government or the new trading houses.156 
Additionally, Filipinos could gain status by joining the growing ranks of the urban 
professionals and becoming a doctor, or a lawyer. Rizal in the late nineteenth century was 
even moved to complain in El Filibusterismo that there were already too many lawyers in 
the Philippines, a comment echoed by the two British visitors, John Bowring and John 
Foreman.157   
However, the most common way for Filipinos to participate in the new economy 
was either as farmers or as landowners.158 For the very few Filipinos who had the 
wherewithal to become landowners, the new economy offered great benefits: the chance 
to live a more comfortable life than most Filipinos, a chance to rise in status without 
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having to be a member of the traditional principalia, opportunities for education, and a 
chance to benefit from the influx of new products and ideas from the outside world.  
At the start of this period, the traditional principalia were best placed to buy up 
land—they had already been doing that for the past few centuries.159 However, the 
traditional principalia were joined by mestizos, generally Chinese-Filipino mestizos, who 
had the money or capital from trade to buy up the land and were legally allowed to do so, 
unlike the Chinese.160 The principalia and the mestizos intermarried in time, although the 
new elites—the ilustrados— were largely mestizos and oriented towards trade.161 Land 
became a major commodity, which was bought up through fair means or foul. 162 
These landed elites were not a homogenous class: the spectrum of wealth or land 
ownership could be quite wide. Some elites owned considerable land and were very 
wealthy—they were able to loan money or had sufficient capital to engage in all sorts of 
business dealings in more than one province. Others were more modest in their wealth, 
and although they still might own a few hundred hectares of land in scattered plots, their 
economic activities and political and social influence were usually limited to one 
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province.163 There were also differences in education, with some of the new economic 
elites being highly educated—they had studied in the best Spanish schools in Manila and 
a few had even gone on to study in universities in Europe. Others were far less educated: 
for instance, the wealthy elite of Cebu did not share in the academic attainments of their 
Luzon-based peers.164 As Michael Cullinane noted, the richest Filipinos tended to be 
urban dwellers with extensive economic and social networks, and they lived lives far 
removed from other Filipinos. Other elites—what he called municipal elites—were rich 
and powerful only in their local, rural communities and had far more extensive contacts 
with poor peasants and workers. 165 
Despite these very important differences, the members of this economic 
superstratum did have two important commonalities. First, despite the disparities in 
wealth, influence, and education, they were all better off and more comfortable than the 
vast majority of Filipinos. Secondly, they clearly benefited from the current economic 
and political system and they therefore had a stake in maintaining both. The Spaniards 
perhaps recognized this and a lot of power and responsibility devolved into elite Filipino 
hands. 
As to the first point, the very richest Filipinos had very luxurious lifestyles 
indeed, especially in comparison to their poor tenants. The houses of the wealthier 
inhabitants of Manila were  
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Large and many European fashions have been introduced: the walls covered  
with painted paper, many lamps hung from the ceiling, Chinese screens, porcelein 
jars with natural or artificial flowers, mirrors, tables, sofas, chairs, and such as are 
seen in European capitals.166 
The rich planters of Negros often spent their evenings indulging in fancy balls 
where they dressed in elegant clothes, in stark contrast to how their workers spent their 
evenings.167 The houses of wealthy Filipino were large, spacious and elegant, large 
wood-and-stone dwellings with airy rooms and capiz windows.168 
These new Filipino elites also associated themselves quite closely with Spanish 
culture and they adopted Spanish dress, architecture and lifestyles. A select few were 
educated in Spanish schools, either in the Philippines or in Spain itself. In these schools, 
the ilustrado—the name given to the educated and Hispanized literati—learned classical 
European fencing, read Spanish literature and some even wrote more floridly than the 
already florid Spanish style in an attempt be more Spanish than the Spaniards. There is no 
better example of the wannabe-Spaniard than the bombastic and pretentious Pedro 
Paterno, but other ilustrado like Jose Rizal or Juan Luna dressed, painted and wrote in 
Spanish styles.169 Even the Filipinos with far less wealth, like the municipal elites, built 
and decorated their houses in Spanish styles.  
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As to the second point, it is clear that most of the privileged Filipinos benefited 
from the economic system. Their wealth and power could not be sustained if their 
property and persons were not protected, if trade routes, ports or roads were disrupted, if 
they were not given ready access to foreign capital or markets, or if their workers could 
move freely or demand more pay or benefits. The elites tended to support policies or 
structures that protected them and upheld their privilege and, as we shall see, they tended 
to oppose whatever went against their interests. The Spanish colonial regime and the 
elites consequently developed a symbiotic relationship—the Spanish were aware that the 
money that flowed into their coffers was because of the endeavors of their rich Filipino 
subjects and did much to protect elite Filipino interests.  
An important example of Spanish-elite collaboration was in the realm of politics. 
The Spanish placed a lot of power into local hands, and in one way or another, rich 
Filipinos ended up as the main power holders in their communities.170 This sort of 
collaboration was nothing new—the datu of prehispanic society had been turned into 
hereditary principalia who ruled over their local communities with Spanish consent. 
What changed in the 19th century was that the Spanish allowed more people to become 
gobernadorcillos—the title later changed to capitán municipal—or the highest town 
official or municipal official. Previously, only the hereditary principalia could become 
gobernadorcillo, so by allowing wealthy mestizos and indios to become politicians, the 
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Spanish expanded the number of Filipinos who participated in the ruling of the colony.171 
By 1847, the basic requirements were that the candidate be  
A native or Chinese mestizo, a resident of the town, at least 25 years of age, able 
to read, write, and speak Spanish and an ex-Teniente Mayor (Deputy Gobernadorcillo) or 
cabezas de barangay with good record [chief of the barangay, the political division lower 
than town or municipality].172  
These requirements were not easily met since Spanish literacy and fluency 
required some sort of an education, which was beyond most Filipinos’ means. 
Theoretically, being a gobernadorcillo also required a fair bit of money since these 
officials had to pay out of their own pockets for any shortfalls in tax collection or tribute 
gathering—and the gobernadorcillo’s salary could be quite insufficient for this 
purpose.173 However, elected Filipino officials were not necessarily the rich and powerful 
of their local communities and in fact, the very richest Filipinos very often went out of 
their way to avoid having to serve in office.174 This was not a given everywhere in the 
Philippines: in Cagayan, the principales sought out the office of gobernadorcillo because 
of the benefits it brought due to the government’s Tobacco Monopoly.175 But whether or 
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not the wealthy elite held the actual office, competition to control or influence political 
power one way or another was seen as desirable and the new Spanish rules allowed the 
new economic elites to participate in local politics in one way or another. In turn, these 
landowning and commerce-oriented Filipinos exerted a lot of effort in being the power 
behind the scenes even if they did not occupy elected positions themselves.176 For a 
group of native elites, local politics became the main focus of their public lives: these 
were the “municipal elites” or Filipinos who were modestly wealthy and influential only 
in their local communities.177 
But perhaps the new law enforcement agencies created in the 19th century were 
the best example of how the privileged class of Filipinos and the Spanish colonial regime 
collaborated or cooperated to maintain the existing economic system. Prior to the 19th 
century, law enforcement in the Philippines was handled either by the army or by local 
militias.178 Rising banditry in the last half of the 18th century prompted the Spanish to 
create the cuerpo de cuadrilleros in the mid-19th century, a rural police force whose 
main role was to “pursue bandits, whose capture or death was encouraged by a system of 
rewards.”179 The cuadrilleros were a very good example of Spanish-principales 
collaboration, since its local units were under the command of the gobernadorcillo and 
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one or two other subordinate municipal officers, all of whom were drawn from the elites 
of the local community.180 Command of this semi-military constabulary force was 
probably the first or only experience of military operations of many future leaders of the 
1896 Revolution and the Philippine-American War.  
Even the Guardia Civil, another law enforcement agency created by the 
Spaniards, showed how the principales and the Spanish colonial regime cooperated to 
maintain the status quo. The Guardia Civil was a gendarmerie, a paramilitary force that, 
like the cuadrilleros, was specifically tasked with upholding rural peace and security 
when the poorly armed, poorly trained and under-manned cuadrilleros proved 
inadequate.181 The Guardia Civil was no longer under the command of local officials, 
and it was one of the manifestations of the trends towards centralization in colonial 
affairs.182 Perhaps as a result of this centralized control, the Guardia Civil earned the ire 
of most Filipinos, including that of the new economic elites who accused the Guardia 
Civil of corruption, high-handedness and of meddling in local affairs. However, the elites 
did not object with the Guardia Civil’s fundamental mission, since the organization’s 
enforcement of the Spanish laws meant that the Guardia Civil protected the roads, ports, 
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farms and towns upon which the principalia relied—not to mention protecting their lives 
and property against increasing numbers of rural bandits.183  
Elite Forms of Resistance 
The principalia’s attitudes toward the Guardia Civil perhaps mirrored their 
attitudes toward the Spanish colonial system in general: their complaints tended to 
revolve around who was in charge but they did not object to the social, political and 
economic system of the colony which was structured to their benefit.  Elite resistance 
therefore tended to be limited and conservative in outlook—it was not “revolutionary” in 
the sense that it wished to completely re-order society.  
A universal element of elite discontent was widespread resentment towards the 
friars, or the religious Orders, like the Franciscans, Augustinians, and the Jesuits. Rightly 
or wrongly, the elite Filipinos were of the opinion that the Spanish friars were the ones 
most responsible for holding them back. This antipathy was understandable since the 
Spanish friars were a major source of trouble for the rich Filipinos. While the Spanish 
government was theoretically moving towards greater centralization and secularization, it 
could not avoid the fact that the local friar was usually the only representative of the 
Spanish Crown in his community and he was also usually the only Spaniard in the towns 
or villages who was literate and familiar with bureaucratic procedure. All this meant that 
the Spanish government continued to give friars important roles in local governance—the 
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Spanish friars were involved in everything from elections and law enforcement to the 
day-to-day running of the community and therefore remained extremely powerful men.184 
It was almost inevitable that the friars should come into competition with the rising new 
Filipino elites, but especially with the modestly wealthy municipal elites in the 
countryside. During elections, for instance, the Spanish friars often had a “faction” that 
fielded a candidate who could be expected to carry out the friar’s political agenda. This 
led to bitter electoral fights between municipal elites and the friars.185 
The friars were also unhappy with the opening up of the Philippines to trade and 
foreign influence and they frequently tried to slow or stop it. 186 In October 1820, the 
Filipinos of Tondo rioted and killed any foreigners—Englishmen, Americans, Chinese—
they encountered. The friars were widely suspected of being responsible for fomenting 
this unrest, and as Aguilar noted:  
Although an isolated incident, the 1820 carnage encapsulated the primary tensions 
of colonial society in the early nineteenth century, created by the long-standing 
dominance of the religious orders and their opposition to the entry of foreign 
merchants capitalists who had been quietly admitted to the colony by liberal-
minded governors/captains-general from around the late 1780s.187 
Given that the Filipino elites needed these foreigners, they did not find this 
isolationist agitation very attractive. The educated Filipinos also resented the Spanish 
antipathy to foreign ideas, especially those that promoted liberty or equality.  
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Finally, the friar orders were economic competitors. Over the centuries, the 
religious Orders, “had become the largest single group of landed estate owners” and the 
friars’ landholdings apparently increased in the 19th century.188 The religious orders also 
came into conflict with their tenants and clients over issues of rent and ultimate control 
over the land.189 
Near the end of the 19th century, a few of the more Hispanized and educated 
Filipinos began to articulate their grievances against the religious orders, and in so doing, 
they began to press the colonial government for reforms to give the richer, more educated 
and more powerful Filipinos more say in the running of the Philippines. This was the 
beginning of nationalist sentiment, and perhaps it was also the beginnings of elite 
revolutionary sentiment. 190  
The most famous of those Filipinos agitating for reform were the so-called 
Propagandists. This group was composed of the expatriate Filipino community in Spain, 
the majority of whom were the scions of families with the resources to send them abroad 
for higher education. The most famous of the Propagandists include the doctor Jose 
Rizal, the journalist Marcelo H. Del Pilar, the painter Juan Luna and the dilettante 
Graciano Lopez-Jaena. They also had the qualities of typical indigenous critics of 
colonial rule: all were young men of some means, and except for Marcelo H. Del Pilar, 
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all had degrees from universities in Europe. Del Pilar was the exception since he studied 
in universities in the Philippines and traveled to Spain specifically to campaign for the 
Philippine cause—the others were there for their studies, and their Propagandist activities 
were generally a secondary consideration to their schooling. 
The Propagandists spent much of their energy in agitating for reform in Spain. 
The hope was that by wooing or convincing Spanish lawmakers through newspaper 
articles, speeches, paintings, and even dinner parties, the Filipinos would find champions 
in the otherwise inaccessible Spanish cortes. More specifically, the Propagandists wanted 
such things as the removal of Spanish monopolization of colonial offices, Philippine 
representation in the Spanish cortes and liberalization of trade in the Islands. These were 
goals born out of self-interest, but they were also informed by the Propagandists’ 
exposure to Western ideas of equality, liberalism and humanism.191 These young men 
were also increasingly aware of their own worth and talents, especially when compared to 
the rather poorly accomplished Spaniards then being sent to the Philippines to run the 
colonial bureaucracy. Second-class status began to rankle.  
The best illustration of Propagandist ideas can be found in the works of Jose 
Rizal, especially in his two novels Noli Me Tangere (“Touch Me Not”) and its sequel, El 
Filibusterismo (“The Filibustering” but also known as “The Reign of Greed”). The 
villains in the books are the Spanish friars Padre Damaso and Padre Salvi, and Rizal is 
not subtle in portraying them as unflatteringly as possible. Damaso, for instance, is loud, 
ignorant, boorish and overbearing—the very image of the arrogant and otherwise 
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unaccomplished Spaniard, blithely secure in his sense of superiority over the Filipinos 
simply by virtue of his blood. With typical Rizal sarcasm, he is described as “jolly, and if 
the sound of his voice is brusque like that of a man who has never bitten his tongue and 
who believes everything he utters is sacrosanct and cannot be improved upon.”192 The 
two friars are, between them, responsible for practically all the conflicts and ills in the 
Noli. Both friars are lecherous, lusting after Filipino women—perhaps symbolic of the 
“violation” of the Philippines by the clerical orders. The two friars are also shown either 
interfering with secular matters or getting into fights with secular authorities. In one 
scene, the local Filipino officials of a town called San Diego are debating how to arrange 
an upcoming festival. The two factions in the town engage in heated politicking, but all 
of it is for naught when it is made known that Padre Salvi’s wishes have the final say: 
“But we don’t want that!” said the young ones [town officials] and some old men. 
“The parish priest wants it this way!” repeated the Gobernadorcillo [town mayor] 
“And I promised him that his wishes would be fulfilled.” 
“Then why have you summoned us?”  
“Precisely to inform you.”193 
What Rizal’s works lack is a clear recommendation about how to solve these ills 
in colonial society. Specifically, revolution and radical change are not described 
sympathetically. In the sequel, El Filibusterismo, there are conspiracies and attempts at 
violent action and Rizal is careful to portray all these attempts at forcible change as 
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failures.  The final scene of the book involves a long exploration of the future of the 
Philippines, as Rizal’s alter-ego Ibarra discourses with a native priest (one of the few 
sympathetic priests in Rizal’s works). Anyone looking for clear endorsements of 
revolution will be disappointed since Rizal seems to advocate little more than patience 
and forbearance: 
“The school of suffering tempers; the arena of combat strengthens the soul. I do 
not mean to say that our freedom is to be won by the blade; the sword enters very 
little now in modern destinies, yes, but we must win it, deserving it, raising the 
intelligence and dignity of the individual…”194 
In the end, Rizal appeared to favor a period of education and “uplifting” for 
Filipinos before independence. The youth would be taught nationalism and patriotism and 
they would be the keys to Philippine independence. Revolution did not seem to be one of 
Rizal’s goals. 
Rizal’s ambiguity about revolution was something shared by almost all of the 
Propagandists and Rizal himself might even be seen as rather more “radical” than other 
Propagandists in his espousal of eventual independence—most never called for even this 
and were content to push for assimilation with Spain. Marcelo H. Del Pilar was the 
primary driving force behind the Propaganda Movement’s attempts at serious political 
lobbying and he did much to turn the Movement into something resembling a political 
movement. Unfortunately he received very little in the way of financial and moral 
support from other Propagandists and rich Filipinos back home.195 As Cullinane noted, it 
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was one thing to push for independence in Spain as a young student, but it was quite 
another to do so at home, when it was time to settle down and run the family business or 
find positions in the colonial government.196  
This is not to say, however, that the Propagandists did not contribute anything to 
the cause of Philippine independence.197 Many of the Propagandists’ works and writings 
did make it back to the Philippines.  As John Schumacher noted: 
To a far greater extent the Propaganda movement was a success in giving the 
people a sense of national identity and unity… Though the leaders of the 
Propaganda movement did not plan the Revolution that broke out in 1896, it was 
their ideas that caused those who did to take fire.198 
Perhaps the most important idea created by the Propagandists was that of a 
Philippine national identity. The Propagandists crafted this national identity in order to 
respond to the Spanish racial denigration of “Filipinos,” and they hoped that if the 
Spanish recognized that the Filipinos were just as civilized as Europeans, and then the 
Filipinos would be accepted as equals and be given equal political rights.199 This national 
identity was not initially created for the purposes of national liberation, but the 
Revolutionists would use this idea of national identity as a justification for revolt and as a 
rallying cry for unity.  
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Elite Filipino resistance towards Spain therefore took the form of municipal 
politicking and propagandistic agitation. None, as far as is known, actively took up arms 
against the Spanish until 1896. This absence of armed resistance towards Spain was 
likely a result of the essentially conservative nature of elite complaints—these privileged 
Filipinos had risen to their positions of prominence by taking advantage of the system 
and did not fundamentally disagree with the colonial society’s economic and social set-
up. They logically wanted to preserve the export-driven economy, they wanted to 
maintain ties to outside markets and credits, they wanted to keep their hold on their land 
and their workers, and they wanted the Philippines to be internally safe and secure 
enough to keep business going and their lifestyles (and lives) safe.  
All this meant that it is not unlikely that, if the Spanish had been willing to 
accommodate the native elite or to give them a greater share in power over colonial 
affairs, the Revolution might never have happened.200 Puerto Rico offers a parallel: the 
elites of that place also agitated for equality with Spain, and since they largely achieved 
their aims, they did not rebel against Spanish rule.201 
Difficulties for Many: Poverty and Discontent in the 19th Century 
The other side of the coin was the poor majority of indigenous Filipinos—the 
laborers, farmers, craftsmen and fishermen—in other words, the so-called “masses” that 
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made up the bulk of the Philippine population. 202 These Filipinos were also affected by 
the changing Philippine economy—and the question is how they reacted to these new 
social, political and economic pressures.  
Some poorer Filipinos probably benefited from the new colonial system, or at 
least they affiliated themselves closely to it. Many poor Filipinos acted as foremen for 
landowners or as workers and employees of the government. One French visitor to the 
Philippines named André Bellessort claimed that, “the government has the support of 
many natives whose loyalty is a matter salaries and wages.”203  It must also be 
remembered that practically all of the soldiers in the colonial army and the Guardia Civil 
were native Filipinos and, except for the Cavite Mutiny, they remained largely loyal until 
the Philippine Revolution.204 
Some peasants also tried to take advantage of the opportunities provided by the 
cash-cropping economy. As Filomeno Aguilar put it, they “tried their luck” and 
attempted to benefit from the new economy by growing cash crops instead of remaining 
strictly subsistence farmers.205  
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In other ways, however, the new colonial system was a source of hardship to 
poorer Filipinos. 206 The colonial government’s desire to increase its revenues increased 
the tax and labor burdens on Filipinos since the tax burden fell disproportionately on the 
poorest sectors of native society.207 The cédula personal was the most notorious and 
unpopular of these new taxes. In brief, it was, “formally an identifying certificate, 
showing the person’s name, his town and province… the civil status of the holder and the 
class of the holder in relation to the tax.” It was also required in “all civil and judiciary 
proceedings” and all inhabitants of the colony over were required to carry one, with 
payment due at the beginning of every year.208 The tax was regressive, since all Filipinos 
paid a flat rate. The cédula’s cost and its intrusiveness were symbolic of the colonial 
state’s increased encroachment on ordinary Filipinos’ lives and of the unfairness of the 
new colonial system.209  
The colonial government also began to tax or control two popular lower-class 
activities: gambling and smoking. The colonial government taxed cockfighting and the 
19th century visitor, John Bowring, noted that: 
[The Filipinos had] a universal love of gambling, which is exhibited among the 
Indian races by a passion for cock-fighting, an amusement made a productive 
source of revenue to the State.210 
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In Bicol—and presumably elsewhere—the government’s Tobacco Monopoly also 
negatively impacted the lives of poor Filipinos. A very large proportion of the Filipino 
population smoked, and with the Tobacco Monopoly they were now forced to buy their 
cigars and cigarettes from government-controlled stores and outlets.211  
The richer Filipinos were also a source of hardship for the poorer Filipinos. 
Peasants who wished to participate in the new cash cropping economy by migrating or by 
exploiting their existing plots more fully needed the money and the backing of wealthy 
Filipinos. For instance, peasants needed help to acquire tools, seeds and implements, to 
buy food when harvests were bad, and to make up for the shortfall when cash-cropping. 
Wealthy Filipinos were also a source of money whenever poorer Filipinos were unable to 
meet the pecuniary demands of the colonial government.  
Many peasants entered into something known as the samacan or kasamahan 
agreement with a richer patron, one by which the patron agreed to loan money or 
resources for eventual repayment or for a share of the peasant’s produce.212 Another 
agreement was the pacto de retroventado. A farmer who needed money would sell his or 
her land to a rich patron, but could continue to work it and would eventually buy back the 
land.213 Both arrangements tended to favor the person giving out the loan or holding the 
land since the interest rates for loans were often very high and resulted in near-permanent 
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indebtedness. In the case of the pacto de retroventado, the creditor also had legal rights 
over the land, which conferred another degree of power. The law also tended to favor 
creditors—economic elites could bribe the government officials to rule in their favor in 
land disputes.214 Economic elites all over the Philippines used these means to consolidate 
their hold on the land, thereby increasing their economic power and dispossessing the 
peasant farmers.215  
Debt therefore remained an important element in Philippine social relations, but 
there was now the important element of imbalance—the debt relationship greatly favored 
the lender and was now far less reciprocal than the prehispanic or early colonial forms of 
debt bondage. The potential for patrons or elites to abuse and maltreat their tenants or 
clients was quite high—high enough that the Spanish took note of it. The Spanish scholar 
Wenceslao Retana noted that “rare, very rare is the tenant who is not in debt to his 
landlord, a debt that brings into being a type of slavery to which he is subjected.”216 The 
reforming governor-general José Basco y Vargas also observed how debt could be used 
to bind tenants to their landowners and he tried—unsuccessfully—to introduce legislation 
to limit these abuses.217  
The situation appeared to be unchanged in the American colonial era: an 
American Constabulary officer noted in the early 20th century that the treatment of poor 
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peasants by landowners in Negros compared to, “our own south before the war when 
slavery fostered brutality.”218 In Pampanga, sugar planters were the undisputed masters of 
their haciendas and often whipped or beat their workers.219 
Many of the poor Filipinos rebelled or protested against this situation although it 
is difficult to say exactly how many of them did so actively. Several factors worked to 
prevent a total breakdown of the social order. First, there is the fact that, as Glenn May 
pointed out, the relationships between tenant and landowner or patron and client were not 
universally abusive and antagonistic even if it was unequal and one-sided.220 The 
interpersonal nature of patron-client ties never disappeared since, as David Sturtevant 
noted, many landowners still lived in close physical proximity with their tenants. This 
forced landowners and their tenants to interact on a personal level, which may have 
prevented rural society from completely breaking down and becoming openly 
antagonistic.221 Landowners often had a paternalistic attitude towards their tenants, and 
felt that they protected, guided and helped their tenants. Sometimes this paternalism 
involved punishing their tenants and sometimes it also meant, “teaching” them to live 
within their means and (rather cynically) to stop going into debt. 222 Ideally, then, patrons 
still felt obliged to aid a client in need or conversely, poor peasants still felt like they 
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could approach their landowners in times of trouble, which enabled the formation of 
bonds of gratitude or of utang ng loob. 
Second, even if poor peasants were unhappy with how they were treated, it was 
possible that they thought there was nothing that they could realistically do about it. The 
landowners had considerable power. Specifically, they now had the ability to call upon 
the new law enforcement agencies of the colonial state. Runaway tenants, workers who 
did not pay their debts, or those who impeded the running of the hacienda could be 
caught and punished by the Guardia Civil or the cuadrilleros.223 The majority of persons 
caught or punished for crimes tended to be poor. One Spanish chronicler wrote in 1882, 
that out of a sample of 5,982 criminal cases, the most common occupation of the 
convicted was laboradores and jornaleros, laborers, at 3,699 and 923, respectively. There 
was only a single propietario or landowner in the entire sample.224 Indeed, the profile of 
the average person incarcerated by the Spanish penal system in the 19th century was, 
according to Greg Bankoff was, a “male, indio and illiterate.”225 The richer Filipinos 
might complain about the Guardia Civil’s behavior, but in reality the hand of state 
repression fell on the poor far more heavily.  
Thus, for various reasons, poor Filipinos did not necessarily object to the new 
political and economic system. Or if they did object, they might not have actively resisted 
or, perhaps they limited their resistance to what James Scott calls “everyday forms of 
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resistance” which did not involve open use of violence. It is difficult to say what 
proportion of the native population essentially supported the colonial system—popular 
support for a social structure is difficult, if not impossible, to quantify.  
Yet it cannot be denied that the pressures of increased taxation and abusive 
landlords did lead to active and violent lower-class discontent. The late 18th century 
marked the beginning of both widespread lower-class revolts against the colonial system 
and the proliferation of banditry in the countryside. Both the revolts and the banditry 
were instances of active resistance against Spanish and elite Filipino rule and both were, 
in many ways, continuations of the traditional form of Filipino warfare: decampment and 
flight from the offending authority or social system.   
Bandits and Messiahs 
Many poor Filipinos took to the hills and became bandits in response to the 
pressures of the late colonial society. These bandits were known as tulisanes, a Tagalog 
word that perhaps comes from “tulis” or sharp, an allusion to their weapons.226 The 
Spaniards and the Americans also knew them as ladrones, although the word remontado 
(“remount” according to the American observer, James LeRoy) continued to be used.227 
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Rural banditry experienced a very sharp upswing in the late 18th century, and 
continued to rise throughout the 19th century.228 As Sastron wrote: “In this province 
[Batangas], there are no roads or lodgings where a man’s money, goods, or life are 
secure.”229 The reason for this rise in banditry was, according to several scholars, largely 
lower-class discontent with the colonial economic and political system.230 It might be 
seen as a form of Eric Hobsbawm’s “social banditry” but it was also a continuation of the 
traditional Filipino practice of decamping and escaping authority that one disagreed 
with.231 The tulisanes also continued the ancient Filipino practice of raiding—perhaps 
there is even a linguistic link since one Tagalog word for the bandits was mangangayao, 
or ambushers, which is similar to the old Visayan word mangangayaw, for the slave-raids 
of prehispanic times.232  The tulisanes also continued the Philippine tradition of talismans 
and spiritual power in combat.233 For instance, one bandit active in Cavite, Luis Parang, 
would fearlessly charge guns directly, believing he was bulletproof because of a powerful 
anting anting—and his continued survival convinced others as well.234  
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The tulisanes continued to interact with settled communities, especially with the 
poorer farmers and peasants. They very frequently had family and friends in the towns 
and villages with whom they continued to interact.235   
The tulisanes were a very serious threat to the colonial system: they waylaid 
travelers, raided farms and haciendas, menaced the roads, robbed churches and municipal 
buildings, and threatened the lives of government officials and Filipino elites. Some areas 
were so troubled by bandits that they were rendered impassable or inaccessible to normal 
travel. The road to Antipolo—a town very near to Manila—was apparently quite beset by 
bandits, which undoubtedly was troublesome given its popularity as a pilgrimage site.236 
The problem of tulisanes could get so bad that the Augustinians were even forced to 
abandon one of their haciendas in Tondo because of the depredations of bandits.237 A 
crucial point about the tulisanes was that they made little to no distinction between the 
Spanish and Filipinos, especially elite Filipinos. Along with their committing 
depredations on Church lands or government property, the bandits also threatened the 
lives and property of wealthy native or mestizo landowners, and, because they disrupted 
the flow of trade, they also threatened the basis of ilustrado wealth.  
The Spanish attempted to control this banditry by raising the aforementioned 
Guardia Civil and cuadrilleros. The expanded law enforcement represented perhaps 
something more than just an attempt to quell rising banditry—it represented a shift in the 
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way the Spanish conceptualized the political geography of the Philippines. In theory, 
there would no longer be a tolerable indeterminate space between the Spanish settlements 
and the wilderness: the Spanish were now claiming universal sovereignty over the 
expanse of the archipelago.238 The tulisanes were no longer errant parishioners to be 
enticed back to the reduccion; now they were outlaws to be punished if caught.  
However, the law enforcement agencies were not sufficient for the task and the 
Spanish were never able to “solve” the bandit problem. From an environmental 
perspective, the mountains and forests of the inland remained dense, impenetrable and 
difficult to traverse. The deforestation of the Philippines had its origins in the economic 
and demographic expansion of the 19th century, but there was still enough rough terrain 
and forest cover to serve as shelter for the tulisanes and to make pursuit by law 
enforcement agencies ineffective. Concurrently, the various police forces of the colonial 
government were chronically underfunded and understaffed. Thus, decampment and 
flight might have become more difficult and certainly much riskier, but it was not 
impossible. Tulisanes could prey upon travelers and farmers and flee to the forests with 
some degree of security. The situation persisted even after the end of the Spanish era, and 
both the Philippine Revolutionary government and the American colonial government 
had to deal with the tulisanes in their turn. These tulisanes would also play a part in the 
1896 Revolution and the Philippine-American War and as Isagani Medina noted, the 
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activities of the tulisanes “became a part of the national pattern of resistance which 
culminated in the Revolution of 1896.”239 
Aside from the tulisanes, the millenarian cults led by charismatic, messianic 
leaders also offered active resistance to the existing colonial system. In many ways, these 
leaders were the direct descendants of the datu: like the prehispanic leaders, the 
messianic figures of the 19th century based their authority on spiritual prowess, charisma 
and continual achievement: they secured and maintained their authority through acts like 
persuasive speech, displays of spiritual power and personal asceticism. But the messianic 
leaders that arose in the last century and a half of Spanish rule were rather different from 
the datu in two key ways. First, despite the centuries of Christianization, belief in the 
prehispanic spirit world remained strong. As John Bowring noted of Iloilo: 
On the arrival of the Spaniards [to Iloilo] they found the district occupied by 
painted Indians, full of superstitions, which, notwithstanding the teachings of the 
Augustine friars, are still found to prevail, especially at the time of any public 
calamity.240 
But, as mentioned in the previous chapter, Christianization had inevitably left its 
mark on Philippine culture, and a syncretism with prehispanic spiritual beliefs was the 
result. They used Christian concepts and beliefs in their spiritual worldview and derived 
their power and authority from God, saints, or holy relics. A few even claimed to be God 
or Jesus. The anting anting or the protective talismans of the 19th century were also as 
likely to be Christian symbols or prayers as they were to be anything else. Retana gives 
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examples of Latin prayers written on pieces of paper that were used as anting anting in 
his book Supersticiones de los Indios Filipinos.241 
Second, these charismatic leaders had a social appeal that was new to Filipino 
warfare: their message was directed to the discontented poor—to the farmers, workers, 
fishermen and peasants who had been marginalized by the new economic system. These 
charismatic leaders offered a vision of a world of spiritual fulfillment, where there was no 
suffering and inequality, where even the poor could achieve bliss.242  
Still, despite this new message these spiritual leaders harkened back to the 
prehispanic datu since like the datu, they claimed that their spiritual power and aura 
would provide this bliss for as long as one followed their authority or stayed in close 
proximity with them.  The messianic cults and their leaders also believed that a person’s 
inner, moral or spiritual strength, quality or purity would have an effect on the corporeal 
world. This was rather like a combination of their belief in anting anting and in spiritual 
prowess. The leader’s spiritual power, or his or her followers’ spiritual purity would 
determine whether they would achieve heaven or bliss on earth. It was therefore as 
important for the followers in these cults to cultivate their inner, moral or spiritual natures 
as it was for them to act on the outside world. Conversely, these cults also believed that 
external factors or actions could affect one’s internal spiritual quality. This simply meant 
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that items like anting anting could affect a person’s spiritual nature, or that fasting could 
purify the self. 
To understand these movements, let us look a bit more closely at two of these 
movements: the Cofradia de San Jose and the Guardia de Honor.  
The Cofradia de San Jose was founded by the indio Apolinario de la Cruz, a 
resident of Lucban in (the now Quezon) Tayabas province.243  He came from a peasant 
family of some means and received some education.  In 1830, he traveled to Manila to 
pursue a career as a friar but was thwarted by his racial background and he had to settle 
for becoming a lay brother in a charitable Catholic institution instead. However, 
Apolinario was apparently not satisfied with being a mere lay brother and founded his 
own organization, the grandiosely named Hermandad de la Archi-Cofradia del Glorioso 
Senor San Jose y de la Virgen del Rosario, or the Brotherhood of the Great Sodality of 
the Glorious Saint Joseph and of the Virgin of the Rosary.244 There was nothing unusual 
about this sort of organization in that period in Philippine history and religious authorities 
regarded it as simply one more lay religious organization among many. Despite the 
Hermandad in the name, the Cofradia was open to both sexes, but its membership was 
restricted to pureblooded indios—no Spaniards or mestizos were allowed, although indios 
of wealth were not barred from joining.245  
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The Cofradia initially was overshadowed by other, elite-dominated organizations 
of a similar nature until it suddenly ballooned in numbers and aroused the suspicion of 
the already paranoid Spaniards. The official tolerance (or at least indifference) to the 
Cofradia vanished and Apolinario de la Cruz’s attempts to gain official sanction for his 
group not only failed, but led to their persecution by the authorities. Juan de la Matta 
wrote of the Cofradia in his confidential report to the governor-general of the Philippines 
Marcelino Oraá, describing the Cofradia as a manifestation of the Filipino tendency to 
“readily believe whatever is presented to them under the veil of religion and of the 
marvelous.”246 Far from dismissing the Cofradia as a mere cult of fanatics, de la Matta 
noted that it had become “seditious” and might have been capable of threatening the 
Spanish hold on the Philippines. 
Perhaps the Spaniards were right to be afraid—the Cofradia’s message had a 
powerful appeal, and the organization became very large, its members very devoted to 
Apolinario de la Cruz. He assumed the name of Hermano Pule, and acquired a vigorous 
and effective young secretary, one Octavio Ignacio de San Jorge, who called himself 
“Purgatorio” who was crucial to the group’s success and also became an object of 
devotion. Hermano Pule communicated with many of his more distant members through 
letters that were read or heard with “reverence and also some curiosity” by his flock. 
When the parish priest of Lucban—the location of the Cofradia’s headquarters—
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confiscated some of the organization’s possessions, he found “two large portraits of the 
leader done in the style of popular images of saints.”247 
Hermano Pule’s teachings centered on promises of bliss in an earthly heaven 
where there would be no conflict and a human community in perfect unity. Presumably, 
this earthly heaven was considered to be better than the hard existence of rural poverty. 
Membership in the Cofradia, but specifically, adherence to Hermano Pule’s authority and 
teachings and sharing in his power was the only way to reach this heaven. Once within 
his orbit, the followers had to change their lifestyles, purifying themselves and improving 
their moral fiber—along with following Pule this was also needed in order to achieve 
earthly bliss. Fundamentally, this meant abandoning the corrupt and fallen towns and 
villages in which the Cofradia members lived and living in a new society, or a separate 
community. In real world terms, the Cofradia members congregated on the town of 
Isabang in Tayabas, later moving to the sitio of Ipilian in an area of Tayabas known as 
Aritao. The latter was more easily defended, but in both cases the Cofradia’s 
decampment turned them into a “group or society apart, the members considered 
themselves proscribed.”248 
When the Cofradia gathered in Isabang, the group swelled to 3,000 or 4,000 
people and it was deemed threatening enough that the Spanish decided to try dispersing 
them. On 22 October, 1840, the provincial governor Juan de Ortega marched to Isabang 
with an ad hoc force of 
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300 Men of his personal guard, cuadrilleros, men of the reserve, along with 
cabezas de barangay, the Fransiscan curates of Lucban and Tayabas and the rent 
administrator Don Salvador de Roma.249  
These were not soldiers, and this was clearly a law-enforcement operation, not a 
military one.  The motley nature of this force also suggests just how ill-prepared and 
poorly-trained Spanish law enforcement was in the 19th century, factors that would be 
crucial in the 1898 Revolution. The members of the Cofradia were themselves not 
particularly well armed or well-trained, but they were highly motivated and they grossly 
outnumbered de Ortega’s small, poorly armed and poorly cohesive force.  
The Spanish force—which was composed largely of Filipinos—broke under a hail 
of Cofradia musketry and arrows and de Ortega himself was killed during the rout. After 
their victory, the Cofradia decamped and removed themselves from Spanish authority 
further when they traveled to the remote and isolated Aritao plain. At this point, the 
Spanish claimed that the Apolinario de la Cruz had been christened “king of the 
Tagalogs” and his authority among his followers was higher than ever. The Cofradia’s 
little community was fortified and prepared for the defense by Purgatorio, and its 
members seem to have kept up their high morale. Perhaps this high morale can be largely 
attributed to Apolinario de la Cruz’s claims and promises of spiritual help and 
supernatural aid when it came time for fighting: 
The cofrades were made to believe that, at the time of battle, invisible soldiers 
would be summoned and the angels would swing the tide of battle in the 
Cofradia’s favor. Also, as soon as the battle started a big lake would open up and 
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swallow the advancing enemy troops… They [the cofrade] believed that their 
hearts would be as firm as the mysterious sword with which Apolinario baptized 
them, and they would be invulnerable to Spanish bullets.250 
The Spanish were now more determined than ever to wipe out this “seditious” 
sect and the governor-general Marcelino de Oraa sent Lieutenant Colonel Joaquin Huet 
with 400 Pampangan regulars, 60 cavalrymen, an artillery unit, and equal numbers of 
cuadrilleros and men of the reserve, to destroy the Cofradia.251 Despite these numbers, 
the the Cofradia were so confident of their powers that they contemptuously rejected a 
Spanish offer of amnesty. Unfortunately, the Spanish were better led and better prepared 
and after a light artillery bombardment they charged the Cofradia’s defenses. The 
Cofradia displayed “admirable firmness” despite suffering heavily casualties, but the 
Spanish forces routed the Cofradia, killing 800 to 1,000 in the process.252 Apolinario de 
la Cruz’s bodyguard defended him to the death, enabling him to flee, but he was 
eventually betrayed and captured and the Cofradia abolished. This did not quell the 
unrest in the Tagalog areas, but it did mark the end of the Cofradia de San Jose. 
The Guardia de Honor had a very similar story, and the organization will 
reappear in this study since it had a remarkably long life and had to be dealt with by 
Spaniards, the Philippine Revolutionary Government, and the Americans.253 Unlike the 
Cofradia de San Jose, the Guardia de Honor started out as a legitimate, Church-
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sanctioned sodality, one meant to encourage Christian virtues and controlled by local 
Spanish priests and friars. It was open to both rich and poor Filipinos and it consequently 
exploded in popularity, which made it difficult for the Spanish clergy to regulate all of 
the Guardia de Honor’s activities. “Pagan” or traditional Filipino beliefs and rituals 
began to appear in some of the isolated provincial chapters. The situation deteriorated so 
much that the Ilocos branches of the sodality were dissolved, but many self-proclaimed 
members continued to practice their own version of folk Christianity under the name of 
Guardia de Honor. Eventually, a charismatic “anitero” or “possessor of an amulet” 
named Julian Baltasar, of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, emerged as the leader of the 
unsanctioned branches of the Guardia de Honor. He does not seem to have been elected 
or chosen and he rose to the position based on his spiritual prowess as a faith healer (an 
“albulario” in Tagalog). Like Apolinario de la Cruz, Baltasar acquired his own folksy 
nickname—“Apo Laqui,” which David Sturtevant translated as “Mister Grandfather” or 
“Male Deity.” Unlike de la Cruz, Baltasar had an equally powerful wife, a blind woman 
known as “Apo Bae” or “Female Deity.”254 
In the mid-1880s, Baltasar’s Guardia de Honor grew in size and influence and his 
house became the focus of pilgrimages by devotees, turning the town of Urdaneta into a 
“gypsy encampment overflowing with foot-loose provincianos.”255 “Apo Bae,” passed 
away in 1896, but her spirit continued to be a source of prowess for Baltasar. Eventually, 
Baltasar remarried and moved away from Urdaneta and to the “remote sitio of Montiel” 
where he “ordered assembling followers to clear large sections of the surrounding forest.” 
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Like Apolinario de la Cruz, Baltasar decamped into the wilderness and created a new 
spiritual community he called “Cabaruan” or “Renewal.”256 Also like de la Cruz, 
Baltasar acquired an energetic young lieutenant, a young man named Antonio Valdes 
who did most of the practical work of leading the Guardia de Honor in day-to-day life 
and eventually led it in combat while Baltasar provided spiritual guidance. 
When the Philippine Revolution broke out, Antonio Valdes organized some self-
defense groups for the Guardia de Honor and, according to Milagros Guerrero, sided 
with the independence movement—specifically, the Katipunan.257 Whatever the case 
may be, the Guardia de Honor’s Revolutionary-era activities, like its raids on Spanish 
depots, earned it the ire of the Spaniards. The Spanish eventually sent forces against the 
sect and captured Cabaruan, arrested Baltasar and broke up the community. This setback 
proved temporary, and Antonio Valdes initiated an increasingly effective guerrilla war 
against the Spanish and the Guardia de Honor was able to survive and even grow during 
the Revolution. By the Philippine-American War in 1899, Valdes had assumed the full 
leadership of the sect after Baltasar’s death and the Guardia de Honor had increased to 
almost 40,000 members in Pangasinan.258 
The Guardia de Honor’s partnership with the Aguinaldo-led Revolutionary 
movement proved short lived. In the end, the aspirations of the Guardia de Honor’s 
peasants and farmers proved irreconcilable to the goals of the landowning principales. 
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Like the Cofradia de San Jose, the Guardia de Honor was a manifestation of peasant 
dissatisfaction with the entire political, social and economic system of colonial society—
its followers were even known as agrabiados or discontentos: “aggravated ones” or 
“discontented ones.”259 The Guardia de Honor eventually declared its hostility towards 
the Revolutionary Government and began to raid the economic assets of local principales 
in Pangasinan and to disrupt the workings of the Revolutionary government. According 
to Sturtevant, they even went so far as to aid the Spanish priests and friars imprisoned by 
Aguinaldo’s government, although Milagros Guerrero disputes this.260 The Guardia de 
Honor maintained its own authority in large parts of the Pangasinan countryside and the 
sect proved a considerable thorn in the Revolutionary Government’s side. Aguinaldo and 
his army were forced to engage in what were essentially counterinsurgency activities in 
Pangasinan—an unedifying case of Filipinos fighting other Filipinos in the middle of the 
war with America. Unfortunately for Aguinaldo, he had no choice: the principales 
threatened by the Guardia de Honor demanded that the Revolutionary Government do 
something about the sect, and Aguinaldo had to comply in order to maintain their 
support.  
The Guardia de Honor and the Cofradia were not the only messianic cults that 
were active in the 19th century—there were others active during the turn of the 19th 
century, like the Colorum or the Santa Iglesia.261 All of them exemplified the Filipino 
tradition of resistance and they displayed many of the old patterns of war: the presence of 
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spiritually powerful, charismatic leaders, the belief in spiritual prowess in combat, 
decampment as a strategy, and the establishment of a separate authority as a goal.  
However, these messianic cults also showed how Spanish colonial rule and the 
changing conditions of the 19th century had changed the indigenous martial culture. First, 
these messianic cults were driven by a strong anti-elite, pro-peasant message, one that 
used the language of Filipino folk culture and religiosity. This populist, spiritual message 
was probably a key strength for these cults since it made them highly attractive to 
ordinary Filipinos.  
These messianic sects also displayed unusually high degrees of motivation and 
morale in combat. The members of these sects were often undeterred by the threat of 
Spanish police forces with more or better weapons. The members of these messianic cults 
were often quite willing to fight and die, which is in contrast to the casualty-averse, 
manpower-acquisitive warfare of prehispanic times. A very large part of their morale and 
combat bravery probably stemmed from the promises of supernatural aid and 
invincibility that their leaders made, but part of it may also have come from the appeal of 
their message. The egalitarian and populist promises of earthly bliss must surely have 
helped encourage and motivate these cultists to fight and resist. 
There was considerable overlap between the bandit groups and the messianic 
cults. Both were generally anti-establishment, peasant movements. Both also usually 
involved charismatic, spiritually powerful leaders. The members of bandit groups and 
messianic cults both detached themselves from the mainstream of colonial society and 
lived apart, whether this meant living in the mountains or simply living in isolated 
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villages completely dominated by the sect or the charismatic leader. In combat, both 
groups believed that talismans and spiritual prowess would confer victory. These 
similarities were perhaps why it was easy for authorities to label the religious sects as 
nothing more than bandits—it was certainly a useful way for authorities to de-legitimize 
these threats to their authority.262  
Conclusion 
At the end of the 19th century, the changes to the colonial system had profoundly 
affected Philippine notions of resistance.  The richer, elite Filipinos who benefited from 
the new system tended to be more “conservative” in their forms of resistance: they 
favored political agitation or propagandizing. Their main goal was to gain more power 
without upsetting the existing social order. A few advocated for complete separation from 
Spain, but this was likely a minority viewpoint. Conversely, decampment and separation 
from the system was the recourse of Filipinos who did not benefit from the socio-
economic system, and this tended to be the poorer or disadvantaged Filipinos.  
When the elites eventually resorted to violence or active resistance, they tended to 
operate with this “conservatism” in mind. They still did not want to upset the social order 
and their initial moves were to seize the centers of power and take over the machineries 
of the government and attempt to recreate the colonial government, complete with regular 
armies. These elites resorted to decampment only when pressed by repeated defeats.  
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The changes wrought by the 19th century were influential for other reasons. The 
new Philippine social structure would determine which indigenous Filipinos would 
decide to risk open revolt and the new ideas of nationalism or political centralization 
would influence their goals and strategies. Finally, the new Philippine economy also had 
a profound effect on the course and conduct of the Philippine-American War, since 
crucial resources had to be imported and much of the country’s pecuniary viability relied 
on the ability to export local goods or raw materials. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE 1896 REVOLUTION 
 
The Philippine Revolution of 1896 was the progenitor of the Philippine-American 
War. It was during the Revolution that a small number of native elites championed the 
cause of Philippine independence in an armed revolt, and many of these leaders would 
continue to lead the fight against the Americans in 1899. However, the Revolution was an 
extremely complex event and there is no room in this study for anything more than a brief 
examination of how it affected the subsequent war. This will include a brief examination 
of the Revolution’s goals and origins, the people involved and the strategies used by the 
Filipinos. It will conclude by summarizing the impact of the 1896 Revolution on 
Philippine military history, emphasizing its influences on the Philippine-American War 
in particular. 
The Katipunan 
The previous chapter showed that indigenous resistance towards the Spanish did 
exist during the 19th century but that none of the relevant groups—the Propagandists, the 
municipal captains, the religious cultists or the bandits—could really become the primary 
catalysts for a nationalist revolution. First, while the Propagandists and the other elites 
expressed ideas of Philippine nationalism, they were not particularly eager to rise up in 
revolt against Spain to fight for their ideals. Second, while the religious cults or the 
tulisanes were engaged in active and very often violent resistance towards the colonial 
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system, they were not nationalist or centralizing and their strategy of decampment tended 
to limit their aims and their scopes.  
An organization that combined both a nationalistic, centralizing impulse and a 
willingness to commit violence to achieve these goals finally did arise in the late 19th 
century: it was the Katipunan, or the Kataastaasang Kagalanggalangang Katipunan ng 
Anak ng Bayan or the “Most High and Honorable Association of the Children of the 
Country.” The Katipunan was the first native Filipino organization to advocate violence 
in the name of a Filipino nation-state: it brought a new form of warfare to the 
Philippines—national warfare. 
Another important first of the Katipunan was its desire to be the sole, sovereign 
authority in the Philippines. In its first official declaration of its principles, the Mga 
Daquilang Cautosan or “The Noble Commandments,” the Katipunan declared that it was 
now the head of a national Philippine government:263 
It is hereby now declared that from this day forward these Islands are separated 
from---and that no other leadership or authority shall be recognised or 
acknowledged other than this Supreme Catipunan. 
The Supreme Catipunan is constituted forthwith, and will be the body that 
exercises sovereign power throughout the Archipelago. 
(Isinasaysay na ang manga Capuloang ito ay jumijiualay sa............ [España] mag 
bujat sa arao na ito at ualang quiniquilala at quiquilanlin pang Puno at 
macapangyayare cung di itong Cataastaasang Catipunan. 
Ang Cataastaasang Catipunan ay tumatayo magbujat ngayon at siya ang 
magjajauac nang manga daquilang capangyarijan dito sa boong Capuloan.) 
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The use of the word “Capuloang,” which can be translated as “islands” or 
“archipelago” is of particular interest since it can be seen to denote universal sovereignty 
over not just Luzon—the home island of most of the Katipunan’s founders— but over the 
entire Philippine Islands. There is a note of irony to this idea of geopolitical space, since 
there had never been an indigenous prehispanic polity that had authority over the entire 
archipelago and the Katipunan’s idea of sovereign territory was therefore derived from 
the jurisdiction of the Spanish colonial state. Additionally, the Katipunan’s idea of a 
Filipino nation was largely derived from the writings of the Propagandists. For instance, 
Bonifacio idealized prehispanic society and one of the Katipunan’s goals was a return to 
this idyllic state. These ideas were clearly inspired by the writings of Jose Rizal and the 
other Propagandists.264  
The willingness of the Katipuneros to start a revolution may have been a result of 
the social backgrounds of its founders and leaders. These were men or women who were 
generally not as wealthy or powerful as the ilustrado, and therefore did not have an 
overriding interest in maintaining the status quo. In its early days the Katipunan had 
originally been a largely urban organization and its members were part of what Michael 
Cullinane called the “urban middle sector”— native Filipinos who had a degree of 
literacy in either Spanish or a Filipino language (sometimes in both) and who tended to 
be clerks or office workers, although some were also engaged in small businesses or in 
trade.265 A good example was the founder of the Katipunan, Andres Bonifacio who was a 
native of Tondo—an area of the Manila urban zone—and who was employed as a 
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warehouse clerk for a foreign trading firm. He was also married to a relative of Mariano 
Alvarez, one of the local landed elites of Cavite, a connection that would have been 
unlikely if Bonifacio had been a poor person of no substance.266  
The other leading Katipuneros were similarly situated. One Katipunero, Adrian E. 
Cristobal, had studied at private schools before working at a customs house and then for 
the German construction supply company that also employed Bonifacio.267 Two other 
leading Katipuneros, Teodoro Plata and Roman Basa, were also office workers and 
therefore literate and employed in white collar professions. There were also Katipunero 
leaders with post-tertiary educations: Emilio Jacinto, a law student, Ladislaw Diwa, a 
lawyer and Pio Valenzuela, a doctor.268 Then there was the famous Melchora Aquino or 
“Tandang Sora,” who was wealthy enough to have large stores of rice and a herd of 
carabaos.269 Another Katipunero, Valentin Cruz, had a large house that had a reception 
hall.270 Finally, there was at least one Katipunero who was gobernadorcillo of a precinct 
of Manila.271 To characterize the Katipunan as a “plebeian society,” which one 
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contemporary did, is therefore not strictly accurate—these were people of some education 
and some means, and they were often employed in white collar jobs.272  
The Katipunan’s original message—laid out in the “Casayasan: Pinagcasunduan; 
Manga daquilang cautosan,” or the “History: What was Agreed Upon; The noble 
commandments”—perhaps owes much to the social status of these early members. Their 
complaints were surprisingly materialistic, and spoke more of stifled ambition or 
suppressed personal advancement than for a desire to radically reorder the social and 
economic structure: 273  
1. [The Katipunan complained of] The pitiless imposition of high taxes upon us, 
even on our bodies, even upon our produce or wealth.  
2. The expropriation of our meagre profit if we practice any industry, so that we 
are kept weak and prevented from bettering ourselves.    
3. The imposition of a high tariff on any goods that pass through the Customs.  
4. The refusal to permit our Archipelago to enter into treaties with Mother Sp.... 
and other powers like America in relation to the export and import of any and 
every item of commerce.  As a consequence, initiative is stifled and we remain in 
poverty.   
The other complaints in this manifesto further reflect the remarkably business-
oriented tone of the four points above: the Katipunaneros lamented the unfair competition 
in trade from the Chinese, they complained that high-paying salaried positions in 
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government were barred to native Filipinos, and they protested the lack of economic 
development or progress in the Philippines.  
The other issues that the Katipunan raised highlight the influence of the 
Propagandists: complaints regarding a lack of representation in the Spanish government, 
a lack of freedom of the press, of unequal priviliges between natives and Spanish and 
reflect a general discontent with second class status. Either way, the Katipuneros’ 
discontent tended to revolve around the fact that they were unable to benfit from the 
existing system more fully.  
The later writings of the Katipunan were less specific on economic issues, but the 
general tenor of resentment towards Spanish domination of Philippine wealth remained. 
For instance, a later edition of the Casaysayan was more general in tone and was a “less 
specific declaration of patriotic outrage and intent” but which still included complaints  
that Spanish greed and perfidy was preventing the “ikaguiguinhawa”of the Philippines. 
This word denotes both prosperity and a sense of emotional relief and comfort that 
accompanies a lack of poverty and want.274 One of the Katipunan’s most important 
documents, “Ang Dabat Mabatid ng Mga Tagalog” or “What the Tagalogs Should 
Know,” stated that:  
Since then, for more than three hundred years, we have supported the race of 
Legaspi most bountifully; we have allowed them to live lavishly and grow fat, 
even if we ourselves suffered deprivation and hunger.  We have expended our 
wealth, blood and even our lives in defending them… 
(Buhat ng ito'y mangyari ay bumibilang na ngayon sa tatlong daang taon 
mahiguit na ang lahi ni Legaspi ay ating binubuhay sa lubos na kasaganaan, 
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ating pinagtatamasa at binubusog, kahit abutin natin ang kasalatan at 
kadayukdukan; iguinugugol natin ang yaman dugo at sampu ng buhay sa 
pagtatangol sa kanila…)275 
Finally, a leading Katipunero, Emilio Jacino, made a similar complaint in his 
“Gising na mga Tagalog!” or “Awaken You Tagalogs!” 
Do you see who eats their lunch outdoors, exposed to the heat of the sun; soaked 
by the rain, and who with the drops of their sweat and the fatigue of their 
exhausted bodies raise from the earth the harvest that gives life to everyone and 
gives comfort to those whose spirits are debased?  They are Tagalogs. 
(¿Nakikita mo yaung maghapunang nanga kabilat sa init ng araw, nangababasa 
sa ulan, at sa agus ng kanilang pawis at sa pagud ng kanilang katawang hapu 
na’y pinabubukal sa lupa ang bungang nagbibigay buhay sa lahat at nagbibigay 
sarap sa mga katawang may masamang loob?  Sila’y mga tagalog.)276 
These statements of Jacinto and in the Dapat Mabatid are quite similar to some of 
the ideas of the messianic cult leaders described in the previous chapter. As explained by 
the historian Renaldo Ileto, the Katipunan’s notions of Kalayaan, or “freedom,” with its 
promise of an impending earthly paradise, echo the promises of the messianic cult 
leaders. However, there were crucial differences between the Katipunan and the religious 
cult. First, the Katipunan tended to limit its denunciations to the Spanish and said little to 
nothing about the wealthy and privileged Filipinos who were benefiting from the export 
economy. Far from being anti-rich, the Katipunan even seemed desirous of their support: 
at the outbreak of the Revolution, the Katipunan tried to implicate some wealthy Filipinos 
in order to force them to support the movement, or what the historian Gregorio Zaide 
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blithely calls “Bonifacio’s clever ruse to implicate the rich.”277 The second biggest 
difference between the Katipunan and the religious cults was that the Katipunan did not 
aspire to disengage from the world. Rather, the Katipunan stated that if they—the 
Katipunan leadership in particular—were to rule the Philippines and to take over the 
system, then the Filipinos would enjoy the benefits of kalayaan. Again, while these ideas 
share similarities to the philosophies of groups like the Guardia de Honor or the Cofradia 
de San Jose, these messianic cults were explicitly separatist and unhesitatingly removed 
themselves from the mainstream of colonial society.  
The Katipunan did consider decampment and separation from colonial society as 
a means of resistance. Upon the organization’s discovery by the Spanish in the middle of 
1896, many of the leaders of the Katipunan traveled to Pook Kangkong, Caloocan, and 
from August 21-26 August they debated on whether the whole organization should rise 
up in revolt or whether those who were wanted by the authorities should flee to Mount 
Pamitinan in the rough and mountainous province of Morong.278 During this meeting, 
Bonifacio convinced his members not to decamp to Mt. Pamitinan, and he declared that 
“Gentlemen, with the Spaniards wise to our activities, we cannot afford to have a 
protracted discussion on the pros and cons of a revolution; time is of the essence. 
We must act, then let us not dilly-dally or the cause is lost.”279 
After a council of war the Katipunan decided to launch an attack on the polvorín, 
or arsenal, of San Juan in Manila—the details of their military operations will be 
                                                
277 Zaide, The Philippine Revolution, 97. 
278 Borromeo-Buehler, The Cry of Balintawak, 34. 
279 Ibid., 36. 
106 
discussed in the next section.280 Suffice it to say for now that the Katipunan’s attacks 
were failures and the rebels (which is what they now were) were forced to into hiding 
after all.   
Despite these early failures, the decision to attack a visible symbol of Spanish 
authority rather than decamping to the mountains was a turning point in Philippine 
military history. For the first time, an organization of native Filipinos actually went to 
war with the ultimate goal of creating a Filipino-led nation-state.  Because the 
Katipunan’s goal was national takeover, their seemingly ill-advised decision to attack the 
Spanish forts and arsenals was actually logical since national unification could not be 
accomplished, or could only be accomplished with great difficulty, if the Katipuneros hid 
in the mountains. Decampment, by its very nature, is isolationist and while a group 
hiding in the forests and mountains might be able to survive and defy authority, it is 
much harder for that group to expand its authority and to topple an entrenched political 
system like the Spanish colonial government. The Katipunan was heralding something 
new to Philippine history: Filipino “national” warfare, or conflict in the service of a 
nation-state, with all that implies when it comes to such factors as manpower or resource 
mobilization, ideology, politics, strategy and tactics.  
The Fighting in Manila 
In combat, the Katipunan forces—rural or urban—were, as Bernad and Achútegui 
described them, an “Improvised Army.”281 Whatever else might be said about the 
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Katipunan—and there have been plenty of debates—it can be said with a fair degree of 
certainty that it was unprepared for the outbreak of war. None of its activities involved 
serious planning for conflict, like formulating strategy, acquiring and stockpiling 
weapons or gathering intelligence. This was especially true of the urban Manila branches 
of the Katipunan, and two engagements can serve as examples: a small skirmish in a 
place in Manila called Pasong Tamo on 26 August 1896, and a larger attack on the 
waterworks in San Juan del Monte, in Manila, on 30 August 1896, both of which were 
fought almost entirely by Bonifacio and other Manila members of the Katipunan. 
The first engagement in Pasong Tamo had been an impromptu one.282 The day 
before, Bonifacio had convened a meeting to decide upon the future of the revolution. 
The group voted on objectives and agreed to start the Revolution on 29 August 1896. The 
meeting swelled in size as people got wind of it and Alvarez claimed that it reached 1,000 
people by 24 August. This number is likely an exaggeration, but we can probably assume 
that the crowd was sizeable. The Spaniards somehow got word of this meeting and sent a 
contingent of policemen and Guardia Civil to deal with the plotters. The ensuing 
skirmish was a very minor one, since the policemen fled after a few shots and when they 
realized how outnumbered they were. 
This skirmish did not discourage the Katipunan and on the 26th of August the 
entire group decided to reposition to a place called Sampaloc. For some reason, Bonifacio 
had appointed a convict named Gregorio Tapalla, nicknamed Old Leon, to lead the group. 
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The scene that followed is outright comical, with an apparently drunk Old Leon 
enthusiastically shouting and encouraging the Katipunan, shouting for them to do as he 
did. The group took this literally and mimicked his every move—for instance, raising 
their bolos and lifting their left feet when he did—rather like a Loony Tunes cartoon.283  
The Katipunan encountered a force of Guardia Civil in Pasong Tamo and all 
order quickly broke down. The Guardia Civil had contrived to surround the Katipunan 
and the “force” became a mob where every man fended for himself and fled in disorder. 
Old Leon was tragically killed. 
The next engagement in San Juan del Monte almost a week later showed many of 
the same patterns. The attack on San Juan del Monte was to be an ambitious assault on 
the water supply system that serviced the city of Manila that also happened to have a 
Spanish government arsenal with much-needed weapons. It was to be the official 
beginning of the Revolution, and the Katipunan decided to go all out by ordering a multi-
pronged attack by all the Katipunan branches: the provincial branches were to attack after 
pre-determined signals in coordination with the Manila Katipuneros.  
The contemporary Spanish historian Manuel Sastrón claimed that the majority of 
Spanish troops in Manila during this attack were 100 soldiers from the 70th Regiment—
presumably the regiment of the line “Magellan”— and except for their officers, all of 
these soldiers were native Filipinos. There were also 65 artillerymen with their pieces in 
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the arsenal, and unspecified numbers of cavalrymen and Guardia Civil all around the 
area.284  
The Katipunan attack was ill-starred from the beginning, marred with problems of 
planning and coordination. Once again, all planning was done just prior to the attack, 
with Bonifacio consulting and instructing with each chapter of the Katipunan that had 
shown up at the rendezvous point.285 Bonifacio and his troops never sent the signals that 
would coordinate with the rural Katipuneros waiting outside the city because Bonifacio 
had apparently been distracted or delayed because of issues with organization. 
Katipuneros had been filtering in to join him while he marched to San Juan del Monte, 
and he also encountered two small detachments of Guardia Civil that had to be dealt with. 
In the confusion, Bonifacio forgot the time and he decided not to signal the rural 
Katipuneros to prevent further confusion.286 In his memoirs, Aguinaldo writes of waiting 
for the signal for his forces to attack Manila but the signal never came and he and his men 
were forced to sneak back to their homes, disappointed.287 
Despite these setbacks—and despite the fact that the Spanish were now fully 
alerted to the fact that something serious was afoot—Bonifacio and his fellow Manila 
Katipuneros still persisted in trying to attack the polvorín in San Juan del Monte. The 
                                                
284 Manuel Sastrón, La Insurreción en Filipinas, (Madrid: Imprenta de la Sucesora de M. Minuesa de los 
Rios, 1901), 75; Secretaria del Gobierno General del Archipiélago, Guía de Oficial de las Islas Filipinas 
para 1894, (Manila, 1894), 225-227. 
285 Alvarez, Recalling the Revolution, 42-43. 
286 Alvarez, Recalling the Revolution, 45; Carlos Quirino, The Young Aguinaldo, (Manila: Aguinaldo 
Centennial Years, 1969), 53-54. 
287 Aguinaldo, Mga Gunita ng Himagsikan, 58-62. 
110 
problems of coordination persisted and it meant that the various Katipunan chapters 
attacked separately and acted with little cooperation. Bonifacio himself arrived late to the 
affray, having been preceded by other Katipunan chapters who had only succeeded in 
stirring up the Spanish forces and alerting the authorities. The Filipinos spent some time 
skirmishing with the various Spanish armed contingents until the Spanish sent a cavalry 
and infantry detachment to reinforce the beleaguered garrison in San Juan del Monte and 
the Katipunan was forced to disperse in disorder. Many of them were killed or captured 
and the whole affair was a disaster for Bonifacio’s reputation as a commander.288 
What these two engagements show most of all was the Katipunan’s 
unpreparedness for war and also how it is simply not possible to improvise your way to 
effective warmaking. To begin with, the Manila Katipuneros barely had any guns. During 
the engagement of Pasong Tamo the Katipuneros only had 20 guns for 500 people.289 
There had apparently been an attempt to secure weapons from the Japanese but the plan 
came to nothing.290 Most Katipuneros were armed with bolos, a large Philippine bush 
knife rather like a machete. For lack of anything else, this weapon would become the 
default weapon of most Filipinos into the Philippine-American War and has become 
much mythologized, although its actual efficacy in combat is questionable. It certainly 
did not help the Katipuneros in their battles. 
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The Katipunan had also made no provisions for supplies like food. By the latter 
half of August, the Bonifacio and many other Katipuneros were constantly on the run 
from Spanish authorities, and they had to rely on the impromptu generosity of supporters 
like Tandang Sora for sustenance, which meant they often went hungry.291 
Another issue was the simple fact that the Katipunan was not structured for 
hostilities. The Katipunan had started out a small, secret organization with a cellular 
structure and its early efforts were spent spreading its message and recruiting. It does not 
seem likely that any plans for an uprising had been formulated beforehand, since the last 
few days before the Revolution was on the verge of breaking out were spent trying to 
work out a basic strategy and organization.292 These meetings and debates continued 
throughout the conflict, but this kind of command structure resulted in confusion in 
action as and poor cohesion. The Katipunan forces started with high spirits, but quickly 
broke down to their component parts when under pressure. 
Indeed, it almost seems as if the urban wing of the Katipunan had a dangerously 
amateurish approach to leadership and command.  The urban Katipuneros’ style of 
leadership and command seemed to rely very heavily on face-to-face meetings with their 
followers where matters of basic strategy had to be voted on—not a system that often 
works under the stresses of combat where decisiveness is paramount. The Katipunero 
leaders also relied heavily on leading by personal example—Bonifacio led from the front 
and had to deal with every problem personally, which was likely what led to the delay in 
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signaling the rural Katipuneros to attack. This need for personal intervention by the 
leaders led to some rather tragicomic scenes: at one point in the engagement in San Juan 
del Monte, one Katipunan commander was even reduced to shouting orders to his men 
from a second story window.293 Then there is the matter of Old Leon—why would any 
sane or competent leader allow someone like Old Leon to lead the troops?  
Perhaps the Katipunan’s seemingly odd and amateurish behavior can be best 
explained by the possibility that, because it lacked an institutional framework for 
command, Bonifacio fell back on the age-old patterns of leadership based on charisma, 
prestige and prowess. As Glenn May theorized, Bonifacio fit into Max Weber’s theories 
regarding pre-bureaucratic charismatic authority.294 In the context of Philippine history, 
this meant that Bonifacio fell back on traditional notions of spiritual prowess and 
charisma when in command. This constant need to display prowess explains why 
Bonifacio and other urban Katipunero leaders frequently led from the front. This type of 
charisma-based leadership also explains the constant meetings—the Katipunan did not 
have formal mechanisms for formulating command decisions by one or a few people that 
would be accepted as legitimate by their followers. Leaders like Bonifacio therefore had 
to win their followers over by continuously displaying their oratorical ability.295 Finally, 
this reliance on charisma and prowess might also explain the unexpected elevation of Old 
Leon: anybody who could display prowess was accepted as a leader in Philippine society. 
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In this situation, Old Leon probably displayed the qualities of one: as a former bandit he 
would have had “combat” experience, and he was certainly charismatic enough for the 
Katipuneros to copy his every move.  
Yet, however authentic and academically interesting Bonifacio’s traditional style 
of leadership was, it proved inadequate when coupled with his choice to frontally 
confront entrenched and well-armed Spanish army and police forces. It was additionally 
to Bonifacio’s misfortune that he lived and operated in the city of Manila, the heart of 
Spanish power, where they had agents and informers, and a place heavily garrisoned by 
Spanish troops. 
As a result of these failures, the Revolution in the city of Manila petered out. A 
contemporary account by an English visitor named John Foreman claims that rumor had 
it that the Katipuneros had killed some Chinese they encountered and used others as 
human shields, but among the residents of Manila, “the idea that the Caloocan affair was 
the prelude to a rebellion was utterly ridiculed.”296 In a sense, if the Revolution had ended 
with these defeats, the Katipunan’s premature rebellion would have resembled the riots 
that would periodically break out and wreak havoc in Manila: violent but limited in 
duration and scope. What made this particular revolt so different was that the Katipunan’s 
ideas had spread to the countryside and it was there that they met the most success. 
The Katipunan and the Rural Elites 
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The military failures of the urban leaders of the Katipunan resulted in the balance 
of power shifting to their rural counterparts, the Filipino rural elites. These rural elites 
were people like Emilio Aguinaldo and Santiago Alvarez in Cavite, Miguel Malvar in 
Batangas, Paciano Rizal (Jose Rizal’s older brother) and Severino Taino of Laguna, 
Maximino Hizon of Pampanga, Francisco Makabulos of Tarlac, an Mariano Llanera and 
Manuel Tinio of Nueva Ecija.297 These were men who, according to Michael Cullinane, 
were those  
Who generally held the highest municipal offices (that is, the legal principales), 
who usually, but by no means always, owned or controlled land and property in 
their municipalities, and/or who often dominated through various means the lives 
of numerous local dependents (small holders, tenants, landless peasants or 
agricultural workers, and fishermen)298 
They were therefore native Filipinos who were the economic and political powers 
in their towns and villages, but whose power and influence generally did not extend 
beyond their municipality. Much of their wealth came from ownership of land and 
through participation in the agricultural export economy. They were not usually large 
plantation owners—the Philippines had a noticeable lack of these—but their wealth did 
make the rural elites the nexus of social networks in their municipalities since it made 
them the center of local patronage ties.299 As stated in the previous chapter, these rural 
elites were not necessarily the actual holders political office—though they often were—
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although they were the power behind the scenes.300 Other rural elites included teachers 
and provincial clerks—or indigenous Filipinos with education and some standing in 
society.  
Not all of these rural elites had been members of the Katipunan: Miguel Malvar 
may not have been a Katipunero, but once war broke out, he joined in the revolt and 
eventually became involved with the Katipunan.301 It does not appear as if Paciano Rizal, 
brother of the hero Jose Rizal and a prominent rural Revolutionary, was a member of the 
Kaitpunan either. Thus, membership with the Katipunan was not so important as general 
sympathy with the organization’s separatist aspirations.  
What compelled these rural elites to rise up against Spain alongside the 
Katipunan? What were their objectives? To answer this question, an example will be 
made of one of their number: Emilio Aguinaldo, the man who would become president of 
the Revolutionary Government and commander of her armies during the Philippine-
American War. 
It is hard to say whether a rural elite like Aguinaldo sympathized with all aspects 
of the Katipunan’s message but there was probably nothing in the organization’s ideas 
(like those expressed in the Casaysayan,) that he would have disagreed with. In his 
memoirs, Aguinaldo certainly claims to have agreed with the Katipunan’s bylaws and 
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goals (“saligang batas at layunin”).302 The complaints voiced in treatises like Calyaan, 
that the Spanish were holding Filipinos back from prosperity, would have likely struck a 
chord. While cabeza de barangay, Aguinaldo had also worked as a trader, sailing around 
the Philippines and selling manufactured goods and textiles from Manila to other 
provinces. It is easy to see the Casaysayan’s complaints regarding taxation and fees as 
appealing to him.303 More importantly, the previous chapter already showed how 
landowners and rural elites were keenly aware of the importance of controlling local 
politics and they were often locked in political competition with the colonial 
government’s municipal representative: the local parish priest. These rural elites had an 
economic interest in being the main political powers in their locales, unencumbered by 
the weight of Spanish hegemony. Aguinaldo would obfuscate on his anti-clericalism 
throughout his life, most likely because of political expediency, but many of his 
statements and actions during the 1896 Revolution and later would show his fundamental 
opposition to the colonial Church. He admitted as much in a letter he wrote 2 years later 
to one of his provincial chiefs: “the abuses committed by the Spanish friars are the 
principal causes of the Revolution.” (“los abusos cometidos por los frailes espanoles 
fueron las causas principales de la Revolucion”).304 
Aguinaldo’s anti-clericalism also brings up the topic of the Freemasonry, and his 
membership in this group suggests that his discontent with the Spanish friars preceded his 
membership in the Katipunan. Lodges were established in the Philippines during the 19th 
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century, and even if the Philippine Freemasons denied they were atheists and separatists, 
the Spanish Church and government accused them of such and dealt with them harshly.305 
Rámon Blanco, the Governor-General during the outbreak of the 1896 Revolution, 
blamed the Freemasonry for the spread of treasonous feelings among the Filipinos.306 
Aguinaldo—and many other Revolutionaries—were therefore already members of a 
subversive movement even before he joined the Katipunan. Indeed, Aguinaldo would say 
in his memoirs that, “Such was my joy in joining the Katipunan that all of my townmates 
that I was not able to enroll into the Masonry I enticed them into joining the 
Katipunan.”307 
This statement suggests that to Aguinaldo, the Freemasonry and the Katipunan 
were similar in goals and he did not see much difference in asking his fellow townmates 
in joining one or the other. 
There were important similarities between the rural and urban Katipuneros—both 
groups were neither the richest nor the poorest native Filipinos, and both groups evinced 
a strong dislike for a Spanish authority they felt was holding them back. The events of the 
1896 Revolution would show that both groups were willing to go to war to secure their 
rights, quite unlike the upper class of Filipino society. One of the Katipunan’s most 
important roles was therefore to act as a catalyst, bringing together ideas and people who 
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were already anti-Spanish, who had the willingness or the means to fight and giving them 
the idea that at some point the Filipinos must actually risk revolution.   
The Rise of Aguinaldo and the Rural Elites 
The rural Katipuneros had several advantages over their urban brethren when it 
came to staging an uprising. Municipal elites like Emilio Aguinaldo, Miguel Malvar and 
Mariano Alvarez achieved enough success that the leadership of the Revolution fell into 
their hands and Bonifacio faded in importance. The participation of the rural, municipal 
elites was therefore key to the Katipunan’s success during the 1896 Revolution, as it 
would be key to the Revolutionary Government’s success in the Philippine-American 
War. What advantages did these rural elites have over their urban counterparts?  
The first advantage that the rural Revolutionaries possessed were their 
experiences of leadership. None of the tiny number of mestizo officers seem to have 
joined in the 1896 Revolution which meant that the rural municipal elites were perhaps 
the only group of elites with the background that made them capable of leading an 
improvised military uprising. As the center of patronage networks these elites were 
probably better able to mobilize for war since they had access to material resources and 
manpower. 308 As overseers of agricultural enterprises or as municipal officials, these 
rural elites would also have had some experience of leading large bodies of men. 
Municipal officials may also have had some vague approximation of military experience, 
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since one of the duties of the municipal captain was to lead the local cuadrilleros in 
hunting bandits and in safeguarding the community.309 
The Revolutionary Government established by Emilio Aguinaldo acknowledged 
the importance of municipal elites to the cause. The form of government that he 
established was heavily dependent on local, municipal elites: in the circular announcing 
the creation of the new government, each town was tasked with creating a Municipal 
Committee that had broad responsibilities in justice, governance and in military 
matters.310 Indeed, the Secretary of War, Daniel Tirona, issued a circular mandating that 
municipal officials recruit soldiers in each local community. They knew how many men 
their towns could spare because “No one knows these things better than the municipal 
presidents and the military commanders of the respective towns” (“Ualang ibang 
makatatalastas kunde ang mga Plo [Pangulo], at mga pinuna sa digma ng bauat 
bayan”).311 
The second advantage the rural elites possessed was the fact that the Spanish 
forces in the countryside were extremely vestigial. Aguinaldo noted in his memoirs that 
in his town of Cavite el Viejo he had to deal with only three members of the Guardia 
Civil.312 For all of its infamy, the Guardia Civil was not a very effective institution by the 
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late 19th century due to a lack of funding, training and equipment.313 When this lack of 
efficacy was combined with scanty numbers, Aguinaldo and other rural elites had no 
troubles dealing with the local Spanish forces. 
Third, the rural elites in Cavite were probably slightly better equipped than 
Bonifacio’s men. Initially, Aguinaldo’s forces were as scantily equipped as their urban 
counterparts and he was forced to arm his men with wooden poles shouldered like guns 
in the hope that they would deceive the enemy.314 However, Aguinaldo was eventually 
able to acquire the stores of arms held by the rural police forces like the Guardia Civil or 
the cuadrilleros. Guns begat more guns: with his seven guns from the cuadrillero and 
Guardia Civil stores in Cavite Viejo—“seed weapons”—he managed to capture the 
stores of the Guardia Civil and the friars in Imus and he added 30 Remington guns, 2 
Winchester rifles (one of which became Aguinaldo’s personal weapon), a light artillery 
piece and a large quantity of ammunition.315 It was these weapons that encouraged 
Aguinaldo to take his stand at the bridge against General Ernesto Aguirre and it was these 
weapons that enabled his forces to discomfit the Spanish forces. The Alvarez clan was 
similarly successful in securing the local Spanish caches of weapons—their initial 
capture of the local Guardia Civil outpost in Noveleta yielded 28 guns.316 Like 
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Aguinaldo, the Alvarezes also managed to capture some guns from Spaniards sent to put 
down the revolt.317 
Eventually, the Cavite Revolutionaries created an impromptu arms and 
ammunition manufactory in San Francisco de Malabon when two Katipuneros from 
Manila arrived with “a large quantity of saltpeter, powder, lead, a crucible for a foundry 
and other implements probably stolen from the maestranza or Spanish arsenal.” The 
Caviteños also set up a foundry in Imus under a Chinese blacksmith named Jose Ignacio 
Pawa who even created crude and doubtfully effective makeshift artillery.318 These 
improvised support services were mainly in the employ of Aguinaldo’s forces, but they 
seem to have helped the Alvarez faction as well. 
The rural elites also seem to have had an easier time supplying their men with 
food and other such needs. For instance, the Revolutionary government of Aguinaldo was 
able to requisition rice from the farmers within its jurisdiction.319 The Revolutionary 
forces eventually set up a somewhat more formalized system of procurement that 
involved promising payments for its supplies.320 
However, it should not be assumed that the rural Revolutionaries were thereby 
well armed and well supplied. The Filipinos were still poorly provided for, especially 
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when compared to the Spanish forces. The Filipinos had constant problems finding 
reliable sources of weapons, spares, gunpowder and ammunition—the makeshift systems 
created in Cavite did not produce enough munitions and the Revolutionary Government 
was always on the lookout for possible sources of guns.321 So few weapons were 
available that most rural Revolutionaries were armed primarily with bolos and other 
edged weapons, and only a fraction of their troops had actual guns. The Revolutionary 
Government even issued a circular mandating the equipping of some soldiers with 
longbows—“the Bow should be as tall as the user.”322 Finally, there was also a lack of 
firearms exposure among the rural Filipinos—Santiago Alvarez described the awe and 
caution that he and his troopers felt when they captured their first Mauser rifle, which 
was then the standard firearm of the Spanish armed forces.323 
Fourth, Aguinaldo and the rural elites may also have had slightly better trained 
troops than Bonifacio at the outset of the Revolution. The core of Aguinaldo’s early 
forces was his cuadrilleros, the local police force under the command of the municipal 
presidente. On 23 June 1896, Aguinaldo inducted all 40 of his local cuadrilleros en 
masse into the Katipunan, although how well they sympathized with or understood the 
Katipunan’s message is highly debatable since he only explained the Katipunan’s 
message to them before inducting them.324 Given that most of the leaders of the 
Revolution in the countryside were local politicians like Aguinaldo, it is not unreasonable 
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to assume that they too would have been able to use their local cuadrilleros. Again, one 
should not exaggerate this advantage: the cuadrilleros were inferior even to the 
indifferently trained Guardia Civil, and they were part-time rural policemen, not soldiers.   
In addition to the police forces, the rural Revolutionaries may also have been able 
to draw upon the tulisanes. In his memoirs, Santiago Alvarez mentions that he recruited 
the “famous outlaw brothers Hipolito and Hermogenese Sakilayan” who he then tasked 
with recruiting men and gathering weapons.325 Outlaws may not necessarily have been 
any better as soldiers than cuadrilleros—perhaps with their lack of discipline they were 
even worse—but they would have been among the few Filipinos in Luzon with any 
experience of fighting.  
All in all, these advantages were enough to enable some of the rural Katipuneros 
to secure the countryside for the Revolution. Rural uprisings were not successful 
everywhere—for instance, a 3,000 strong uprising in Nueva Ecija failed in the face of 
very modest Spanish forces.326 But in places like Cavite and Batangas, the combination 
of rural elites and vestigial Spanish forces won out. 
The Fighting in Cavite 
After Aguinaldo’s early seizure of Kawit, he turned his attention to the town of 
Imus, where the Spanish friars and the local Guardia Civil had taken refuge in the friar’s 
casa hacienda, or estate house. According to Carlos Quirino, Baldomero Aguinaldo—
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Emilio’s cousin and one of his closest confederates—had failed to capture this building 
and Emilio could not countenance this blow to family prestige: “he [Emilio] would not let 
an Aguinaldo meet with failure.”327  On the other hand, Emilio Aguinaldo himself does 
not record this failure on Baldomero’s part and merely claims that the local presidente of 
Imus, Jose Tagle, had come to him asking for help in dislodging the Spanish forces. The 
casa hacienda was no easy target for the ill-armed and poorly trained Filipinos, it was a 
“compound surrounded by massive high walls of adobe stone—a veritable fortress.”328 
The casa hacienda also had a church with a tower in which the Guardia Civil had taken 
positions, further complicating the task of the Filipino attackers.329 Attacking this 
position required what Aguinaldo called “estrategia militar” and in his memoirs, he 
candidly admitted that “in my entire life, this was the first time that I had ever been faced 
with such a big problem” (“sa pagka’t sa tanang buhay ko ay ngayon lamang ako 
mapapasuong sa ganito kalaking suliranin sa buhay”).330 
Aguinaldo’s first solution was to divide his forces to try and attack the casa 
hacienda from three sides. He gave command of the two other prongs of the attack to 
Jose Tagle and Baldomero while he gave himself the most difficult assignment: the 
frontal attack. Despite this stratagem, the assault failed in the face of enemy firepower 
and because of the strength of the enemy position. The Guardia Civil in the tower kept up 
a galling fire and were aided by the surprisingly warlike friars who fired through the 
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windows of the hacienda.331 Aguinaldo took this defeat in remarkable stride and after 
regrouping he carefully observed all sides of the enemy position. He then observed that 
there was a warehouse full of rice near the hacienda and he had his men set fire to this 
warehouse to smoke out the Spanish forces. This ultimately succeeded and resulted in a 
victory for Aguinaldo. 
The victory in Imus on 1 Sept 1896 was immediately followed by a defeat.332 
Aguinaldo received word that a column of Guardia Civil infantry and cavalry under 
General Ernesto Aguirre of the Spanish general staff had been sent to succor the 
Spaniards trapped in Imus. Aguirre could only gather 100 men from the garrison in the 
Arsenal in Cavite and so his column was greatly outnumbered by the Filipinos.333 
Aguinaldo gathered what forces he could and force-marched south to meet 
Aguirre. He initially took up positions outside a church at Bacoor, which was a town 
north of Imus. The church had the advantage of a low stone wall and Aguinaldo placed 
his only seven riflemen behind this wall along with some of his bolo-armed men. 
However, the local Katipunan head led them to some trenches that the local townspeople 
had dug and which Aguinaldo decided to use because they were“truly well made” 
(“totoong magaling ang pagkakayari”).334 This proved to be a mistake since Aguinaldo 
ran into Aguirre’s column on his way to these trenches and what ensued can only be 
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described as a meeting engagement, or a situation when two forces are advancing with no 
one side possessing the advantage of the defense. Aguinaldo had not sent any scouts 
ahead of his column and he blundered into the Guardia Civil who surprised the Filipino 
forces with gunfire. Aguinaldo’s little army disintegrated almost immediately and he 
ruefully noted in his memoirs that his forces would not listen to his orders to charge. 
(“hindi ko maiutos na sisirin”).335 Aguinaldo only survived by playing dead until the 
Spanish forces left and he could make his way back to Imus. 
Aguinaldo’s most famous victory came soon after—and it was against the same 
General Ernesto Aguirre who had almost killed him near Bacoor. Aguirre had not pressed 
his previous success and had turned back from Imus to Manila. He returned to Cavite on 
3 Sept 1896, once again determined to pacify Imus.336 This time, Aguinaldo had learnt 
his lesson and he decided to wait for Aguirre’s forces on the banks of a river crossed by a 
stone bridge. Aguinaldo had the bridge demolished and disguised this fact from the 
Spanish. He also ordered the creation of trenches and other defenses to shelter his men 
while they covered the bridge.   
The Spanish forces that advanced on the Filipinos were a mixed force of regular 
and Guardia Civil cavalry, artillery and infantry.337 The Spanish forces confidently 
launched a frontal assault of the rebel trenches, but despite being preceded by a light 
bombardment from some mountain guns, the attack was stopped by the dismantled bridge 
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and the Filipino fire. The Spanish forces withdrew to regroup and Aguinaldo decided to 
counterattack. He led a small group of handpicked men across a ford and fell on the 
enemy flank. This broke the Spanish ranks, and they fled in disorder, chased by the 
victorious Filipinos. While scouring the battlefield, Aguinaldo acquired one of his most 
prized possession: Aguirre’s Toledo-forged saber, or his sable de mando—officer’s 
sword.338 
Other Revolutionaries in Cavite also managed to defeat the Spanish forces in their 
areas and the province was eventually liberated. Spanish rule in Cavite collapsed and in 
the ensuing power vacuum, two rival governments were established in the province: the 
Magdalo government, headed by Emilio Aguinaldo, and the Magdiwang Government 
headed by Mariano Alvarez. These two factions would eventually be caught up in 
fratricidal infighting but this should not distract from the fact that their accomplishment 
was a historical first. For the first time, Filipino resistance groups had managed to defeat 
the Spanish and instead of fleeing to the hills and forests, the Filipinos laid claim to 
territory that they subsequently governed. While these two governments did not rule 
more than half the province each, they aspired to be national governments. They were 
structured after the colonial government, with presidents and a full complement of 
cabinet secretaries, like Secretary of Justice and Secretary of Agriculture.339 These 
governments can therefore be seen as nationalist institutions in seed form and while it 
might seem rather absurd for a government that ruled barely half of a small province to 
be electing a “Mataas na Pangulung-Pangkalahatan” or  “Venerable All-Over President” 
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it showed that these governments were laying claim to the entire Philippines.340 The 
nationalist aspirations of the Katipunan were taken one step further, so it was unfortunate 
that the 1896 Revolution came to a ruinous end in 1897. 
Defeat in Cavite 
The Spanish colonial authorities recovered from their initial panic and they 
stopped sending ill-prepared forces into Cavite piecemeal. Instead, they consolidated 
their hold on Manila and called for reinforcements. Lacking any sort of navy, the 
Filipinos were unable to prevent these reinforcements from landing. Capturing Manila 
would have helped, since it would have deprived the Spanish of Manila’s 
communications facilities (like the telegram line to Spain) or its port facilities, but with 
the defeat of Bonifacio’s forces, Manila was essentially immune from Revolutionary 
attack. The Spanish therefore had a secure line of reinforcement and resupply, the 
continued flow of which was subject only to the willingness of the metropole to keep 
sending resources to the Philippines. Conversely, the Filipinos would steadily weaken 
since the forces in Cavite had no access to foreign weapons and because the province’s 
isolation and the disunity of the Revolution meant they could not expect much in the way 
of reinforcements.  
The Spanish government replaced the current governor general Rámon Blanco 
with Camilo de Polavieja, a career soldier with combat experience in Africa, and he 
brought with him a contingent of soldiers from Spain. The Spanish formed the “Division 
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Lachambre,” named after its commander, Jóse de Lachambre. In his account of the 
campaign, staff officer Federico de Monteverde y Sedano, claimed that the division had 
13,580 men in combat formations, while Carlos Quirino estimated that the division had 
22,000 men in total.341 While other rebellions of varying degrees of success and intensity 
had broken out in other parts of the Philippines the Spanish decided to focus on the 
Filipinos in Cavite, rightly surmising that this was the Revolution’s center of gravity. 
They thus isolated the province and after planning and preparation, they hurled the 
Lachambre Division at the insurgents in Cavite. At this point the Revolution was 
essentially lost since the Lachambre Division—a small unit by European standards—
represented a concentration of force that the Filipinos simply could not hope to stop. 
The Lachambre Division was large and unwieldy, and as Monteverde admits, it 
had a difficult time traversing the rough terrain and poor roads of Cavite. It had to divide 
into smaller columns by necessity and its routes of advance had to be carefully planned 
so it could unite when attacking but it was otherwise slow-moving and difficult to 
maneuver. The Division’s greatest strength therefore was when attacking and moving 
straight ahead. Its main objectives matched the Division’s strengths: to simply advance 
and crush any opposition and to impress Spanish authority by the marching of her 
soldiers on rebel ground.342 
However, the Spanish were lucky in that the Filipino strategy maximized the 
strengths of the Spanish forces. The Filipinos tended to sit defensively, presenting the 
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Spanish with an inviting and accessible target for their unwieldy mass of soldiers. The 
Filipinos therefore met a concentration of force with their own concentration of force, 
which was a fundamentally flawed strategy.  
What prevented the situation from becoming an unmitigated disaster was the fact 
that the Filipinos also fought from the tactical defensive, sheltering in trenches and other 
field fortifications. These defenses were often well-designed, perhaps because of 
Edilberto Evangelista, a Belgian trained engineer and the only Propagandist to join in the 
Revolution. Aguinaldo claims to have held Evangelista in very high regard and it is 
perhaps no exaggeration that without his defenses, the Filipinos would have done even 
worse.343 It was unfortunate that Evangelista was lost early during the Lachambre 
offensive, although the Filipino entrenchments continued to be excellent. They could also 
be quite extensive: the Filipinos dug trenches 3 kilometers long to defend a small town 
known as Anabo II.344 A tactical defensive is proverbially stronger than a tactical 
offensive and fighting on the defensive was easier for the poorly trained Filipino officers 
and men, since the static way in which the Filipinos fought did not place a lot of demands 
on the men’s initiative and cohesion.  
However, the Filipinos were generally unable to prevent the Spanish from 
constantly defeating and capturing their defenses. In general, it seems as if the Filipinos 
only stymied the Lachambre Division’s attacks whenever the Spanish made mistakes. 
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One example was the Battle of Anabo II and Pasong Santol. On 7 March, the Spanish 
forces captured the town of Salitran, and were surprised to find that the expected 
concentration of Revolutionary forces was not there. As it turned out, Aguinaldo had 
decided to defend a village a short distance from Salitran, Anabo II, instead. A small 
Spanish reconnaissance force was caught in the open by the Filipino forces and suffered 
heavy casualties, including the loss of its commander, Colonel Antonio Zabala.345 Even 
this success proved brief and illusory, however, since the Spanish were able to bring up 
reinforcements and rout the Filipinos from their trenches. 
The Filipinos launched a handful counterattacks, but these were also frontal 
affairs that came to naught in the face of Spanish professionalism and firepower. For 
instance, during the Filipino attempt to recapture Silang, Aguinaldo admitted that many 
of his troops ran away upon contact with the enemy and he had to chase after his troops 
in order to rally them.346 
A detailed examination of the campaigns during the 1896 Revolution will have to 
await another study. Suffice it to say for now that despite their trenches, the Filipino 
forces were driven out of Cavite. The Revolutionary Government—now composed of 
Aguinaldo and his closest confederates—was finally forced to engage in that age-old 
Filipino practice of decamping and fleeing from superior forces. Aguinaldo was now a 
remontado, and like all remontado, he was difficult to capture and represented a threat to 
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the established order by simply staying alive and keeping his force in being. However, his 
ability to affect affairs in the Philippines was thereby greatly diminished. 
Why did the Filipinos even try to stand up to the Spanish in head-on 
confrontations? This strategy clearly played into Spanish hands and emphasized Filipino 
weaknesses. Why did they not use mobile columns, and maximize their familiarity with 
the terrain and the unwieldiness of the Lachambre Division to attack and ambush the 
various Spanish detachments on the march? Why not hit the Spaniards’ vulnerable supply 
columns or supply depots? Why allow the Spanish forces to advance practically 
unhindered across ground that would have been perfect for ambushes and night attacks? 
Indeed, why confront the Spanish at all? Why not run to the mountains and force the 
Spanish to disperse, instead of giving them an easy target? 
As to the first strategy, a mobile, hit-and-run approach would have required far 
more training, staff work and professionalism than the Filipinos possessed. Detecting and 
attacking the Spanish columns would have required a high degree of planning and well-
trained officers and men in order to achieve the desired coordination. Such a strategy was 
probably beyond the Filipino forces. It would have also required a high degree of 
cooperation and trust among the officers, which did not exist in the fractured ranks of the 
Revolutionary leadership. 
Why did the Filipinos not engage in guerrilla tactics and decamp to the hills and 
mountains? This was probably not acceptable to the leaders of the Revolution for various 
reasons. First, it would have involved abandoning their lands, homes and wealth—
perhaps something not acceptable to these landed elites. Second, the Revolutionary 
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leaders aspired to be centralizing nation-builders. Their goal was to create a Philippine 
state, which can only be achieved with great difficulty while hiding in the mountains. 
Their notion of a state resembled the Spanish colonial state, hence why Aguinaldo and 
the other Revolutionaries seized local centers of power and created governments with 
territorial jurisdictions. Hiding in the mountains, isolated from the populace, from the 
centers of power and even from each other is not conducive to nation-building. Finally, it 
may also represent a lack of willingness to engage in the difficult and uncomfortable 
lifestyle of an outlaw in the jungle, a style of life associated with the poor and the 
disaffected, not with the landed, economic elite. However, it must be stressed that these 
points are conjectural and a deeper examination of the1896 Revolution will have to wait. 
Throughout this military crisis, the Revolutionary leadership was absorbed in a 
bitter and counterproductive struggle for leadership. Disunity and factionalism were 
constant problems for the Filipino independence movement, from the Propagandists to 
the Katipunan. In 1896, there was no individual charismatic enough to truly unite a 
critical mass of Filipinos, and beyond anger with the Spanish, neither was there an idea 
strong enough around which people could rally and for which they were willing to forego 
personal interest. The Revolutionaries were united by a common set of grievances, but 
not by a common set of goals. Thus, the removal of the colonial government in Cavite 
created a power vacuum, a situation remarkably similar in nature to the mandala or 
“circle of kings” of prehispanic times but with a big difference: the Katipunan had 
created the idea of a unified Philippines. A few of the more ambitious Revolutionists now 
had a new objective during the conflict: to become the leader of this unified, Philippine 
nation-state and trying to get other Filipinos to accept their authority.  
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The Aguinaldo and Alvarez factions contended with each other for supreme 
leadership of the Revolution, and this struggle eventually drew in Andres Bonifacio. This 
conflict has been much studied and analyzed by Philippine historiography. Reynaldo 
Ileto’s conclusion that “[elite] rivalry would harm the revolution from within” can be 
taken as the orthodoxy: there is a widely held belief in the historiography of the 
Revolution that disunity harmed the Filipino cause and may even have led to their 
defeat.347 It is certainly true that disunity was harmful, at least to cohesion or “morale”, 
but it is also doubtful that absolute unanimity would have done much to change the 
ultimate outcome of the 1896 Revolution. Even if the Magdalo and Magdiwang factions 
had worked together, they would not have had any better training in military leadership, 
and neither would they have had better-trained and disciplined soldiers or more guns. 
Unless the Filipinos also changed their strategy then unity would not have done much to 
affect the outcome and may simply have meant more Filipinos sitting supinely in their 
well-constructed trenches. Zeal for a cause alone cannot guarantee victory, as Tadeusz 
Kościuszko can attest. 
 However, the Revolutionary leaders expended much effort and energy in trying 
to resolve this internal conflict. Was this ambition coming into play? Or perhaps the 
Filipinos merely dealt with the one problem at hand that seemed the most familiar and to 
which they could offer real solutions: political and dynastic rivalry were contests in 
which these municipal elites had much experience. It would certainly have been a more 
intelligible problem than military tactics and strategy. Finally, it may even been linked to 
the Filipino idea of loob or inner quality. This follows the ancient Filipino belief that the 
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spiritual and moral tone of individuals affect the external world, and in this case, conflict 
and disunity might perhaps be interpreted as a weakening of inner resolve and physical 
prowess in combat.348 Again, this is conjecture and more work needs to be done on the 
Revolution. 
By the middle of 1897, the province of Cavite had been overrun by the 
Lachambre Division and the uprising there was largely defeated. Aguinaldo spent the last 
few months of the year on the run, a headache for the Spaniards and a constant drain on 
their resources, but not much of threat and unable to influence events or advance the 
cause of Filipino nationalism.349 Both sides eventually agreed to a truce, the Pact-of-
Biak-na-Bato and Aguinaldo sailed for exile in Hong Kong on 27 December 1897.350 In 
Hong Kong, Aguinaldo and a few other exiled Revolutionary leaders became known as 
the Hong Kong Junta. They did little until the outbreak of the Spanish-American War 
provided them with a means of returning to the Philippines. 
This was not the end of the fighting in the Philippines, however, and scattered 
uprisings occurred in various parts of the archipelago. None were very successful, but 
they finally forced the Spanish to disperse their forces. If the Revolution had actually 
been coordinated across several provinces—if it had actually been national in practice 
and organization and not just in its aspirations—then perhaps the fighting in Cavite might 
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have turned out differently. For now, the Revolution was in abeyance and it would not be 
until 1898 that it would be fought out again in earnest. 
Conclusion 
The Filipino Revolutionaries were clearly unprepared for the outbreak of 
hostilities in 1896. The Katipunan was still in the early phases of recruitment and 
expansion when it was discovered by the Spanish and pitched into war. Thus, when 
fighting began the Katipunan had no war plans, no caches of arms, no training or any 
other serious preparation for the violent revolution it was advocating. We will never 
know if, given time, the Katipunan would have ever turned into an effective insurgent or 
revolutionary organization. The Katipunan’s unpreparedness was the primary factor that 
dictated the course of events from hereon in.  
This unpreparedness was largely why the rural elites who had joined or 
sympathized with the Katipunan’s cause became the leaders of the Revolution: they had 
inherent advantages like human resources to mobilize, experiences in leadership, or 
scanty opposition. Thus, the 1896 Revolution saw the rise of rural municipal elites, the 
most notable of whom was Emilio Aguinaldo—the mayor of a small town who would 
one day become the first Filipino president. Alongside him rose other rural elites, men 
like Miguel Malvar, Mariano Trias, Daniel Tirona and Artemio Ricarte 
However, this unpreparedness was also why the Revolutionaries did not have 
trained officers or personnel, a source of weapons or plans. Thus, the Revolutionaries 
were most successful when attacking isolated Spanish outposts or countering haphazard, 
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poorly-prepared Spanish attacks. When the Spanish finally landed reinforcements—
something that the Filipinos were completely incapable of preventing—then the Filipinos 
were in trouble. The social background and lack of preparedness of the rural elites who 
commanded the Revolution meant that they picked a strategy that played to the strengths 
of the Spanish: the Filipinos sat passively on the defensive, waiting to be attacked. Their 
counterattacks were equally ill-starred and tended to be frontal attacks on prepared 
Spanish positions. The Filipino leadership had no way of rectifying these problems and 
they concentrated instead on the issue of division and discord in the leadership ranks of 
the Revolution. 
The 1896 Revolution marked the beginning of almost 6 years of intermittent 
combat in the Philippines. The Revolutionists would have very little respite and very few 
opportunities to rectify their shortcomings. It would not be remiss to say that none of 
these deficiencies would truly be corrected by the time of the Philippine-American War. 
Almost all of the same circumstances would prevail: the dominance of the rural elites and 
the lack of guns, training and organization on the part of the Revolutionary leadership.   
But these negative factors aside, the 1896 Revolution also marked the first time 
that Filipinos used violence or force in order to attain nationalistic goals. The Revolution 
was therefore the advent of national warfare in the Philippines. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE STRATEGY AND POLITICS OF THE PHILIPPINES 
 
The 1896 Revolution saw the introduction of national warfare to Philippine 
military history, but it remained largely theoretical: neither the Katipunan nor the 
Revolutionary Government exercised anything close to national authority. It was only in 
1898, when the Revolution was renewed that true national politics and warfare came to 
the Philippines. The Aguinaldo Government was the first indigenous Filipino government 
that could exercise—and claim—real and functioning authority over a significant portion 
of the Philippine Islands. This meant that the Aguinaldo Government was the first 
Filipino government that could theoretically muster the resources of the entire 
archipelago, and it was also the first native government that had the burden of having to 
enforce its authority and its will over a large expanse of territory.  
The Aguinaldo Government’s fundamental strategic mission was to defend and 
enforce its sovereignty within its claimed jurisdiction in the face of both internal and 
external threats. Internally, its biggest issue was the fact that not all Filipinos recognized 
its authority. Its external problems stemmed from its need to defend itself from foreign 
infringements on its sovereignty. There was something vaguely ironic about this strategic 
mission, however: Aguinaldo professed to be defending a Filipino nation, but it did not 
yet exist. Aguinaldo essentially had to create the nation that he was ostensibly defending.  
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The Aguinaldo Government’s internal and external concerns were very closely 
intertwined. Aguinaldo used external concerns—worries about foreign invasion and 
recognition—to justify strengthening his domestic power. In other words, his justification 
for nation-building was external threats. This is not unique to the Philippines: war and 
military organization have historically been intimately connected with the centralization 
and strengthening of governments. What this chapter will argue, however, is that the 
Aguinaldo Government had to use either the prospect of foreign intervention or the 
exigencies of war to justify its nation-building project. That necessity was due to the 
newness of the endeavor: Aguinaldo lacked a historical example from which to draw 
legitimacy and he had to rely on his accomplishments as a commander in the 1896 
Revolution.  
Despite the newness of his endeavors, Aguinaldo’s war-making and nation-
building were not a radical break from the past. Rather, Aguinaldo continued to be 
influenced by circumstances and cultural trends that had influenced Philippine military 
history and politics for the past 300 years. Some of these circumstances included the 
continuing multi-polarity of Philippine politics, the unchanged nature of Philippine 
geography, the continuing importance of internal and external trade, and the continuing 
importance of prowess, spirituality and display in the exercise of leadership. As this 
chapter demonstrates, the Philippine-American War was not a break with the Philippine 
military past, but a part of it. 
In this chapter I will focus on the social, economic and political factors that 
influenced the course of the Philippine-American War—in other words, historical factors 
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other than war that affected conflict. These factors were particularly important in 
determining the strategy, the nexus of politics, economics and war. Strategy is the arena 
of policy where, Basil Lidell-Hart argues, the leaders of a war “co-ordinate and direct all 
the resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object 
of the war—the goal defined by fundamental policy.” 351 
The Aguinaldo Government had a grand strategy, one that tried to match the 
economic, military and political resources it thought it had to its desired ends. It was also 
a strategy that tried to employ political action as well as military force. We will examine 
these resources and these goals—both of which were determined by internal and external 
considerations. That is, we will see what the Filipino leaders wanted, and how they 
attempted to achieve these goals.  
The Aguinaldo Government 
The Filipino leadership discussed here is the Aguinaldo Government—the 
organization headed by Emilio Aguinaldo. It was a group of young men who eventually 
formed the first national government of the Philippines in 1898. There were other 
indigenous political actors in the Philippines during this period, and while they will be 
mentioned, they are not considered a part of the central cadre that was at the heart of what 
became the national government of the Philippines. They were limited in their influence: 
either because they were only politically significant in local settings, or they were 
associated with the central leadership cadre only temporarily. Here we shall discuss who 
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the main national leaders of the Philippines were, the nature of their claims to leadership, 
and the dynamics of their interactions with each other.  
The apogee of the Aguinaldo Government’s power and relevance was in 1898-
1899. Not coincidentally, this period is most represented in the Philippine Insurgent 
Records, since the Aguinaldo Government was then most active and therefore generated 
the most documentation. By 1900 the Aguinaldo Government was in hiding, its influence 
had dwindled considerably, and its bureaucratic structure had fallen apart. The Americans 
captured Aguinaldo on 23 March 1901 and at this point the government became the 
“Malvar Government”—named after a close confederate of Aguinaldo, Miguel Malvar. 
While the Malvar Government still claimed to be a national government, its realm of 
authority was circumscribed and very localized. In many ways, the Malvar Government 
(or even the late Aguinaldo Government) more closely resembled the remontado 
resistance groups of the past, and the collapse of indigenous central authority in 1900 
marked the effective end of the nation-building experiment. Hence, the focus will be on 
the years 1898-1899, the period of true national warfare and politics. 
Who were the people in this government? Obviously, the foremost member was 
Emilio Aguinaldo, the former small-town official who became the putative head of the 
1896 Revolution. In many ways, Aguinaldo was an unlikely candidate as the head of a 
national government. As the last chapter showed, he had been a man of only modest 
wealth, education and accomplishments especially in comparison to well-known 
ilustrado like Jose Rizal or Juan Luna. During the 1896 Revolution, Aguinaldo had risen 
to prominence and had been elected “president,” but in actuality his authority had been 
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severely challenged by rivals like Andres Bonifacio and the Alvarez clan, and it had also 
been strictly localized to Cavite.  
Aguinaldo overcame these challenges to his authority, and the years 1898-1899 
would find him at the height of his career. He became diktador, capitán general, and 
presidente: theoretically the most powerful man in the Philippines, its first truly national 
leader and commander of its first national army. It was quite an ascent for this former 
small-town mayor and petty trader. History would show Aguinaldo to be an extremely 
ambitious person, and he would also prove to be ruthless in his efforts to maintain his 
position. 
What was Aguinaldo’s claim to power? Aguinaldo owed his prominence to his 
apparent skill as a commander in the 1896 Revolution. His reputation was mentioned in 
one of the Hong Kong Junta’s actas: “the glory which the President so worthily 
conquered in the last rebellion.”352 Additionally, in the circular he released upon landing 
in the Philippines, Aguinaldo noted, “I will once again take on the command of all the 
armed forces until we have achieved our noble desire [of independence.]” Here we see 
Aguinaldo specifying that he had returned to re-assume military command, emphasizing 
his role as a military commander. He did not even mention his status as the elected 
president of the 1896 Revolution. 
Throughout the war, Aguinaldo never relinquished his role as supreme 
commander of the armed forces and he issued as many (surprisingly specific) orders as 
capitán general as he did as presidente or diktador. Even if he did not write these orders 
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himself, they bore his name and indicate a desire to be seen as commanding the army in a 
real capacity. For instance, on 16 July 1898, two months after his return to the 
Philippines, he sent a telegram to one of his commanders, General Mariano Noriel, 
advising him on the deployment of a specific artillery detachment in support of an attack 
on the Spaniards.353 There are other such documents in the PIR and they contain 
commands that give quite detailed and specific operational orders. 
Given Aguinaldo’s emphasis on the military element, it made sense that he would 
also praise war and the use of force. In a published message about the Revolution 
addressed to the Filipino people Aguinaldo said: 
It is a truth that the clean renewal of a country’s honor [requires] the use of force, 
in order to achieve the strength given to it by God. 
Sa pagka’t isang katotohanan na ang malinis na Pagbabangong puri ng bayan ay 
ang paggamit nito ng karahasan, upang maigiit ang kapangyarihang 
ipinagkaloob sa kaniya ng Dios.354 
He also praised the army at the end of a speech at the opening of the Congress of 
Malolos, “Mabuhay ang Puno at Caual na nagtangol nitong Sangcapuluan!” or “Long 
live the Leader and the Soldiers who defended this Archipelago!”355 In general, this 
praise emphasized the army’s victories in spite of facing formidable enemy forces. 
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So important was the martial dimension to Aguinaldo’s exercise of leadership that 
the very first government he organized in 1898 was a military dictatorship. Until he had 
secured his position, Aguinaldo and his advisor Apolinario Mabini clearly felt that he 
could only justify his assumption of supreme authority in the Philippines by invoking 
military necessity. In the 24 May 1898 decree that established this dictatorial 
government, Aguinaldo specifically stated that he was suspending or invalidating the 
Republic formed in the “past insurrection” and replacing it with a dictatorial government 
until “tranquility” had returned and “the legitimate aspiration of liberty had been 
completed.”356 Thus, he was explicitly using his capacity as military commander of the 
Revolution to reassert control over both the army and civilian government. 
One consequence of Aguinaldo’s militarism was that the army became a political 
power in its own right. Aguinaldo was therefore quite concerned with the army’s loyalty, 
and he tried to staff its highest echelons with close associates, or he tried to win over the 
loyalty of men he had to appoint as military officers but who had not started out as his 
partisans.  
The Hong Kong Junta, the cadre of former Revolutionary leaders who had gone 
into exile with Aguinaldo, dominated the government’s inner leadership circle. The group 
included Teodoro Sandico, Tomas Mascardo, Miguel Malvar, Mariano Llanera, Vicente 
Lucban, Galicano Apacible, Vito Belarmino, Gregorio del Pilar and Manuel Tinio.357  
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Aguinaldo reposed a considerable amount of trust in these men and packed his military 
high command with them. Half of the signatories of one of the Hong Kong Junta’s most 
important actas would become senior officers in the army.358 Sandico is a particularly 
noteworthy example: he first served as Secretary of Foreign Affairs but, instead of 
quitting when he was ousted by Pedro Paterno’s takeover of the Cabinet, he joined the 
army and continued fighting under Aguinaldo’s banner. 
The Hong Kong Junta was a fairly heterogeneous group, composed of men from 
different social circles, provinces and backgrounds. A few had backgrounds similar to 
Emilio Aguinaldo’s. Malvar, Llanera, Mascardo, and Tinio had been rural municipal 
elites, serving as either small town mayors or local notables.359 On the other hand, three 
members of the Hong Kong Junta, Apacible, Gregorio del Pilar and Sandico, might be 
considered ilustrados in the same category as Jose Rizal, men with a measure of wealth 
and with degrees from prestigious schools in the Philippines or in Europe.360 Only one 
was not a Tagalog: Vicente Lukban, from the Visayas.  
Despite these differences, these were the men who were the most faithful to the 
cause of Philippine independence and Aguinaldo, not surrendering or defecting when the 
going got rough, and not attempting to supplant or overthrow the president. Glenn May 
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has written that old school ties helped create leadership networks among Revolutionaries 
in Batangas and perhaps the Hong Kong Junta’s prolonged exile together served a similar 
function.361 The members of the Junta were together in Hong Kong for several long and 
lonely months—enough time for them to form bonds and forge a common purpose. 
Once Aguinaldo had re-established himself in the Philippines, his inner circle 
expanded to include non-Hong Kong Junta members, most of whom had some strong 
personal connection with Aguinaldo. For example, his cousin Baldomero Aguinaldo 
served as Secretary of War in the first year of the 1898 Revolution. A list of army officers 
found in the PIR also shows the predominance of Caviteños and Aguinaldo partisans in 
high military command: Daniel Tirona, Emiliano Riego de Dios, Mariano Trias, 
Pantaleon Garcia, Mariano Noriel, and Jose Ignacio Pawa.362  
A number of other people who had been active in the 1896 Revolution and who 
had not sided against Aguinaldo also seem to have become part of Aguinaldo’s 
leadership cadre: men like Paciano Rizal, Juan Cailles and Artemio Ricarte. Why they 
joined the Aguinaldo Government is difficult to answer. Perhaps they did so out of a 
patriotitic desire to help in the nationalist cause. One possible explanation was that they 
were ambitious men and military office offered them an avenue to power and influence 
on a wider stage. Few of these men were otherwise remarkable in their wealth, education, 
or influence. This situation was echoed in the lives and careers of the more junior 
officers, men who also tended to be drawn from municipal rural elites or former 
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students—generally men who still belonged to the elite classes of the Philippines but 
were not as highly socially positioned as, say, Jose Rizal or the other Propagandists. 363 
In sum, the relationship dynamics in the leadership cadre in the Aguinaldo 
Government was highly personalistic. Among the high command of the government, 
interpersonal bonds, charisma and personal accomplishment played key roles in how 
leadership was exercised. Aguinaldo tended to trust members of the Hong Kong Junta 
along with former Revolutionary comrades and friends and kinsmen from Cavite. This 
was a small group that amounted to perhaps forty or so men but they formed the core of 
Filipino leadership. When I write about the “Aguinaldo Government,” I henceforth refer 
to these men, the main deciders and initiators of policy in the national, central 
government that arose after the collapse of Spanish authority in 1898. This group was 
predominantly military so it can also be said that central government in the Philippines 
was practically synonymous with the army.  
The Idea of Independence 
What did Aguinaldo and other leaders of the government mean when they spoke 
of Philippine independence? According Reynaldo Ileto, the ilustrado idea of 
independence was closely modeled on the Western idea of a “sovereign nation” with 
established borders within which “all of its inhabitants…pledge loyalty to the 
government and constitution.”364 This was certainly correct: there are parts of the 
Malolos Constitution that were practically word for word restatements of the Spanish 
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Constitution of 1812. Significantly both constitutions define sovereignty as “residing 
exclusively in the people.”365 Article 20 of Mabini’s rejected constitutional project, the 
Panukala sa Pagkakana ng Republika nang Pilipinas also drew heavily on the Spanish 
1812 Constitution, similarly defining sovereignty as bounded by territory.366  
That article of Mabini’s Panukala also defined the territorial extent that the 
Aguinaldo Government was claiming: Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao and “all the islands 
attached to those [three regions] just mentioned.” Since no indigenous prehispanic polity 
had ever ruled this much of the archipelago, this territorial claim was obviously derived 
entirely from the Spaniards, and corresponded to the jurisdiction of the colonial state. 
Mabini even went so far as to invite the inhabitants of the Marianas, Carolinas and “all 
the others who were governed by the Spanish Government here in Oceania” to join the 
Philippines.367  
Aguinaldo stated the territorial extent of the new Philippine nation in a draft of a 
letter to President William McKinley: “The Spanish possessions in the Oceania constitute 
the Independent State known as the Republic of the Philippines.“368 However, the 
Aguinaldo Government may not have viewed the Marianas or the Carolinas as integral to 
Philippines since Aguinaldo wrote to Sandico suggesting that these two places be offered 
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to America in exchange for an alliance. Those were bold words, considering the lack of 
control the Filipinos had over these areas.369 
Within this bounded territory, independence meant political autonomy or in 
Aguinaldo’s words, to have Filipinos “led or headed by other Filipinos,” (“pagpunuan ng 
kapua Filipino”).370 Aguinaldo echoed the sentiment in a propaganda piece, written by 
him, that he ordered Mabini to translate in such a way as to make it seem as if an 
American soldier had written it.371 In this document, Aguinaldo invoked the Monroe 
Doctrine, stating that Monroe had claimed that “America is for Americans” (“Ang 
Amerika ay para sa Amerikano”) and that logically “the Philippines is also for the 
Filipinos” (“Ang Filipinas ay para sa Filipinas naman”).372 What Aguinaldo does not 
express publicly was that he and his closest confederates were the “kapua Filipino” who 
would lead the country. Implicit in these statements was that the idea of independence 
also meant defending his personal rule. The Aguinaldo Government’s basic political 
objective was therefore the maintenance of the authority of its members as the leaders of 
a national government in the face the face of external or internal threats. This notion of 
independence had two extremely important consequences when it came to the conduct of 
war.  
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First, the emphasis on definite boundaries meant that the Aguinaldo Government 
could not tolerate a hostile force or foreign government imposing its authority within 
these borders. Foreign invasion or intervention into Philippines affairs was a constant fear 
of the Aguinaldo Government. The Revolutionary leaders referred to the uncertain fate of 
the archipelago as the “Philippine question” and they were afraid that some other power 
might decide to settle this question by infringing on Philippine territory. The Hong Kong 
Junta was already concerned about foreign intervention even before the renewal of the 
Revolution against Spain and it also had deep concerns about allying with America.373 
Later, during the Philippine-American War, Mabini wrote that the Philippines could still 
be endangered by the “intervention” of foreign powers. 374  
This fear of foreign intervention was borne out when the Americans finally 
declared their policy on the Philippines. On 24 December 1898, general Ewell Otis 
announced in no uncertain terms that the United States “intends to establish among them 
[the Filipinos] an efficient and most stable form of government.” 375 The Aguinaldo 
government quite rightly saw this pronouncement as a challenge to its authority. On 5 
January 1899, Aguinaldo published a protest against the proclamation of Otis: “Protesto 
contra ese acto tan inesperado de la soberania de America en estas islas,” or “I protest 
against this unexpected act [imposing] American sovereignty on these islands.”376 At 
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some point prior to the outbreak of the Philippine-American War in 4 February 1899, the 
Americans threatened to land troops in the southern island of Panay. Sticking to its 
assertions of sovereignty, the Aguinaldo Government threatened war—a threat that was 
averted when the Americans backed down.377  
A fear of foreign intervention went hand in hand with fears of foreign military 
power. The specific example was obviously the United States, a country whose strength 
had been praised prior to the outbreak of war. Once the war began, this praise turned into 
dire warnings of the difficulties about resorting to strength of arms in securing 
independence. For instance, Mabini claimed that the Americans had “armies, squadrons 
[fleets] and the unlimited resources of a great and powerful nation.”378 In a message to 
the Filipino people, Aguinaldo described the Americans as the “Coloso Norte 
Americano,” and commented that “the enemy is extremely rich and powerful.”379   
Second, sovereignty also had to be enforced within its borders. It must constantly 
be stressed that Filipino nationalism at this juncture was weak and that the Filipinos were 
more united in grievance than in a common identity. That age-old quality of Philippine 
politics, multi-polarity, or the existence of multiple contending groups and individuals of 
power and influence, reasserted itself with the collapse of Spanish authority in 1898. 
Dealing with this multi-polarity was the major internal challenge of the Aguinaldo 
Government.  
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An important source of disunity came from regional divisions.380 Aguinaldo’s 
authority was strongest in Luzon, close to his seat of power, but it faded the farther one 
traveled. The Aguinaldo Government was particularly weak in the Visayas, the island 
group south of Luzon. The members of the Aguinaldo Government were predominantly 
Tagalog and the linguistic differences between Tagalogs and the Cebuano-speaking 
Visayans have been much commented upon by American observers who were fixated 
with “ethnic” or “tribal” differences. But what was more important was the lack of 
interaction between the two regional elites—they generally did not go to the same 
schools, they did not operate in the same social circles and the commercial networks of 
the two places were largely separated. 381 This meant that there were few of the all-
important interpersonal bonds and networks between members of the Aguinaldo 
Government and the Visayan elites. Thus, it was only wherever Vicente Lukban 
established himself that the Aguinaldo Government managed to exercise any real 
authority. Lukban had been a member of the Hong Kong Junta and a close associate of 
Aguinaldo. 
Otherwise, the Visayans were reluctant to accept Aguinaldo’s authority. The 
sugar planters of Negros, for instance, formed their own army and government after the 
collapse of Spanish authority. They refused to affiliate themselves with the Aguinaldo 
Government, or even with other Visayan independence movements. They sent a florid 
letter to Aguinaldo that praised his victories but basically wanted a “federal government” 
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or one that gave them plenty of local autonomy.382 The government of Negros eventually 
welcomed American authority and (more importantly) military protection.383 The 
Negrenses were not alone in this sentiment and many people in Cebu accepted American 
authority too, thereby challenging the legitimacy and authority of the Aguinaldo 
Government in the south of the Philippines.384  
The Aguinaldo Government also faced challenges from some elites who simply 
did not want to acknowledge its claims to leadership. There may have been a social or 
class-based element to this resistance since these elites were led by Cullinane’s “urban 
elites,” the wealthiest and most educated Filipinos whose influence could be far-
reaching.385 These people threatened the Aguinaldo Government by either staying neutral 
during the fighting or by actively trying to take over the reins of government. In two of 
his speeches Aguinaldo complained of the “learned” and wealthy men who either did not 
help the “mangmang” (“ignorant”) or demanded high office as the price of their 
allegiance.386 It is interesting to note that Aguinaldo did not see himself as one of these 
wealthy ilustrados. In his Christmas address in December 1898, he claimed that in other 
countries, the rich led revolutions but, “here, it is the opposite and the revolution was 
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initiated by the poor,” (“nguni ditto sa atin ay naguing baligtad at nagbuhat sa 
mahihirap”).387 
No other person epitomized these ilustrado better than Pedro Paterno. Paterno 
was an ilustrado of the first rank: wealthy, educated, and a friend of famous and 
prestigious Propagandists like Jose Rizal or Juan Luna. In the early days of the 1898 
Revolution, Paterno was against the cause of independence and released a circular calling 
for “Spanish sovereignty and Filipino autonomy” that was denounced by the Aguinaldo 
government.388 Despite this early hostility towards him, Paterno somehow worked his 
way into government and became powerful enough to unseat the cabinet headed by 
Aguinaldo’s advisor Apolinario Mabini in May 1899.389 Paterno was not working alone: 
other elite Filipinos of similar wealth and standing thrust themselves into power now that 
the hard fighting appeared to be finished. This provoked a crisis in government: Teodoro 
Agoncillo’s eponymous “crisis of the Republic,” an episode which has received much 
scholarly attention from Philippine historians.390   
We do not have the details on how these elite Filipinos joined the government, but 
we do know that Aguinaldo invited them. There were two reasons why the Aguinaldo 
Government needed these elites. The first was the most obvious: the government needed 
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their wealth. The other reason was that Aguinaldo valued the Westernized education of 
the ilustrado, which he thought would give prestige to his government, making it 
acceptable to foreigners.391 
How exactly the non-cooperation of these elites threatened the Aguinaldo 
Government is somewhat more difficult to assess. The standard accusation leveled at 
them by Philippine historians is that the ilustrados were quick to surrender to the 
Americans and thereby weakened the Filipinos’ will to fight. It is true that the Paterno 
Cabinet stated that one of the reasons why it had unseated Mabini was because of the 
latter’s unwillingness to negotiate with the Americans.392 Yet as shall be seen, the 
fundamental strategy of the Aguinaldo Government remained unchanged and the war 
obviously continued despite the change in the composition of the cabinet. As Nick 
Joaquin pointed out, not all high-ranking ilustrado were willing to give up the fight.393  
These ilustrados also tried to use the Malolos Constitution to reduce the power of 
the president and the regional congress in favor of a senate, presumably filled with these 
elites.394 The threat they posed to Aguinaldo has probably been overstated, however. 
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Paterno and the others were never part of the army, the main source of power in the 
government, and as a result their authority was limited. Paterno seems to have recognized 
this limitation and he tried to affiliate the cabinet with the army by convincing Aguinaldo 
to grant its members officer rank.395 Paterno’s attempts to do so can be seen as failures, 
since they didn’t actually command any troops and, as the case of Juan Luna’s brother 
Antonio will later show, rank alone did not automatically confer respect and obedience in 
an army where interpersonal networks were more important. 
The ilustrados’ threat to Aguinaldo also tended to solve itself since many of these 
fair weather patriots quickly surrendered to the Americans when the fighting turned sour, 
thereby limiting their impact. Finally, Aguinaldo and his fellows could be ruthless if they 
wanted to be. People who were perceived as threats to his hold on authority were often 
simply killed—Andres Bonifacio and Antonio Luna being prime examples.  
Ultimately, the biggest threat that the ilustrados’ non-cooperation likely posed to 
the Aguinaldo Government was that it weakened the government’s legitimacy and denied 
it needed money.396 Whether these issues were serious enough to have cost the 
Philippines the war as Teodoro Agoncillo implies is much more debatable. Perhaps the 
ilustrado were simply not that important. After all, they did not have the ability to muster 
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manpower and resources for the army. The rural municipal elites were much more 
important and the Aguinaldo Government relied on them much more heavily.  
In fact, an equally pressing internal threat to the Aguinaldo Government’s 
authority and claims to sovereignty came from people on the opposite end of the socio-
economic spectrum: from the tulisanes, remontado and religious cults. These anti-
establishment, peasant resistance groups persisted even after the declaration of 
independence simply because the Aguinaldo Government never fundamentally addressed 
their concerns. Thus you have Pio del Pilar and Vicente Lukban both complaining of 
attacks by bandits, or by people that del Pilar called “men of bad life.”397 Officials also 
complained of cults, like the “Catipunan ni San Cristobal” and the “Guardia de Honor”398 
There were other threats to law and order, such as attacks from Igorots, Muslim tribes, 
people who disrupted elections and many others.399  
The Aguinaldo Government’s Strategy 
The Aguinaldo Government came up with a strategy to deal with these internal 
and external threats to its authority. In a circular aimed at the Filipino people, Aguinaldo 
wrote that his Government wanted, “Firmness and justice in the interior, culture and 
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propaganda in the exterior” (“Fortaleza y justicia en el Interior, Cultura y propaganda en 
el Exterior”).400  
The Aguinaldo Government aimed at gaining foreign recognition of its 
sovereignty while consolidating its authority within the Philippines. These two points 
were closely linked: the Aguinaldo Government believed that foreign governments would 
only recognize the Philippines’ right to self-rule if the Filipinos portrayed themselves as 
civilized and therefore “worthy” of independence. Hence, the Philippines had to be 
“orderly” in its internal affairs, which meant that everybody had to acknowledge its 
authority and follow its laws. Not coincidentally, if it was unified and orderly internally, 
the Philippines would also be in a better defensive posture militarily. 
However, the Aguinaldo Government wished to avoid military confrontation as 
much as possible largely because its members did not think that the Philippines could 
defend itself against a foreign military power. They constantly stressed the weakness of 
the Philippines.401 For instance, in September 1898, Aguinaldo stated that the Philippine 
victory over the Spanish in 1898 was accomplished by “[an] army [that] was improvised 
and lacking in arms” (“hocbo ay pagdumali at salat sa sandata”).402 Aguinaldo was not 
the only Revolutionary leader to note the Filipinos’ lack of arms. A member of the Hong 
Kong Junta, Aurelio Tolentino, wrote a tract that emphasized the heroism of the 
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Revolutionary forces who defeated the Spanish with barely any weapons or military 
training.403 
The Aguinaldo Government also confronted what was essentially an insoluble 
strategic dilemma: the problem of sea control. The Philippines could be dominated by an 
enemy who could exert control over the seas around it.404 As the 1896 Revolution had 
shown, the Filipinos might be able to overcome the scattered, isolated and poorly armed 
Spanish garrisons, but they could do nothing to prevent the reinforcement and resupply of 
Spanish forces. The Filipinos also lacked the ability to disrupt or prevent littoral naval 
operations, like coastal bombardment, blockade, or amphibious landings because of a 
lack of coastal anti-ship weaponry like heavy artillery or sea mines.  
Sea control was also vital to the Philippines’ military economy, since the 
Philippine archipelago did not possess any arms industries of any size. This was a 
product of Spanish law—in particular, a piece of legislation which states that weapons 
production could only take  “place in the manufacturing establishments that they have in 
the Artillery Corps in the Peninsula.”405 Only gunpowder and ammunition was 
manufactured in the Archipelago.406 However, Aguinaldo would claim that the 
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Philippines lacked “Fábrica de Municieónes de Guerra,” or “factories for munitions” 
which suggests that what arms production did exist was probably very limited.407 
The problem of sea control also meant that the Philippine civilian economy could 
be hampered by blockade. As the last chapter showed, the late 19th century Philippine 
economy had become highly export and import dependent, and access to foreign markets 
and capital was crucial for the wealthier Filipinos—precisely those Filipinos who were 
the leaders of the 1896 and 1898 Revolutions and the Philippine-American War.  
Because of these challenges, any revolt or armed resistance by Filipinos had to 
achieve their objectives before weapons and ammunition ran out and before a blockade 
wrecked the export economy. Incidentally, these issues of sea control suggest that even 
with ilustrado financial support, the Aguinaldo Government would always have problems 
securing weapons since any weapons purchased abroad had to be able to make it through 
an enemy blockade.  
The Quest for Recognition 
The Aguinaldo Government’s answer to its external problems was a “strategy of 
recognition.”408 To put it simply, the government attempted to use propaganda, lobbying, 
and diplomacy to secure recognition by foreign governments and thereby secure outside 
aid or head off any foreign invasions. Incidentally, foreign recognition would also ensure 
the continuation of external economic contact. 
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The Filipino leadership initiated its strategy of recognition abroad almost as soon 
as it had established itself in the Philippines. The government created a department of 
Foreign Affairs, whose secretary was one of the most important members of the 
Cabinet.409 The department was to set up foreign embassies tasked with propagandizing 
and diplomatic negotiations. They also were to arrange the shipments of arms and 
supplies that were required by the Philippine government.  
The foreign service and its mission were elaborated upon in a formal plan of 
diplomatic action that outlined in detail how the Aguinaldo Government wished to 
organize its diplomatic campaign.410 Embassies with committees like “Centros de 
Información y Propaganda” and “Agencias de información y propaganda” were to be 
established in Manila, Washington, Saigon, France, Germany and Spain. These were to 
work with the press in order to disseminate the message of the Aguinaldo Government, 
portraying its cause as just and the Filipinos as civilized. 
The embassies would do more than just propagandize; they were also tasked with 
negotiating commercial contracts. Such trade agreements were considered a tool of 
foreign diplomacy, or a way to secure recognition and aid—and to trade for weapons if 
they could. The embassy to Saigon was singled out as being specifically tasked with arms 
procurement, since that city was under the control of a neutral power. 
                                                
409 R9F82D1, E. Aguinaldo. Capitulo 1, “Del Gobierno Revolucionario,” Articulo 4 and Articulo 31. 
Cavite, 23 June 1898; R11F111D10, E. Aguinaldo. Bacoor, 24 August 1898. Also R24F385D5. 
410 R17F205D1, “Plan diplomatico que se propone para su desarrollo al Consejos.” 
162 
However, the main role of all of these embassies remained propagandizing, either 
through the foreign press or by directly lobbying foreign governments. This was similar 
to the unsuccessful and disorganized efforts of the ilustrado Propagandists in Spain and it 
is to be wondered whether the Aguinaldo Government drew its inspiration from them. 
The embassy to the United States would also try to lobby the American Congress 
directly and much was made of the upcoming session of Congress on 5 October, since the 
Aguinaldo Government thought that this was when the American government would 
deliberate on what to do with the Philippines.411 It was therefore important for the 
American Congress “to hear the voice of the Philippine people” (“oír la voz de pueblo 
Filipino”). The document advocated campaigning or lobbying for the Filipino cause in 
the hope that it would aid the cause of the Democratic Party that formed the 
opposition.412  
The Aguinaldo Government’s propaganda effort emphasized a few basic points. 
First, it asserted that Aguinaldo had come to an agreement with Dewey and other 
American officials in Asia. In return for Filipino aid, the Americans would recognize 
Filipino independence.  One finds an example of this claim in a manifesto known as the 
Reseña Veridica de la Revolución Filipina (“The True Version of the Philippine 
Revolution”), a document that was to be distributed to the foreign press and foreign 
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governments.413  The Reseña went into detail regarding the discussions and negotiations 
between Aguinaldo and several U.S. officials. One of its arguments was that Admiral 
Dewey had recognized Philippine independence, which bound the U.S. government, and 
which also obligated the U.S. Navy to take the new republic under its protection.414 
Morality played a key role in Philippine propaganda. The Aguinaldo Government 
was eager to portray itself as the “good” party, fighting a war it had been forced into 
because the United States had reneged on an agreement. This claim was, it should be 
noted, quite similar to the Filipino belief that the 1896 and 1898 Revolutions, were 
necessary because the Spanish had broken their word in the Blood Compact and in the 
Pact of Biak-na-Bato. 
A second point the Aguinaldo Government often made in its propaganda was that 
the Americans were violating their own principles in waging war against the Filipinos. In 
fact, the Filipino leadership argued that the Filipinos’ reasons for fighting foreign 
invaders were not much different from the ones that impelled the Americans to go to war 
against the British. An undated and unsigned flyer aimed at Americans—a rare Filipino 
document written in English—goes so far as to claim that the Filipinos were fighting for 
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the same principles that (supposedly) motivated the Americans in their Revolution: 
Liberty, Equality and Fraternity.415   
Finally, the Aguinaldo Government’s propaganda was keen to show the 
Philippines as a civilized country that was deserving of independence. The propaganda 
tried to paint a picture of an orderly, peaceful Filipino society that followed all the rules 
of Western civilization. For example, on 6 August 1898, the government published a 
circular signed by Aguinaldo aimed at foreign governments that emphasized the level of 
culture and civilization of the Filipinos by noting how “perfect tranquility” existed in 
areas under its control and the army was organized along Western lines and treated its 
prisoners well.416 Another example was a piece of propaganda from 1 August 1898, 
which claimed that the Filipinos rose up in revolt against Spain not out of revenge, but 
out of a desire for freedom.417 The Revolution’s only object was to free the people from 
the chains of servitude, and it was undertaken with “a desire for perfect order and justice, 
repudiating the savage life and loving civilization” (“sino que tiene idea perfecta del 
orden y de la justicia, huye de la vida salvaje y ama la civil”). The rest of it goes on much 
the same way: the Revolution and the Filipinos were high-minded and civilized, 
following all of the modern laws of progress, working for peace and prosperity.  
Similar propaganda was directed towards American soldiers in the Philippines. In 
“A Mis Paisanos Americanos,” the Filipinos are described as “enlightened” or have 
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“awakened minds” and are “of one heart.”418 The propaganda piece also enjoins the 
American soldiers “Do not believe what foreign newspapers say that the Philippinos are 
‘salvajes,’ you well see that such a thing is not true.” It also repeats the claim that the 
Filipinos had cooperated with Americans in defeating the Spanish, and now that the 
Spanish forces were gone, the American mission was complete. A similar message could 
be found in a flyer captured by the Americans in Batangas in 1900.419  
Interestingly, Aguinaldo’s claims resembles those of the ilustrado 
Propagandists—that Filipinos were just as civilized as the Spaniards and were therefore 
worthy of political equality. It is more than likely that the Aguinaldo Government was 
inspired by or actually used their ideas.  
The Aguinaldo Government did not want the Americans to just leave, however. 
420  Their fears of foreign intervention made them desirous of some kind of alliance with 
the Americans. On 6 June 1898, one of the members of the Hong Kong Junta suggested 
that the Filipinos ask for protectorate status from the Americans.421 In a letter to 
Aguinaldo dated 31 August 1898, one A. Zialcita—apparently one of the officials 
negotiating with the Americans—advised Aguinaldo to offer trade concessions to the 
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Americans in return for their protection.422 Even the supposedly intransigent Mabini sent 
a telegram to President McKinley that stated that the Filipinos were seeking an 
arrangement with the Americans for protectorate status.423 Protectorate status did not 
mean colonial status, however, and the way the Filipinos described it made it clear that 
they sought an alliance between equals, “in the custom of a defensive [pact].”424 One of 
the things that the Aguinaldo Government sought was for an American naval squadron to 
be stationed in the Philippines—a clear sign that the Filipinos understood the importance 
of sea control.425  
Teodoro Sandico had a different idea: he wished to appeal to every other power to 
fight the Americans. He thought that it was possible that the “Philippine question” might 
end in an international conflict that would oblige the Americans to abandon the war. He 
was of the opinion that the justice of the Filipino cause might induce sympathy among 
Europeans, and he also thought that the American position in the Philippines was 
contrary to European and Asian interests. Sandico specifically mentioned Japan as a 
possible ally.426 
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The Organization of the Interior 
The second half of the Aguinaldo Government’s strategy involved “firmness and 
justice in the interior.” The Aguinaldo Government’s goal of “strengthening” the interior 
basically meant overcoming the problem of multipolarity. It had to unify and centralize 
power and reduce resistance to its authority. This task was linked to external 
considerations, since the Aguinaldo Government believed that the strategy of recognition 
required the trappings of European-style governance and a show of internal stability in 
order to convince foreign powers of the Filipino right to self-rule.  
On a practical level, the Aguinaldo Government first had to convince Filipinos to 
accept its authority; second, create a political system that was acceptable to foreigners 
and which would enforce or maintain its rule inside the Philippines, and third it had to 
install a system that could gather the resources it needed to maintain its army and 
bureaucratic structure and thereby carry out the first two objectives. 
The Aguinaldo Government was quite concerned with “unity,” by which it meant 
acceptance of the Aguinaldo Government’s authority. Disunity, or internal divisions, 
Aguinaldo warned, could lead to civil war, which could lead to “the complete ruin of our 
adored Country.”427 For example, Aguinaldo appealed to the still-extant Katipunans or 
secret organizations to cease any further plotting. Apparently some Revolutionaries were 
disgruntled at what they felt was a lack of appreciation for their efforts and Aguinaldo 
had to appeal to them to accept his authority for the sake of order, good governance, and 
the esteem of other nations, which depended on the smooth and peaceful functioning of 
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Filipino political institutions.428 There are other speeches and circulars where Aguinaldo 
stressed the need for Filipinos to be united, to be of one “loob” and support his rule.429  
Second, the Aguinaldo Government theoretically adopted Western-derived forms 
of elected, representative government with executive and legislative branches.430 
Aguinaldo took great stock in the outward form or appearance of his government. In a 
draft of one of his speeches, he essentially stated that the Philippines’ adoption of a 
Republican form of government, with a constitution and representatives, showed the 
country’s fitness for self-rule since it echoed the systems in Europe.431  
Government in the Philippines was reorganized in June and July of 1898 
following two decrees issued on 18 and 23 June.432 In practice, this reorganization 
created a government that was far less democratic and representative than Aguinaldo’s 
propaganda made out. For instance, property qualifications meant that only a tiny handful 
of wealthy people in each town were actually eligible to vote or hold office, a situation 
largely unchanged from Spanish times.433 Furthermore, the government was not as far-
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reaching as Aguinaldo claimed. The military situation prevented many provinces from 
having elected representatives in Congress both during the 1898 reorganization and after 
the outbreak of the Philippine-American War. To maintain the image of a national 
congress, Aguinaldo simply assigned these provinces representatives, a good number of 
whom were his close, military, confederates.434  
Thus while the Aguinaldo Government claimed to be a widely-based democracy, 
in practical terms it had a much narrower base: its primary constituency were the rural 
municipal elites. These were the Filipinos with power and influence in their rural towns 
and villages—the same ones as had been in power in their locales in Spanish times—and 
they were Aguinaldo’s most logical constituency, since he was one of them.435 Given that 
they were also the Filipinos drawn into local government in Spanish times, they also had 
experience in the practical matters of governance that included gathering taxes and 
mustering manpower.436  
This leads to the third point: the structure that the Aguinaldo Government created 
to collect the resources it needed and to maintain order was based on these municipal 
elites. They had important roles to play in the collection of taxes and the organization and 
supply of local military and security forces stationed nearby.437 These men became the 
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linchpin of the Aguinaldo Government, and without them governance and war would 
simply not have been possible—something that Aguinaldo publicly acknowledged.438 
The loss of the assistance of these rural elites could prove critical. For example, in 
Iloilo Tagalog forces sent to “aid” the locals came into conflict with them instead because 
the local elites were unwilling to give the Aguinaldo Government control over their 
resources. 439 As a consequence, the locals were unwilling to supply the Tagalog soldiers 
with food and the Aguinaldo Government’s efforts in Iloilo foundered because its forces 
were logistically dependent on local communities. Milagros Guerrero is correct in 
pointing out that the relationship between “civilian and military elements of the 
government” was crucial to the conduct and outcome of the war.440 In modern military 
parlance, the rural elites were the “center of gravity” of the Philippine forces—that is, 
“the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will 
to act.”441  
On top of these local government units Aguinaldo placed the superstructure of his 
national government. It was divided into civilian and military branches with Aguinaldo 
himself heading both. In practice, the military branch of government tended to be the 
more important branch since it was the centralizing force and the primary representative 
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of the Aguinaldo Government in most towns and provinces. For instance, in the early 
days of the 1898 Revolution, army officers were tasked with overseeing the political 
reorganization whenever Spanish power was expelled in a region.442 The onset of peace 
after the collapse of Spanish authority was supposed to have reduced their authority and 
civilian offices like the Secretary of the Interior did indeed assume greater importance.443 
However, the outbreak of the Philippine-American War once again gave the military 
officers considerable authority by virtue of the exigencies of war.  
Another reason for the military branch’s dominance was the fact that it was, as 
mentioned previously, largely staffed by people Aguinaldo trusted. Aguinaldo doubtless 
felt more comfortable in entrusting considerable political power to those men. Thus, 
Aguinaldo sent these trusted men to establish the Government’s authority in some of the 
more far-flung corners of the Philippines—places where Aguinaldo had no real contacts 
or networks and where adhesion to the central government was not necessarily 
automatic.444 An illustrative example was Daniel Tirona’s expedition to Aparri, in the 
very far north of Luzon, where he was sent to gain the allegiance of the locals and 
reorganize their government.445 Tirona’s efforts inevitably led to tensions with local 
officials. He was even moved to complain of the “despotism” and lack of cooperation of 
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the local civil officials, who in turn complained of the “abuses” committed by him and 
his soldiers.446  
Underpinning this ascendancy of the military hierarchy was the fact that the 
military controlled access to a vital and widely sought-after commodity: weapons. Since, 
as we have seen, there were no indigenous arms industry in the archipelago, there were 
very few guns as well. The Aguinaldo Government itself had the advantage of having the 
largest stockpile of weapons and potential access to foreign sources of weaponry. So, for 
example, the Aguinaldo Government received a large shipment of weaponry sometime in 
June of 1898 (most likely the largest such shipment it acquired during its existence). This 
was a shipment of 1,992 Mauser rifles and 200,000 rounds of ammunition—a purchase 
that had been expedited by the American consul of Hong Kong Rounceville Wildman.447 
The shipment cost $60,000 (Spanish dollars), a sum that only the Aguinaldo Government 
could afford, since it was the only institution that had access to the settlement money 
from the Pact of Biak-na-Bato and that had the ability to impose taxes on large numbers 
of Filipinos. There was another shipment of 500 rifles, 500,000 cartridges and 2 Maxim 
machine guns from Canton that cost $137,287—again, a sum only the Aguinaldo 
Government could afford.448 The Aguinaldo Government also tried to control the 
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movement of guns within the Philippines and towns or provinces were forbidden from 
loaning their guns to other towns or provinces without permission.449 
These early shipments of weapons served as “seed weapons” so to speak, which 
the Aguinaldo Government used to establish itself. Every successful defeat of a Spanish 
garrison meant more captured weapons and more prestige for the government. With 
every victory, more people pledged allegiance to the Aguinaldo Government, which gave 
it more resources for further conquests. The effect was cumulative, and weapons were 
thereby used to grow the government’s power.  
Various local commanders and municipal elites sought weapons, since they 
needed arms or armed support to secure their own positions, keep order, and maintain the 
status quo. People had to petition the government for access to these weapons and control 
of them and their supply was therefore an important source of the Aguinaldo 
Government’s authority. For example, the Filipino elites attempting to capture the tiny 
Spanish garrison in the town of Baler eventually had to be given armed support—
including a modern cannon—by Aguinaldo.450 The Aguinaldo Government also used its 
military power to maintain “order” by quashing banditry and the like—a service sought 
after by the rural elites. Indeed, the Aguinaldo Government publicly declared that it 
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would eliminate all instances of banditry or “bandolerismo,” declaring that such disorders 
undermined the war effort.451 
Much more can be said about the topic of political organization but it would no 
longer be relevant to a study on military history.452 Suffice it to say for now that this 
political system—one that placed more power in the hands of municipal elites—seemed 
to work fairly well for Aguinaldo. For instance, the treasury estimated that at the end of 
December 1898, it had expenses of about $7,069,074.81 but an income of 
$7,078,365.41—a balance of $8,290.60 in its favor.453 In 1898, Aguinaldo faced many 
challenges from elites, bandits, foreigners and the like, but the political system he 
controlled worked well enough for him remain in command and reach the height of his 
power in late 1898 and early 1899. The question was whether the system could withstand 
the stresses of war. 
The Consequences of Politics and Strategy 
Was the Aguinaldo Government’s political strategy successful? Were its leaders 
able to secure “firmness and justice in the interior, culture and propaganda in the 
exterior?” 
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The Aguinaldo Government’s goal of strengthening its hold on power in the 
Philippines was a qualified success. There was resistance to Aguinaldo’s authority from 
some groups, like the ilustrado, but the rural municipal elites joined the government, and 
their support made the system work. Most of Luzon and parts of the Visayas 
acknowledged the authority of Aguinaldo. Stable structures of rule were created, taxes 
were collected, and laws were enforced. The Aguinaldo Government had access to a 
considerable amount of human and material resources and with it created the largest army 
any indigenous government had ever deployed. 
On the other hand, the strategy of recognition was an abject failure: it neither 
prevented the war, nor stopped it once it had begun. No foreign power was willing to 
recognize the Aguinaldo Government and the Americans were unwilling to enter into the 
proposed protectorate relationship and refused all offers of a ceasefire. The only terms to 
which the Americans were open was subordination, something which the Aguinaldo 
Government labeled as “autonomy” and which it rejected outright. Imperial racism and 
self-interest could not be overcome with appeals to liberalism and common humanity. 
This failure was not from a lack of trying: the Aguinaldo Government sent out 
agents in an attempt to carry out its diplomatic plan. Sixto Lopez was appointed as the 
general agent in London and Felipe Agoncillo was sent to America.454 Ultimately, the 
Filipinos never secured an audience with McKinley or any other American official of 
note, or with any European government. Japan became the focus of much diplomatic 
effort and Mariano Ponce and Gregorio Agoncillo (Felipe’s nephew) were sent to 
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Shanghai and Japan in an attempt to secure the support of the Chinese revolutionary party 
and the Japanese government.455 Negotiations with the Japanese seemed to bear fruit, 
since some members of the Japanese army and the Imperial Government expressed some 
interest in “the Philippine question.” The Japanese went so far as to send low-ranking 
army officers to the Philippines to examine the situation and offer advice.456 As late as 
1900, a Japanese Commission was sent to the Philippines, where meetings took place and 
some discussion of forming an alliance where “Asiaticos” like Filipinos, Japanese and all 
the inhabitants of “Colonias de color inglesas” would unite to oppose the white powers 
of Europe and America.457 Unfortunately, Japanese interest in the Philippines waned as 
the imperial government’s attitudes changed and despite some early promise, nothing 
came of these diplomatic efforts.458  
Whatever the case may be, the failure of the strategy of recognition may have 
doomed any Filipino resistance in the long run since they were now bedeviled by the 
same problem of sea control that had cost the Filipinos the war in 1896. The American 
naval blockade cut the Philippines off from foreign sources of weapons and trade, and it 
also cut inter-island contacts.459  
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The Aguinaldo Government’s internal and external political strategies had 
important effects on the course of the Philippine-American War. The government’s 
nationalist ideology and territoriality meant that it was now burdened with a strategic 
problem new to indigenous warfare: the problem of defending or enforcing its territorial 
integrity. The government also needed to maintain the loyalty of the municipal elites, 
without whom the political and military structures would fall apart. Finally, so concerned 
was the Aguinaldo Government with foreign recognition that it also tried to reform its 
army along Western lines. The next chapter is therefore closely integrated with this one: 
how did all these political and strategic factors directly influence military organization, 
action and outcome? 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE PHILIPPINE ARMY AND “GUERRA MODERNA” 
 
In this chapter, I will examine the organization of the military of the Philippines 
and the course of the fighting during the years 1898-1900. This period encompasses the 
renewal of the Philippine Revolution (1898) and the Battle of Manila, which occurred in 
February 1899, and was the first and arguably the most important engagement in the 
Philippine-American War. The Army that fought in the Battle of Manila was organized 
according to regulations laid down as a consequence of the 1898 Revolution, thus 
Revolution and the battle are intimately linked. The next chapter will discuss the rest of 
the Philippine-American War, when the Philippine Army had to deal with the 
consequences of defeat. The two chapters are linked, but are separated in the interest of 
clarity.  
The Aguinaldo Government’s mission remained unchanged: it had to defend its 
sovereignty from internal and external threats. In order to meet this goal, it decided to 
remake Philippine military culture. Aguinaldo displayed an awareness that the traditional 
style of resistance and conflict practiced in the Philippines—decampment and indirect 
warfare—was incompatible with his desire to create a centralized nation-state.  
In a 21 May proclamation Aguinaldo insisted that Filipinos fight in the style of 
“Guerra Moderna” or in Tagalog (and in Aguinaldo’s own translation) “Bagong Digma.” 
This “modern war” was defined as fighting in a civilized manner—showing mercy to 
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Spaniards who surrender, respecting foreigners and their property, and showing unity. 
The stated reason for fighting in this way was to impress the Americans and other foreign 
powers of the Filipinos’ level of culture and civilization. In return for this good behavior, 
foreign powers would recognize the Philippine nation.460 
Aguinaldo never explicitly described “Lumang Digma” or “ancient warfare,” but 
it can be said with certainty that he was calling for change in the Philippine military 
culture. Aguinaldo’s use of the term “modern warfare” is therefore critical because here 
we have a Filipino explicitly making a reference to a favored way of warfare that he 
associated with European mores. “Modern Warfare” was linked to notions of “civility” 
and was therefore a desire to appear European in order to be accepted by European 
powers. As mentioned in the previous chapter—any kind of armed resistance not part of a 
controlled, regular army was now considered “banditry” and was to be squashed by the 
central government.461 
 This was part of Aguinaldo’s strategy of recognition. Implicit was the notion that 
“civilized” warfare would require centralized control by the Aguinaldo Government of 
the use of armed force in the Philippines. “Guerra Moderna” was the military expression 
of “Firmness and justice in the interior, culture and propaganda in the exterior.”462 
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Unfortunately for Aguinaldo, he was not working with a blank slate. For instance, 
the political scene in the Philippines remained multi-polar, and local rural elites were still 
the only people who could lead an armed resistance in the countryside. These people had 
to become his officer corps, and they were not professionally trained and motivated 
soldiers. The attempt to remake the military culture of the Philippines therefore had a 
deleterious effect on the Philippine Army’s combat performance. The Aguinaldo 
Government would pay a very steep price for its decision to confront the Americans in a 
style that emphasized American strengths and Filipino weaknesses. 
The 1898 Revolution 
Emilio Aguinaldo’s exile to Hong Kong in 1897 seemed to have put a halt to the 
Philippine Revolution. The Filipino forces had been defeated, Aguinaldo was trapped and 
isolated in Hong Kong, and the Revolutionary leadership was divided, often bickering 
about money.463 Armed resistance continued even during Aguinaldo’s exile. Manuel 
Sastrón wrote that Filipino resistance to the Spaniards flared up soon after the Battle of 
Manila and he mentions a rebellion in Cebu in particular.464 Milagros Guerrerro was 
exaggerating somewhat when she claimed that Aguinaldo claimed “the people’s victory 
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as their own” but it is probably true that these instances of resistance threatened 
Aguinaldo’s prestige as a commander, specifically, his claim to be the sole commander of 
all Revolutionary forces. 
The Revolution therefore appeared to be dead in the water—until the American 
victory in the Battle of Manila Bay on 1 May 1898 changed the entire strategic situation. 
This event was the crucial turning point that allowed the continuation of the Philippine 
Revolution since the defeat of the Spanish navy solved the Filipinos’ problem of sea 
control. To put it simply, the American naval blockade prevented Spanish reinforcements 
and resupply. This was critical, since it was Spanish reinforcements that had turned the 
tide in the 1896 Revolution. Aguinaldo could now return to the Philippines. Because he 
had worked out an alliance of sorts with Dewey, the American fleet also allowed the 
revolutionaries to import weapons and ammunition. 
However, American assistance did not solve Aguinaldo’s biggest problems: he 
had no army with which to reconquer the Philippines. Aguinaldo and the rest of the Hong 
Kong Junta had been cut off from their power bases while in their uncomfortable exile, 
and the military structures they had organized back in 1896-1897 had been dissolved. To 
make matters worse, the Hong Kong Junta received word that a government was being 
formed back in the Philippines under American aegis. Aguinaldo therefore had to return 
as soon as possible or risk losing control of the Revolution. The news of the American 
victory and its aftermath therefore provoked debate among the members of the Hong 
Kong Junta as to what to do next.465 Teodoro Sandico argued that it was the threat of 
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division and dissension that made it “absolutely necessary” for Aguinaldo to return to the 
Philippines in order to take charge of the revolution. In his memoirs, an embittered 
Apolinario Mabini was rather more blunt and claimed that Aguinaldo returned because he 
was “fearful that other influential Filipinos (should rob him of glory and) reach an 
understanding with the Americans in the name of the people.”466  
In light of these concerns with disunity, it might therefore seem strange that upon 
landing, Aguinaldo immediately issued an edict that called upon the Filipinos to rise up 
on their own initiative.467 Another, undated, edict included the same command: the towns 
had to rise up in revolt and capture the Spaniards in their localities.468 It was specifically 
aimed at local municipal captains, although, if the capitán proved unwilling, then 
anybody who was open to the nationalist cause could take over and be recognized by the 
Aguinaldo Government. Any town that did join in revolt was to be considered the enemy. 
Aguinaldo’s pronouncements may seem contradictory to his desire for 
centralization and unity, but given the lack of military structures to reactivate, Aguinaldo 
probably had no choice but to recreate the spontaneous, multi-polar and largely disunited 
revolt of 1896. Thus, the Filipino forces that rose up in revolt in 1898 greatly resembled 
the forces that had done so in 1896: armed bands raised and led by rural elites who had 
common grievances but no common cause. Indeed, these bands were led by the very 
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same rural elites who had revolted in 1896: in Cavite, Mariano Trias, Ladislaw Diwa and 
Artemio Ricarte all took up arms against Spain once more.469 One major difference was 
that the Filipinos were now better armed, courtesy of the Spaniards, who had enlisted 
their former enemies into the local militia in a rather misguided attempt to secure 
manpower and support in the fight against the Americans.470 
It was the scattered, de-centralized forces that Aguinaldo had called into being on 
21 May 1898 that did the most to defeat Spanish colonialism. These scattered forces 
began to engage the various Spanish forces in the Philippines, with most of the action 
happening in Luzon. John Taylor claimed that “a swarm of insurgents surrounded 
Manila” on 1 June 1898, following the defection from the Spanish side of a large portion 
of the Filipino militia to Aguinaldo’s cause. On 5 June Filipinos began to attack the line 
of blockhouses defending Manila.471 The contemporary Spanish historian Severo Gomez 
Nuñez, who noted that the Filipino attacks on the outskirts of Manila had begun as early 
as June, corroborates this.472 On 7 July 1898, Aguinaldo commanded the “heads of 
towns” or “Punong Bayan” to organize attacks by the sandatahan or the militia on 
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Manila—perhaps inviting the scattered bands of insurgents to gather around the city?473 
Either way, the city was fully besieged by Filipino and American forces by July. 474 
When the commander of the American 8th Corps, General Wesley Merritt, arrived 
in Manila on 25 July 1898, he claimed that: 
The Filipinos, or insurgent forces at war with Spain, had, prior to the arrival of the 
American land forces, been waging a desultory warfare with the Spaniards for 
several months, and were at the time of my arrival in considerable force, variously 
estimated and never accurately ascertained, but probably not far from 12,000 men. 
These troops were well supplied with small arms, with plenty of ammunition and 
several field guns, had obtained positions of investment opposite to the Spanish 
line…475 
Thus, this decentralized Filipino army had effectively destroyed Spanish power in 
Luzon, either capturing the Spanish garrisons or forcing them to retreat to Manila. By 
July of 1898, the Americans declared that, “Spanish power is dead beyond possibility of 
resurrection.”476  
There is very little documentation on this “desultory warfare.” What little there is 
suggests it was a repeat of the 1896 Revolution, where Filipino forces, raised by local 
elites who controlled the countryside, defeated small Spanish garrisons. However, 
American naval superiority prevented the reinforcement and resupply of Spanish forces 
in the archipelago, effectively isolating the Spanish army in the Philippines. The situation 
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was exacerbated by poor Spanish leadership, which chose to defend as much of the 
Philippines as possible with small contingents of soldiers.  
These small garrisons were thoroughly demoralized and it seems that in some 
cases the Spanish never fought at all. Isolated, outnumbered, with no hope of rescue, 
many of these isolated Spanish garrisons wisely chose to surrender.477 The defection of 
the Philippine militias was a particularly powerful spur to surrender. For instance, 
Sergeant Carrasco surrendered his tiny band of 19 Spanish soldiers in San Miguel de 
Mayumo in Bulacan after 300 of the Filipino militia defected to the Revolutionary 
cause.478 In another instance, Aguinaldo noted in a letter to Pio del Pilar, that the Spanish 
governor of Laguna was willing to give up his entire province if Aguinaldo allowed him 
and 700 Spanish prisoners to retreat to Manila unharmed.479 
When combat did occur, the Spanish suffered because of their demoralization, 
dispersion, and isolation. Three encounters can serve as examples: the combats in Cavite, 
Batangas, and Baler. 
Manuel Sityar, a mestizo staff officer serving in the Spanish army, describes how 
in Cavite—the center of gravity of the 1898 Revolution—the commanding general 
Leopoldo Garcia Peña completely mishandled the situation.480 Peña sent out a small force 
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of Spanish soldiers to confront the Revolutionaries, but this force apparently marched out 
blind, with no reconnaissance or intelligence and was ambushed by forces under Mariano 
Trias. The Filipino ambushers fired their guns simultaneously and this so intimidated the 
Spanish that they surrendered. Not only is this indicative of the incredibly low morale of 
the Spanish but the use of intimidation is also a continuation of age-old patterns of 
Filipino warfare. After this incident, Spanish morale completely collapsed and they 
surrendered to the Filipinos. The only garrison in Cavite to resist was the one in Kawit, 
which the Filipinos bombarded into submission. The Filipinos even mounted cannons on 
small boats in order to bombard the Spanish position from the seaward side. Remarkably, 
the Spanish endured this cannonade and eventually surrendered only because they ran out 
of ammunition.481 
 In the province of Batangas, Spanish forces holed up in the cabecera or town 
center of Tayabas. As described by Reynaldo Ileto, this siege eventually involved 15,000 
Filipinos—an improbably high number—against a mere 443 Spaniards.482  Various 
armed bands of Filipinos congregated on Tayabas, surrounded the Spanish position and 
proceeded to besiege and bombard the hapless garrison. The Filipino commanders issued 
a set of orders that aimed to restore discipline in the rag-tag force, with much of it 
echoing Aguinaldo’s constant rejoinder that the Filipinos act in a civilized manner and 
treat their prisoners well. But there is more, and as Ileto notes: 
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The final order is interesting: it reminds the soldiers that despite all the shooting, 
bombing and cannonades, the aim of the operations is to sitiar, to closely 
surround and besiege the enemy, rather than to wantonly advance against them.483  
Miguel Malvar, a member of the Hong Kong Junta, eventually took command of 
the forces and launched a few failed assaults on the wildly outnumbered Spaniards. 
Eventually, the Spanish simply surrendered—and found out that they had been opposed 
by 15,000 Filipinos armed with 7,500 Mauser rifles and who had fired an incredible 
500,000 cartridges.484 These numbers are very likely exaggerated, but they are probably 
indicative of the fact that at this stage of the war, the Filipinos were sufficiently well-
armed and supplied with ammunition and could achieve fire superiority over the 
Spaniards. 
Finally there was the celebrated siege of Baler. Baler was a small and rather 
unimportant town in the east coast of Luzon where a small band of Spanish soldiers held 
out in a siege that was celebrated by the Spaniards as their one lone accomplishment in 
this phase of the Philippine Revolution.485 As in the other sieges, the original commander 
mishandled the situation by not taking warnings of a hostile populace seriously, not 
conducting intelligence gathering, and not preparing for hostilities by gathering supplies 
or improving his defenses. The siege began sometime in June of 1898 and for the next 
several months, the Spanish holed up in the local church while the Filipinos launched 
occasional assaults, maintained a constant bombardment and expended prodigious 
amounts of rifle ammunition. Despite these efforts, and despite the fact that steady 
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attrition reduced the garrison to fewer than 35 men, the Filipinos were unable to secure a 
victory. The siege dragged on for 10 months, sustained largely because the Spanish 
commander stubbornly—and rather unintelligently—refused to believe that the Spanish 
had already given up on the Philippines. In the end, the garrison in Baler surrendered of 
their own volition—they were not defeated, despite being vastly outnumbered and 
outgunned by their Filipino opponents. The siege of Baler shows how critical morale and 
will was to these encounters: if the Spaniards were willing to endure the privations of a 
prolonged siege they proved surprisingly capable of resisting the Filipinos. 
The surviving Spanish forces retreated to Manila and were then besieged by the 
Filipino forces. The Filipinos were soon joined by Americans, who keenly observed the 
Filipino siege, already half-suspecting they would have to fight their former allies. Thus, 
the siege of Manila might give some idea of how Filipinos carried out their other sieges.  
The first most obvious thing that the Filipinos did was to circumvallate—
construct fortifications—around the Spanish position in Manila. These fortifications were 
generally trenches, and they were “skillfully constructed.”486 More will be said about the 
Filipino fortifications later since they were the same ones used in the battle of Manila in 
February 1899. The Filipino soldiers did not hold their positions with any consistency 
and one American observer claimed that Filipino troops had a tendency to leave their 
trenches whenever they felt like it.487 The Philippine Army had to issue orders preventing 
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Filipinos from entering American lines, which suggests a certain lack of control over the 
movements of its soldiers.488  
As in the two other sieges, Filipino troops also constantly—and rather 
indiscriminately—fired their rifles at Spanish defenses. John T. McCutcheon, the noted 
reporter and political cartoonist, wrote that a Filipino soldier “fires his rifle whenever he 
feels like it and often when a Spaniard’s head is not even in sight.” This observer came to 
the conclusion that Filipino soldiers “are not drilled and disciplined, but they love to fight 
and in that respect are effective soldiers.” 489 Lt. A. J. Luther, of the First Colorado 
Volunteers, observed that, “the Spanish and the insurgents continually trade volleys, but 
neither side seems able to hit anything.”490 
It will never be known if the Filipinos could have captured the city of Manila on 
their own. The presence of the Americans hampered Filipino freedom of action and the 
Treaty of Paris terminated the siege without any Philippine input. Perhaps it was for the 
best, since the Filipino style of siege warfare had the potential of producing a disaster 
because of all the non-combatants in the city. Constant small arms firing and cannonades 
might have produced immense civilian casualties. Furthermore, the Filipino tendency of 
starving out Spanish garrisons it could not assault would also have affected Manila’s 
civilian population very badly. Indeed, one reporter observed how the two-month siege 
that actually did occur already produced a dire situation: 
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Manila had become a city of dread, poverty, almost of starvation, and isolated 
entirely by reason of all railway and telegraphic communication having been cut 
off by the Filipinos. Bread could not be obtained because the stock of flour had 
been exhausted, and cattle were not to be had. The inhabitants were therefore 
compelled to eat the carabaos.491 
In the other sieges the Filipinos living in the towns and villages where the 
Spaniards took shelter simply decamped. Decampment may not have been possible in 
Manila since its population was many times larger than in Baler and Kawit. But it is a 
moot point. The Americans took the city right from under the Filipinos’ noses and shut 
them out of the last and greatest prize in the archipelago. 
In sum, the decentralized forces that Aguinaldo called into action in May 1898 
were successfully able to overcome the Spanish defenders, and with a few exceptions 
(such as Baler), they were able to do so in a very short amount of time. This was a 
significant accomplishment, one for which the Filipinos were rightfully very proud and 
for which Aguinaldo tried to take credit.492  
The Filipino Revolutionaries’ success in 1898 showed that it had certain 
strengths. The local elites who led the armed bands that intimidated or besieged the 
Spanish forces were capable raising large numbers of men and somehow keeping them in 
the field. Success created its own momentum and people who were on the fence in 1896 
pledged their allegiance to Aguinaldo when his victory looked assured. This meant that 
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the Spanish faced an unremittingly hostile populace, and had nowhere to turn for local 
support. 
The 1898 Revolution had three important differences from the 1896 Revolution. 
First, the Filipinos were much better armed in 1898, ironically, because the Spanish gave 
them the weapons. Second, the Filipinos had sea control since they had the services of the 
US Navy. With Dewey’s fleet blockading the archipelago, the Spanish were unable to 
reinforce or resupply their forces in the Philippines. Third, Spanish leadership was 
particularly bad in 1898. It was a serious misjudgment to supply arms to the Filipinos. 
Perhaps the Spaniards were desperate, but their solution was rather ill-advised: they gave 
weapons to former enemies who had not received any economic or political concessions. 
The decision to scatter their forces to hold down as much of the archipelago as possible 
was also a poor one, made worse by the fact that local commanders usually failed to 
detect stirrings of unrest.  
Despite these Filipino advantages and Spanish mistakes, the Filipino forces still 
had a difficult time defeating demoralized, outnumbered and out-gunned Spanish 
garrisons. They frequently expended what appeared to be considerable amounts of 
ammunition to no real end. In Baler and Tayabas, attempts to end the sieges by assault 
failed. The Filipino forces lacked training, organization and discipline, which limited 
their tactical options. Relying on circumvallations, firepower, and attrition in order to 
wait out an enemy was probably the best that the Filipinos could do and they were 
fortunate that the Spanish morale was low enough that the sieges usually succeeded. 
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However, the case of Baler shows what could happen if the Spanish simply refused to 
surrender. 
In conclusion, the Filipino army of 1898 was very similar to the armed bands of 
Revolutionaries of 1896. It had the same characteristics, and largely the same strengths 
and weaknesses. Therefore, it must be concluded that the 1898 Revolution ended in 
victory owed much more to external factors than to any great change or improvement in 
the quality of Filipino arms. Specifically, the Spanish forces in the 1898 Revolution were 
cut off from reinforcements, badly led and suffered from poor morale. The Filipinos were 
better-armed but were still not terribly proficient in tactical matters. Whatever the case 
may be, the Filipinos did manage to destroy Spanish power in the Philippines and it was a 
great feat of arms—perhaps the greatest feat of Philippine arms. 
Emilio Aguinaldo managed to take credit for this victory, which cemented his 
reputation as a conquering, spiritually powerful general. He used the prestige and 
authority he gained from this victory to consolidate his hold on political power, and to 
reform the armed forces of the Filipinos. 
“Ang Bagong Digma” 
Aguinaldo was much concerned with projecting an air of order and discipline to 
foreigners and on 24 May 1898, he issued an edict encouraging the Filipino soldiers to 
behave with civility when in combat.493 Many other such orders from the Philippine 
leadership would follow, but the issue of discipline and civility became especially acute 
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when the Filipino forces reached Manila. There were foreigners in the city—American 
soldiers and sailors along with merchants, embassies and consulates—and Aguinaldo 
issued another edict that warned his soldiers and commanders that they were fighting 
while under foreign scrutiny.494  
Ultimately, the Aguinaldo Government decided to regularize the loosely 
organized and disciplined soldiers of the Revolution. The “Guerra Moderna” was 
therefore the military expression of the Aguinaldo Government’s strategy of “firmness 
and justice in the interior, culture and propaganda in the exterior.”495 It is therefore 
logical that this desire to fight in the style of “modern warfare” would lead Aguinaldo to 
create a regular army, one organized along contemporary Western European lines. It is 
important to note that Aguinaldo was most concerned with form and appearance. None 
of the edicts or orders issued by Aguinaldo and the other commanders link the 
regularization and reform of the army with military or tactical efficiency. Their primary 
concern was to control and discipline the soldiers in order to impress foreigners and, 
implicitly, to consolidate the central government’s hold on armed force in the Philippines.  
An early attempt to control and discipline the army was a 3 June 1898 circular 
that listed some orders that the Filipinos soldiers had to follow.496 It mostly pertained to 
discipline, like maintaining fire discipline or not wasting ammunition, sparing the lives of 
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surrendered enemies, continuing the training or drill of the soldiers, and not cutting 
telegraph lines. Ranks of officers and non-commissioned officers were to be regularized 
based on the number of troops under the command of the various chiefs then leading the 
armed bands. For every 11 soldiers with weapons, there would be a corporal, for every 
two corporals a sergeant, for every two sergeants a second lieutenant, and 100 soldiers 
made up a company that was to be led by a captain with a first lieutenant assisting.  
On 30 July 1898, the Aguinaldo Government released a circular that formally and 
comprehensively established a regular army.497 Again, the reasons Aguinaldo gave for 
creating the army were more concerned with internal order than external defense and bear 
quoting at length: 
The disorder that has afflicted the towns–a product of this current Renewal of 
Honor—must be stopped at all costs. Order is necessary for the prosperity of the 
towns and for the strengthening of the Government.498 
(Ang caguluhang sumapit sa manga bayan dala nitong casalucuyang 
Pagbabagong puri, ay dapat patiguilin ano man ang carainan, sa pagca’t ito’y 
siyang hinihingi nang cabuhayan nang manga bayan at catibayan nang 
Gobierno.) 
The circular further claimed that Aguinaldo was particularly concerned with the 
economic well-being of the Philippines, since the Revolution had pulled men from their 
“fields and livelihoods.” Having so many men under arms, Aguinaldo warned, was 
draining away the “lifeblood” of the Philippines. Efficiency in combat, or reforming the 
army for reasons of military performance, is not mentioned at all.  
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 The army had various names. The 30 July decree called it the “Revolutionary 
Army” or “Hocbong Tagapagbagong Puri,” in Tagalog and “Ejercito Revolucionario” in 
Spanish. The Tagalog name is appears only rarely in the documentation, although it was 
used in official army letterheads or as stamps.499 The Philippine army was generally just 
called the “Hucbo,” or the “Ejercito Filipino”—the Philippine Army.500 
So what was this Filipino Army like? How did Aguinaldo attempt to remake this 
army?  
The raw materials of the army were the numerous armed bands that had risen up 
in revolt in the wake of the Battle of Manila. So first, these bands had to be brought under 
central control. One important measure in the 30 July decree was an order for lists and 
registers of all armed revolutionary groups in the Philippines so they could be properly 
registered as soldiers and officers. The decree clearly mandated that the only armed 
groups that could operate in the Philippines were those that had Aguinaldo’s approval 
and which had pledged their allegiance to the Government. Indeed, the decree included 
the oath that high-ranking officers (“mga Puno at oficial”) were to recite an oath. It began 
with: 
I swear to carry out all the orders of the Army and the National Revolution, and I 
will carry out with a faithful heart all the duties entrusted upon me… 
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It was quite natural for the Aguinaldo Government to want to have some control 
over the commissioning of officers. On 24 May 1898, the Aguinaldo Government 
revoked all commissions then in existence, apparently wanting to start with a clean slate. 
From that point on, all commissions had to be approved by the Government.501 The best 
that the Aguinaldo Government could do was to insist that commissions be forwarded to 
the capital where they could be approved.502 Once again, the Aguinaldo Government’s 
main concern was control and not tactical efficiency, since these officers were not trained 
in the Western-style of warfare that they were supposed to practice. The officers received 
their ranks based on the number of soldiers they brought to the army or on the officer’s 
social standing.  
Ultimately, the Philippine Army was unable to fundamentally alter the attitudes of 
its officers: they remained non-military elites who had simply donned uniforms and had 
been given ranks. These elites could be quite good at mustering manpower or directing 
the digging of trenches and other public works—things they were used to doing as 
landowners, local officials or managers of economic enterprises. But commanding large 
bodies of men, ensuring their logistics, and coordinating their movements proved beyond 
the amateur officers of the Philippine Army. Neither did these officers develop a 
professional attitude towards rank or service: interpersonal relationships mattered more 
than the formal command network. This is not to say that these officers were not 
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committed to the cause—they persisted with their resistance and suffered for it.503 Even 
though they were willing to suffer, the officers of the Philippine Army were unable to 
translate their dedication into cohesion. 
Despite the Army’s attempts at centralization, it still created regional commands 
to devolve power and authority into more local hands. This was likely for the sake of 
organizational convenience, since it would have been impossible for Aguinaldo to run the 
entire army directly. The Army was divided into provincial commands, except for 
Manila, which was divided into four zones. The Government made sure to give these 
commands to people with personal ties or loyalties to Aguinaldo.504  
The Army regularized in its structure, changing the table of organization and rank 
structure it had established in the 3 June 1898 decree. The company was the building 
block unit, or at least it was the smallest formation that was detailed in the 30 July decree. 
Each company was 110 men strong, commanded by a captain and assisted by 1 second 
lieutenant, 1 first lieutenant, and 4 sergeants, and with a line strength of 88 soldiers. 
There were 4 mess soldiers under 1 corporal—possibly the only corporal in the company. 
There were also 4 stretcher-bearers and one bugler. To compare, one colonial company of 
Spanish troops was slightly larger, with 119 men. Aside from having 10 extra riflemen, 
the Spanish company had more non-commissioned officers: 6 corporals and 4 
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sergeants.505 The Spanish organization was what the Filipinos would have been most 
familiar with, but none of the documentation explains why the Filipino organization was 
different. Perhaps the Filipinos recognized their lack of experienced soldiers—the ones 
who become non-commissioned officers. There is also a document in the PIR that seems 
to show Aguinaldo tinkering with the organization of a company. It is undated, but it is in 
Aguinaldo’s handwriting and it may illustrate how Aguinaldo took an active hand in 
structuring of the Army.506 That Aguinaldo had a direct hand in organizing and 
restructuring the Army is further corroborated by another document that shows the pay 
structure of the Army and which was “en concepto de Aguinaldo.”507 
The largest standard unit discussed in the 30 July decree was the battalion—in 
contrast to most European armies, whose largest permanent formations tended to be 
regiments. A further deviation was that Filipino battalions varied in size, depending on 
the province in which they were stationed. Battalions stationed in places like Cavite, 
Manila, Pampanga or Tarlac—larger or more populous provinces—had six-company 
battalions. Those stationed in Morong, Bataan and Nueva Ecija had four-company 
battalions, Mindoro had a two-company battalion, and a single company guarded 
Marinduque. 
If this decree had been followed, the Philippine Army would have been very small 
indeed, since even a large battalion of six companies would have only amounted to about 
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661 soldiers, not including officers. The few muster rolls that do exist do not correspond 
with these prescribed numbers, although this evidence is problematic since the muster 
rolls were compiled after the outbreak of the Philippine-American War, when the army 
was expanded in size. Tayabas was supposed to have 660 or so men organized into one 
battalion, but on 30 June 1899, it appears to have had two battalions, one with 670 men 
and one with 506.508 Similarly, the headquarters in 14 April 1899, Nueva Ecija claimed to 
have 1064 men on its rolls, when it should only have had 660 or so men.509 The muster 
rolls do suggest that the 660-man battalion was the model that the provincial commands 
tried to copy with more or less success.510 The muster rolls also show that the battalions 
were named after the provinces they were stationed in, such as “the First Battalion of 
Tayabas.”511  
These provincial troops were to be recruited on a volunteer basis—the soldiers 
currently under arms who did not want to fight would be allowed to demobilize. If the 
number of volunteers exceeded the allotted strength for each town, then the surplus of 
men would be enrolled in the police forces, which was another institution that was 
formalized in this decree. Some of the surplus volunteers would also be sent to the 
capital, where they would form a 3,000-strong central corps under the direct command of 
the president himself, as commander in chief. Eventually, this force was supposed to have 
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reached 10,560 men, but it is not clear if it ever did, or if it was even formed.512 Either 
way, this central reserve was proof that Aguinaldo wanted to have on hand the strongest 
armed force in the Philippines. 
 However, numbers for the Philippine Army are incredibly difficult to come by 
and Taylor is probably correct that it was difficult to ascertain just how large the Filipino 
Army actually was.513 Taylor mentions that the Americans in the Philippines estimated 
that there were 20,000-30,000 around Manila, with an unspecified number in the 
provinces.514 Jose Alejandrino, a general in the Philippine Army, gives the figure of 
20,000 rifle-armed men in his memoirs.515 The Aguinaldo Government itself seemed to 
think it could only financially support 25,000 soldiers in a state of war.516 Earlier, in a 
circular aimed at foreign governments, Aguinaldo claimed that the Revolution had 
30,000 men “organized in the form of a Regular Army.”517 However, he apparently later 
claimed to a Visayan politician that had as many as 50,000 men.518 
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There were likely more men available for local operations who were not part of 
the regular army: the Sandatahanes or local militias and the local police forces, whose 
organization and administration was largely out of central control and devolved into local 
hands.  
The number of rifles the Philippine Army had on hand might provide some 
indication as to how many soldiers it fielded, but this is even harder—perhaps 
impossible—to ascertain. There is no comprehensive record of rifles, just scattered lists, 
although Alejandrino claimed that one was made and that there were approximately 
20,000.519 Taylor seems to be the only reliable source—given his familiarity with the 
Philippine Insurgent Records—and his guess of 35,000 rifles is probably as good as any 
estimate.520 This corresponds to the figure of 20,000-30,000 soldiers in the Philippine 
Army. The real problem with the weaponry, however, was not the number of rifles but 
the amount of ammunition on hand. As Aguinaldo said, the Philippines did not have any 
“Fabrica de Municiónes de Guerra.”521 
If this study is to make any guess as to the size of the Philippine Army, then the 
figure of 25,000 or so seems most reasonable: the size mandated by the Aguinaldo 
Government’s budgetary study and one that corresponds to the number of rifles the 
Government had on hand, leaving some over for local militias and police forces. All in 
all, one gets the impression that the Philippine Army was not very large. This makes 
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sense since the Aguinaldo Government did not want an unwieldy horde. It wanted an 
army it could properly control, equip, and organize in order to impress foreigners. It 
likely did not have the financial or bureaucratic resources for an army much larger than 
25,000 or so troops—at most, 30,000.  
The Army had a uniform, one that the Government manufactured itself.522 The 
officers had insignia of rank that Jose Alejandrino claimed was designed by Juan Luna, 
the famous artist, although the documentation makes no mention of this.523 The uniforms 
of all the branches were described in great detail and by and large they all seemed to have 
been based on Spanish uniforms, with the most common pattern (of both armies) being 
the rayadillo—a white cloth with thin blue pin stripes.524  
The most elaborate instructions for uniforms were those for the clothing of 
Aguinaldo’s prospective presidential guard, a group that probably never came into 
existence.525 The regulations for the presidential guard also show Aguinaldo’s concern 
for appearance and mimicking European armies since the guards’ uniform was modeled 
on what was likely the Spanish Army’s uniform. A page from a Richard Knotel-esque 
uniformology book was included in the edict to serve as a model.526 Interestingly enough, 
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this was the only branch of the army where a height requirement was specified—1 meter 
and 70 centimeters or about 5 feet 6 inches was to be the minimum height of the guards. 
The focus given to the presidential guards again shows the great concern the Aguinaldo 
Government had with appearance. 
The logistics of the Philippine Army are difficult to describe, since so little on this 
topic can be found in the PIR.527 Food was normally supplied by the local presidentes, 
with provincial militias in particular being the responsibility of local governments.528 But 
this arrangement was not possible for the forces besieging Manila. From what little data 
that can be found, it can be determined that the Aguinaldo Government bought and 
shipped foodstuffs by banca or small boat to the forces around Manila.529 Soldiers were 
supposed to receive a regular ration of rice and other food, although it is not clear if this 
regulation was actually implemented.530 It was only the Regular Army that was to be 
supplied by the central government; specifically Contributions of War could only go to 
the regular troops.  
These supplies were transported by boat, but other documents in the PIR suggest 
the use of railways, horses, and carts. The Philippines had very few railway lines, but 
those that existed were obvious strategic assets. One example is the Manila to Dagupan 
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Railway—the first railway line laid down in the Philippines and one of the most 
important, since it ran from Manila to the city of Dagupan in Pangasinan, on the 
Lingayen Gulf. The Aguinaldo Government gave the railway a $2,000 loan but it likely 
remained in private (British) hands.531 The horses and carts that the army wished to use 
belonged to private citizens who had to put their property at the government’s disposal.532 
Other evidence (to be discussed later) will suggest, however, that the Philippine Army’s 
logistics arrangements were poor or inadequate, especially with regards to distribution. 
Finally, the description of the Philippine Army will end with an examination of 
their tactics and training. In his 30 July decree, Aguinaldo ordered the continuing use of 
Spanish manuals but none of these manuals have been found in the PIR. The one manual 
that has survived is not a drill manual, but a soldier’s handbook—a booklet that outlines 
the most basic of a soldier’s duties like saluting, following orders or how to mount a 
guard.533 It is also a word-for-word translation into Tagalog of the basic soldier’s manual 
issued to Spanish soldiers and members of the Guardia Civil.534  
What we do know of the tactics of the Philippine Army can be gleaned from 
scattered letters and orders. From these documents, it can be seen that the basic tactics 
that the Philippine Army followed were largely linear tactics, designed for frontal 
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confrontations. For instance, one surviving diagram describes a company attack.535 A 
trumpet call was the sign for the company to disperse into skirmish line, keeping two 
platoons in close order in reserve. The spacing interval between individual soldiers was 
not certain but it did order 4 paces between squads in the same platoon and 6 between 
two platoons. The dispersed order was described as a “guerrilla” order. The Filipino 
regulations were very similar to—and were likely derived from—contemporary Spanish 
tactical manuals, which also advocated an advanced skirmish line backed up by a solid 
infantry line in reserve to the rear.536 The Spanish also called dispersed order “guerrilla 
order.”  
An order for a battalion attack similarly advocates a skirmish line thrown ahead of 
a solid body. However, it also gives instructions on how to move in battalion column.537 
Close-order drill, even when under enemy fire, was therefore still considered part of the 
Philippine Army’s tactical repertoire. This approach seems to be reinforced by two other 
surviving snippets of tactical drill that describe how the vanguard of a company must 
execute a turn in close order.538 
The only surviving tactical writings composed by Antonio Luna that have 
survived deal with ranges and types of rifle firing by platoon.539 Luna describes volley 
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firing by platoon, individual firing and “rapid firing.”540 He does not seem to have a very 
realistic notion of range: he suggests opening fire at ranges of 800 meters and as far as 
2,000 meters in volley fire. Luna is thus advocating a 2-kilometer shot and it would be 
difficult for even well-trained soldiers to see, let alone hit, a target at that range, even in 
volley fire. To put it in perspective, the Americans thought that with “careful” practice—
which in the US Army was very rigorous—a soldier could be “fairly effective” in hitting 
individual targets out to be about 600 yards, or about 650 meters. A well-trained group of 
men might be able to hit a mass of soldiers as far as 1,500 yards—well short of Luna’s 
two kilometers.541 Even the Americans seriously overestimated their ranges, however. In 
the latter half of the 19th century, studies showed that effective firing range in combat was 
probably closer to 300 yards or 274 meters.542 
Did the soldiers actually train in these tactics? Indeed, did the Philippine Army 
train at all? On 18 October 1898, Aguinaldo published a circular that complained that the 
soldiers and officers of the Army had abandoned their duties and their discipline.543 It 
provided a daily schedule that officers and soldiers had to follow. The soldiers had to 
spend most of the day drilling, training and receiving tactical instruction. However, there 
is nothing in the PIR to suggest that they actually did what they were told to do, and only 
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a few small bits here and there in American sources that depict training. Here is one 
snippet of information from John Bowe, a member of the 13th Minnesota Volunteers:  
In the intervals between the music two insurgent companies of soldiers, one of 
them men and the other of boys, both armed with wooden guns, would drill and 
parade in front of the house. Their work was rank, but we tried to make them 
think it was the only correct thing. The officers were armed with swords and if a 
soldier made a false move, which was nearly all the time, the officer would hit 
him over the shoulders or legs with the flat of the sword.544  
There are other hints that show that at least some of the units in the Philippine 
Army trained and drilled. A Spanish sergeant who joined the Philippine Army drilled 
some soldiers in his area, if only briefly.545 The noted reporter and political cartoonist 
John T. McCutcheon wrote to the Chicago Record that Juan Cailles drilled his soldiers:  
Next came the soldiers—hundreds and hundreds of them—all dressed in blue 
cotton drilling, and each man carrying a rifle. The picture they made in their 
bright uniforms as they filed down the Calle Luis, with the bands playing and the 
horses dancing, was a sight not soon forgotten.546 
Frederick Funston of the Kansas Volunteers also mentioned an occasion when “a 
large force of Filipino soldiers engaged in drill advanced on the outpost of the First 
Montana.”547  
It is hard to determine from such slim evidence whether the Filipinos trained or 
drilled according to regulations. It is difficult to tell whether this training was done 
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frequently or with rigor. Perhaps the strongest evidence about the sort of training the 
soldiers received could be found in the battle fought by the Filipino soldiers against the 
Americans. This was the Battle of Manila, and it showed that the Philippine Army’s 
training was seriously deficient. 
The Battle of Manila 
By the start of 1899, the Philippine Army had several months to be trained and 
reorganized by the Aguinaldo Government. The Government had also had several months 
to consolidate its hold over the Philippines. In his annual report for 1899, Gen. Ewel Otis, 
Wesley Merritt’s successor stated that 
General Aguinaldo was now at the zenith of his power. He had recently repressed 
rebellion which had raised its head in central Luzon. He had assembled a pliant 
congress, many members of which had been appointed by him to represent far 
distant congressional districts, and which had voted him the dictator of the lives 
and fortunes of all the inhabitants of the Philippines.548 
This image is a little overdrawn, but it was not a false one. At the start of 1899, 
the Aguinaldo Government was indeed at the height of its powers:  it controlled much of 
Luzon and its army was probably the best trained and the best-equipped that it would 
ever be. How then did the army fight? Did Aguinaldo’s attempts to professionalize his 
army succeed?  
The Battle of Manila will serve as the best example of the Philippine Army’s 
performance in large part because it is the only major engagement of the war that has 
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more than a few scattered documents in the PIR. It was also the best opportunity the 
Filipinos had of defeating the Americans in a single battle. 
The first shots of the Battle of Manila, were fired at around half past 8 in the 
evening of 4 February 1899. The point of the outbreak was at the San Juan Bridge in 
Sampaloc, although one Filipino report referred to the bridge as the “Puente de Balsa.”549 
The circumstances leading to the outbreak of open conflict are difficult to determine and 
highly controversial—it is not clear whether Filipinos or Americans initiated the fighting. 
What is certain is that the gunfire in Sampaloc initiated a general combat. In this regard, 
it is clear that the Americans were the ones who took the initiative and turned what could 
have been a minor skirmish into a full-blown battle.550 Gen. Otis admitted in his report 
that “the engagement was one strictly defensive on the part of the insurgents and of 
vigorous attack by our forces.”551  
The Order of Battle 
Otis claims that his 8th Corps had about 10,000 troops in a loose cordon around 
Manila, ready to meet the Filipinos—although Otis’s own math would suggest 11,000.552  
The Americans occupied a position that Brian Linn described as a “pentagonal defensive 
line shaped like home plate” that was about 16 miles in perimeter, with the Pasig River 
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dividing the American forces into northern and southern halves.553 The 2nd Division 
under Maj. Gen. Arthur McArthur occupied the northern half of the American position 
and it was around 6,453 men strong.554 The southern half was occupied by the 1st 
Division under Maj. Gen. Thomas Anderson, which numbered about 3,850.  
The great majority of these troops were Volunteers, short-term soldiers mustered 
specifically for the Spanish-American War. They were mustered, organized and partially 
equipped by each state. Most of the men had had no military experience, although some 
were members of their states’ National Guard and had some training.555 The Army tried 
to fill out the Volunteer Regiments’ officers rosters with officers from the regular ranks, 
but there were far too few of them and many (if not most) of the Volunteer officers were 
just as inexperienced as their men. For example, one lieutenant colonel in the 20th Kansas 
may have been chosen because he had been the private secretary of the governor, while 
the Utah Battery had a captain who was a lawyer, a lieutenant who was a civil engineer, 
and another who was a teacher.556 In short, many of these volunteer officers and men 
would not have been very different in background or military experience from their 
Filipino opponents. 
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However, unlike the Filipinos, these greenhorns were integrated into an existing 
military system, with an established tactical system and more or less systematic training 
regimen. The American military had assimilated the lessons of “Indian Warfare” and the 
Civil War to develop a system of attack that took into account the firepower of modern, 
rifled, clip-fed guns. Infantry was taught to attack in open order, and either rushed the 
enemy lines while providing their own walking suppressive fire or had one unit provide 
covering fire while another advanced. This tactical system also took into account broken 
ground, and thus proved very suitable for use in the Philippines.557 The Volunteers all 
received several weeks’ worth of drilling and training in this system before shipping out 
for war and they continued their training while in the Philippines. 
When it came to the quality of weaponry, the Filipinos may have had a slight 
advantage. Only a small handful of American soldiers were equipped with the smokeless, 
bolt-action, magazine-fed Krag-Jorgensen rifle (or the Springfield Model 1892-99 in 
American service). The Volunteer Regiments were armed with the old Springfield Model 
1873, the “Trapdoor,” which was a .45 caliber, breech-loading, single shot rifle. The 
Springfield .45 was shorter-ranged than the Mauser rifle used by the Filipinos, produced 
smoke when fired and had a lower rate of fire. The 8th Corps’ Inspector-General 
consequently did not think much of it.558 It was not just the Springfield: the New York 
Times published an article that decried the inferiority of even the Krag-Jorgensen to the 
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Mauser.559 The Springfield rifle did at least have one thing in its favor—it was powerful. 
Frederick Funston noted that: “there was one thing to be said of those old Springfields… 
if a bullet from one of them hit a man he never mistook it for a mosquito bite.”560  
When it came to artillery support, the 8th Corps only had two light, the 6th 
Artillery and the Utah Volunteer Battery, but it did have the support of Admiral George 
Dewey’s ships in Manila Bay. The Filipinos had their own artillery, although some would 
have been obsolete or of indifferent quality. For instance, the Filipinos had at least 11 
guns of various types in Caloocan and Paranaque.561 The Filipinos also had 6 guns in 
Pasay.562 The Filipinos captured a considerable number of cannons in Cavite, some of 
which made it to Manila.563 If one assumes there were guns in the other Zones of Manila 
then the Filipinos potentially had more land-based artillery than the Americans. 
The Americans had far too few troops to occupy the entire line, a situation 
exacerbated by the broken terrain and poor communications. What the Americans had 
instead was “a series of semiautonomous regimental commands” that tried to guard the 
extended front through the judicious use of reserves and the careful observation of 
obvious lines of attack. Because of this very unfavorable disposition, the American plan 
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was not to meet an attack passively, but to advance and occupy strategic locations at the 
first indication of hostilities and to counter-attack as needed. 564 
The order of battle of the Filipino forces is much harder to ascertain. A 
breakdown of the specific units that were around Manila is perhaps not possible and the 
exact numbers of the Filipino forces has long been an issue of conjecture. Otis himself 
estimated 20,000 to 30,000 Filipinos outside Manila and Linn noted that the estimates 
have ranged from 15,000 to 40,000.565 Almost all of these estimates of Filipino size are 
based on American estimates from the time, and they have been widely accepted by most 
historians. Benito Legarda Jr., for instance, accepts the estimate of a Harper’s 
correspondent of 20,000 Filipino troops around Manila.566 There has thus been a 
consensus that the Filipinos outnumbered the Americans, with the only point of 
uncertainty being the degree. 
The main problem with these numbers is that they are not supported by 
documentation in the Philippine Insurgent Records. There is one document that lists only 
5,170 soldiers in 47 companies around Manila.567 This document, however, is unsigned 
and undated—although it bears the letterhead of Gobierno Revolucionario de Manila, 
which means that it can be dated from August 1898 to January 1899, when the 
                                                
564 Linn, The Philippine War, 44. 
565 War Department, Annual Report 1899, 1: 4: 93; Linn, The Philippine War, 42. 
566 Legarda, The Hills of Sampaloc, 15. 
567 R9F69D1, Forces around Manila, undated.  
214 
government changed its name to the Republic of the Philippines. There are a few other 
documents, however, that tend to support an even lower number of Filipinos.   
Pio del Pilar, the commander of the Second Zone sent an order of battle summary 
to the Filipino Army’s headquarters listing 1,599 officers and men divided into 20 
companies. He listed 38 casualties, which meant that at full strength at the beginning of 
March, 1899, the Second Zone had a line strength of 1,637 officers and men.568 This is a 
rather low number, given that the authorized strength of a company in the Filipino army 
was 110 officers and men, which should have yielded at least 2,200 men in the Second 
Zone, but it is comparable in size to other battalions in the Philippines.  
It is not implausible that Filipino units were not at full strength even at the start of 
the battle in 4 February, although we may take 2,200 or so men (not counting officers) as 
a theoretical maximum for the Second Zone. Figures do not exist for the other 3 zones. 
Each of the zones around Manila was deemed at least equal to an entire province, 
commanded by a General de Brigada (Brigadier General) with full staff, but since most 
provinces generally only had a single battalion, the Zones around Manila were oversized 
for Filipino units.569 Assuming roughly similar numbers for each zone, there is the 
possibility that there were only 8,800 Filipino or so troops around Manila, or about 35% 
of the budgeted Philippine army. A force of 20,000 would have meant that 80% of the 
budgeted army was stationed around Manila, which is not implausible. 
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 Another possible way of gauging the size of the force around Manila is to 
remember that the Aguinaldo Government controlled about 8-9 other provinces each of 
which had, on average, about 1,600 troops. This adds up to a total of about 14,400 
soldiers scattered in the provinces controlled by the Aguinaldo Government. Subtract 
14,400 from 25,000 and this leaves a theoretical maximum of 10,600 soldiers around 
Manila or 42% of the budgeted army. Given that some provinces had fewer than 1,600 
soldiers (although none had more) then there may have been more than 10,600 soldiers 
around Manila, but not much more. 
Gen. Thomas Anderson, the American commander north of the Pasig provided 
some additional corroboration. He estimated that his First Division, which faced two 
Filipino zones, was opposed by only 5,000 Filipino insurgents during the Battle of 
Manila.570 Assuming that the Second Division south of the Pasig faced a similar number 
of insurgents, then there would have been roughly 10,000 or so Filipino soldiers around 
the city of Manila. This is a far cry from even the low figure of 15,000, much less the 
commonly stated figure of 20,000 or so Filipinos around Manila. It must be remembered 
once again that the Aguinaldo Government did not want an unwieldy mob: it kept the 
size of the army down for reasons of cost and control. Ultimately, providing an exact 
number of Filipinos is probably not possible, and perhaps all that can be introduced is 
reasonable doubt about the traditional belief that the Filipinos outnumbered the 
Americans. If they did outnumber the Americans, it was not by much.  
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Whatever the numbers involved, the Filipinos had to contend with some severe 
geographic handicaps. Otis himself noted that the Filipino forces were bisected by the 
Pasig River, with the Americans in command of most of the bridges. The river was not 
easily forded and was easily interdicted by American naval forces. As a result “insurgent 
troops of one wing could not give support to the other in order to meet any emergency of 
battle which might arise.”571 The Filipinos were obliged to fight with all the 
disadvantages that come with occupying the outside lines—extended lines, a difficulty 
with communications along the line, and a difficulty of massing reserves at a central 
location.572 This was exacerbated by a lack of provisions for restoring telegraphic lines 
either back to Malolos or among the units themselves should they be cut.573 Additionally, 
it must be noted that the Filipinos themselves were badly stretched. They had to man a 
perimeter at least as long the American line. This problem would not have been easily 
soluble even with 40,000 troops but if there were indeed only 11,000 or so Filipino troops 
around Manila, then they would have been at a significant disadvantage.  
However, the Filipinos also had some very important advantages—ones that 
might normally have been decisive. They were operating on the defensive—the 
traditional formula is that an attacker has to be three times stronger than a defender in 
order to prevail. The Filipinos knew the terrain, were accustomed to the climate and were 
sheltered by prepared positions. Indeed, the Americans were of the opinion that the 
Filipino fortifications were very good. Aside from the usual trenches, the Filipinos also 
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occupied most of the Spanish blockhouses and had integrated these buildings into their 
defenses. These were not extremely heavily fortified bunkers, but they were sturdily built 
and could easily handle small-arms fire. According to Karl Irving Faust, blockhouses had 
walls fortified against rifle fire and were almost all built on raised ground, sloped to 
deflect fire.574 The Filipinos also had the ability to read and modify the terrain for 
military advantage. In the Santa Mesa area, where the war broke out, the Filipinos had 
constructed fortifications that both covered the river crossing and prevented them from 
being flanked from multiple sides.575 Other American reports attest to the quality of at 
least the first line of the Filipino trenches.576 
The Filipino forces around Manila were divided into four zones. The First Zone 
was to the south, with its left flank resting against Manila Bay, and occupying the towns 
of Bacoor, Las Piñas, Palanag, Pineda, and Malate. The Second Zone was next to the 
first, with its right flank resting against the Pasig River, and occupying the towns of 
Makati, Pateros, Taguig, Pasig, and Santa Ana. The Third Zone was directly north of the 
Second Zone, occupying the towns of Mandaluyong, San Juan del Monte, Pandacan, San 
Francisco del Monte, San Mateo, Montalban, and Marikina. Finally, there was the Fourth 
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Zone, north of Manila, with its right flank resting against Manila Bay, occupying the 
towns of Caloocan, Novaliches, Tambobo, and Navotas.577  
If there were any Philippine pre-battle plans, they have not been preserved in the 
Philippine Insurgent Records. However, it does not seem like the Philippine commanders 
had any plans at all, or if they did, these were known only to themselves.578 This lack of 
planning was exacerbated by absences in command during the Battle of Manila. The zone 
commanders were either not present or quickly incapacitated.579  
The Combat  
Specifics of the battle for the Philippine side are practically non-existent so a 
detailed reconstruction of the Philippine moves during the battle is impossible. The best 
that can be managed is to correlate recommendations and various after-action reports 
written by the Filipino commanders with the American accounts of the battle. 
Once the fighting began, most of the American sources agree that, all over 
Manila, the general Filipino reaction to the gunfire in Sampaloc was to open fire at 
anything that seemed threatening. Frederick Funston, an officer stationed in the southern 
half of the battlefield:  
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There was scarcely any diminution in the fire of the enemy, it being so incessant 
that the darkness on our front seemed to emit an almost continuous roar. But it 
was badly directed, as the Filipinos were evidently crouching down in their 
trenches and using their Mausers as rapidly as they could, simply splattering the 
whole country with bullets, the great majority of them going far over our heads.580 
Other accounts corroborate Funston’s. The official history of the Nebraska 
Regiment noted that “In a few minutes after the… first shot, firing was opened by the 
native army… on the Nebraska camp and was soon taken by the entire native army 
around the city” and “soon the Mausers were popping and the bullets were flying in every 
direction… Bullets were dropping promiscuously and shelter was desirable, if not 
necessary.”581 Another Nebraska soldier claimed that, when they were sighted by the 
Filipinos, “the insurgents started to shoot as fast as they could all around us.”582 A soldier 
serving with the 13th Minnesota wrote that during a firefight that lasted for 2 hours: 
“whenever we raised our heads we could see flashes of fire in front of us.”583 The 
Filipino penchant for wild firing was noted by a soldier named Selman Watson with the 
1st Colorado: “As a result, scarcely a night goes by that some nervous ‘soldado’ doesn’t 
take a shot at something or other.”584 
Most of these bullets were wasted in the darkness. Major Sime of the First 
California repeated Funston’s suggestion that the Filipinos fired their weapons over their 
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heads: a Filipino force suppressed by American fire “did not show themselves at all, 
except by poking their rifles over the wall and firing aimlessly.”585  
All this firing suggests that the Filipinos had large stocks of both guns and 
ammunition at the outset of the war. There are also some hints as to how the Filipinos 
were resupplied with ammunition: Lt. Col. Victor Duboce of the First California 
observed that many of the houses along the Filipino line contained ammunition, which 
suggests that the Filipinos dispersed their ordnance so it could be easily accessed by the 
front line troops themselves.586 This decision eliminated the need for a method of 
delivery from the rear, but it also resulted in the capture or destruction of large stocks of 
weapons and ammunition when these supply huts were fired upon or overrun by the 
Americans. 
Despite all the gunfire, the front lines were relatively stable on the night of 4 
February. The Americans launched most of their attacks on the morning of 5 February 
1899. The Third Zone bore the brunt of most of the American probes north of the Pasig 
River.  An anonymous letter to Aguinaldo states that the commander of the Third Zone, 
Luciano San Miguel, had weakened the defenses in his area and did not maintain the 
proper vigilance during the night of the 4 February.587 The author of the letter observed 
the Filipino troops retreating towards Cubao by Sunday morning (the 5 February) before 
ultimately ending up in Marikina. The letter goes on to claim that the Filipino dead were 
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simply left unattended. The fleeing Filipino troops rallied somewhere in Marikina, 
possibly because that was where the anonymous letter-writer had set himself up in order 
to supply the troops there with food. The American commander, Col. John M. 
Stotsenburg, appears to corroborate the fact that the Filipino forces had retreated to the 
outskirts of Marikina and established themselves there, since his attack on 6 February 
1899 encountered resistance.588 However, on 7 February, the Americans entered 
Marikina proper unopposed. The defeat of the troops of the Third Zone was a particularly 
grievous loss to the Filipinos since the waterworks that supplied fresh water to Manila 
were located in Marikina.  
Another Filipino account that roughly corresponds to the American after-action 
reports was a summary of events written by the second in command of the First Zone, 
Juan Cailles.  He wrote that he came to the First Zone and found it in disarray. He 
attributed to the loss of the officer in charge up to that point, a Lt. Col. San Juan. Cailles 
was only able to set up defenses in Parañaque—a fact that tells us that the Filipinos lost a 
considerable amount of ground, since the First Zone’s initial positions had been in Pineda 
and Lico—much closer to Manila.589 American accounts do indeed describe how the US 
troops broke the Filipino resistance in the Pineda area and pushed ahead as far as 
Makati.590 The Filipino commanders attributed the retreat of the troops of the First Zone 
to the bombardment of American naval vessels, the Baltimore and the Monitor.591 The 
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American sources agreed that the naval bombardment was quite effective, although the 
actual ships supporting the American attack were the Monadnock and Charleston.592 
There was, in fact, no such as ship as the “Monitor” in Manila Bay, although the 
Monadnock is of the ship type known as a monitor.  
Some general observations of Filipino military behavior during the battle can be 
made. The most obvious point is that the Filipinos exhibited extremely poor 
marksmanship. As Funston and the others have told us, the Filipinos apparently tended to 
fire high. This poor marksmanship was likely made worse by the American use of cover 
and suppressive fire. However, the Americans attacked Filipino trenches head on and 
they suffered far fewer casualties than they ought to have in the face of entrenched 
opponents armed with modern bolt-action, clip-fed rifles.  
It is to their credit that at least some Filipino units did not merely sit in their 
trenches and passively accept enemy fire. For instance, in Makati, Col. James Smith of 
the 1st California noted that his right was in danger of being turned by a Filipino flank 
attack.593 Unfortunately, the poor Filipino marksmanship meant that almost all these 
maneuvers failed to inflict much harm on the Americans. 
The American accounts also strongly suggest that the Filipinos did not seem to 
have any reserves at any level. Col. Smith of the 1st California managed to sneak a force 
to the left flank and rear of some Filipino troops, but no reserves were deployed to meet 
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him, which contributed to the defeat of the Filipinos.594 Indeed, the American reports 
narrate many instances of American outflanking Filipino lines, with the Filipinos rarely 
sending forces to meet them. Additionally, once the Filipino trench line was breached, 
there were usually no forces in the rear to cover the Filipinos’ retreat or to provide a 
rallying point. This combination of putting all the troops in the trenches, without a 
reserve, meant that there were often gaps in the Filipino defensive line. The Americans 
frequently found the Filipino flanks, since the latter were often unable to present an 
unbroken line. 
Despite these tactical shortcomings, the Filipinos did show remarkable bravery 
and unit cohesion. Most units did not run even after sustaining heavy casualties from the 
American rushes. They only retreated when the Americans were right on top of them, as 
was noted by (for example) Gen. Thomas Anderson, who described a group of Filipinos 
that his division encountered as holding their ground like the Scottish “in Flodden 
Field.”595  
Once they were retreating, Filipino retreats tended to be disorganized, with the 
troops only stopping when rallied by senior officers. Mabini strongly criticized the 
Filipino commanders for not planning withdrawals.596 The officer who apparently 
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planned the least was Pio del Pilar, whose negligence resulted in his troops attempting to 
cross the Pasig River while under heavy fire.597  
These disordered withdrawals were not universal, however. In the early stages of 
the battle, Gen. Thomas Anderson noted that Filipino line “fell back before our advance, 
fighting, however, with spirit. The rice fields in our front were intersected by little 
irrigating dikes, and behind each of these a stand was attempted, the Filipinos firing from 
behind them.”598 However, even this fighting withdrawal became a headlong retreat once 
the pressure from the American attacks became too great.  
A second major mistake of the Filipinos was the failure to establish a secondary 
defensive line. Once the front line was breached, the Filipinos had nowhere to run for 
shelter. As a result, the Filipino forces had to hastily construct new trenches and defenses 
in the days after the Battle of Manila.  
The Consequences 
The first phase of the battle ended by the evening of 5 February 1899. Filipino 
casualties in the battle are hard to ascertain since no Filipino casualty reports have 
survived. The only casualty report that this author has found so far was Pio del Pilar’s 
claim to have lost only 38 casualties in his second zone for all of February 1899.599 The 
claim is simply an invention, given the amount of action del Pilar’s zone had seen.  
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So once again, we are forced to rely on the American reports—with all the 
weaknesses that such an approach entails. Gen. Thomas Anderson’s 1st Division buried 
238 Filipinos, but he claims they killed 2,000 of the 5,000 Filipinos they fought.600 The 
division also captured 306 prisoners, but it is not known how many Filipinos were 
wounded, how many died and were carried away, and how many died of their wounds. 
Gen. King’s command, the First Brigade, buried 153 Filipinos.601 North of the Pasig, 
Arthur McArthur’s forces buried 374 Filipinos for the entire month of February. 
McArthur claimed that the Filipinos were usually able to carry away their wounded and 
many of their dead and he assumed that the ratio of wounded to dead Filipinos was 3:1, 
which was then the standard accepted ratio.602 Brig. Gen. Harrison Gray Otis, commander 
of the First Brigade of McArthur’s division, claimed that his troops buried 199 Filipinos 
for the month of February.603  
All in all, Otis maintained that his 8th Corps buried 700 Filipinos—which does not 
correspond to the claims made by his subordinates—and that the total Filipino casualties 
must have been 3,000.604 The American casualty estimates do not always appear to be 
very reliable and they may have over-claimed kills. McArthur and at least one other 
officer suggested that the Filipinos carried away their dead and wounded, but this is 
                                                
600 War Department, Annual Report 1899, vol. 1, pt. 4, p. 375. 
601 Ibid., 376. 
602 Ibid., 427. 
603 Ibid., 433. The Second Brigade gave no estimates. 
604 Ibid., 100. 
226 
contradicted by the Filipino reports—including the Filipino surgeon-general, who later 
accused the troops of leaving their dead and wounded behind.605 
If there were only 8,800 or so Filipinos, then 700 dead would constitute a 
disastrous fatality rate of 10%—not even counting the unknown numbers of wounded. If 
there were 11,000 Filipino soldiers, then the casualty rate drops to 6%. However, since 
the American figures cannot be properly checked to Filipino ones, it is currently not 
possible to determine how many casualties the Filipinos took except to suggest that they 
were heavy. 
What is certain is the overall result of the battle—a decisive defeat for the 
Filipinos. The Filipinos had been largely ejected from their positions around Manila and 
their troops were demoralized and disorganized. Pio del Pilar noted, for instance, that the 
troops of the Second Zone had suffered from a “descalabro completo” or a “complete 
setback.”606 They had also lost huge stocks of irreplaceable weapons and ammunition, 
including artillery. In his letter, del Pilar noted that his forces had lost four cannons, 
“many rifles,” large quantities of ammunition, and the Second Zone’s smithies and repair 
shops. Del Pilar claimed he needed 300 rifles and 5,000 rounds of rifle ammunition as 
replacements. The American lists of captured Filipino weaponry support this assertion of 
large equipment losses.     
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A General Order released on 7 February 1899, noted that the Filipino troops’ were 
completely demoralized and it was even thought to be necessary to replace some of these 
them with newly commissioned reserves.607 The defeat was so serious that the Filipino 
troops could offer no sustained or effective resistance to the American advances for a few 
days after February 5. Some units dug trenches and made a stand here and there, but these 
lacked direction or coordination.  
This demoralization can be seen in a description of some combat in Caloocan 
soon after the Battle of Manila. The Aguinaldo Government had somehow recruited or 
conscripted some Igorots—upland tribesmen—into its army, and one of them recounted 
his part in the “Battle of Caloocan” to the author of an Igorot grammar book.608 This 
unnamed narrator described how the Filipino soldiers were so frightened and demoralized 
by constant American rifle and artillery fire that they “take their bayonets they dig up the 
ground they bury all their cartridges” and then reported to their commander that they had 
fired off all their ammunition. The narrator described heavy casualties—“many dead”—
and constant retreats by the Filipino soldiers. 
Fortunately for the Filipinos, the Americans realized that their advance had left 
them scattered and disorganized as well, and they were forced to stop and consolidate 
their gains. Hence, some American units had to abandon their more forward positions, 
which they claimed the Filipinos took as a sign of victory. These American “retreats” 
may explain why the colonel in the Third Zone (presumably Ambrosio Mojica) sent an 
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absurdly optimistic report to Malolos on 10 February, noting that not much was 
happening in his sector. 609 Still, Mojica was the exception and the Filipino situation was 
bad for a week or two after the Battle of Manila.  
Otis noted that some time after the Battle of Manila, Filipino forces had re-
established their positions in Pasig, Pateros and Taguig, north of the Pasig and even 
managed to push their line forward to Guadalupe “within rifle shot of Makati.”610 These 
positions were threatening and indicated that the Filipino forces were regrouping. 
However, these Filipino attempts at defense were hurried and disorganized and the 
Americans continued their advance outside the city. The Filipinos managed to offer some 
resistance in some areas, and there were attempts at local counter-attacks. The most 
notable was an attack launched in the vicinity of the Guadalupe Church in Makati that 
was met by the 1st California under Lt. Col. Victor Duboce, who noted that after some 
skirmishing, the Filipinos started to advance in close order: 
A number of insurgent troops in squads of from 10 to 50 were coming up over the 
ridge of the hills, and with field glasses their uniforms could be distinctly seen 
and three officers on horseback easily recognized by their swords and uniforms. 
They were continually yelling and at short intervals sounded their bugles. The 
largest body noticeable included fully 100 men, nearly all of whom were in the 
regulation uniform. Most of these troops moved slowly forward toward the 
cemetery, but upon being fired upon as well as shelled they retreated somewhat 
and moved toward the sky line in a southwesterly direction.611 
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Linn referred to this as an attack in “parade formation” where, as Duboce noted, 
the Filipinos marched forward in “good order.”612 There is no mention of this attack in 
Filipino records, but this account by Dubcoe does show that some of the Filipino forces 
did train and drill. Unfortunately, they drilled in obsolete and dangerous close-order 
formations.  
The Continuation 
The postscript to the Battle of Manila took place at the end of February, when the 
Filipinos attempted to recapture the city. Such was the importance the Aguinaldo 
Government attached to the city that it was practically inevitable that the there would be 
an attempt to retake it. The attack was to have two components: a push from the regular 
army north of the Pasig, and a simultaneous uprising of sandatahan, or militia forces, 
within Manila itself. The uprising in the city was a crucial part of the operation. 
According to Aguinaldo, the Filipino soldiers outside Manila were counting on the 
sandatahan to confuse the Americans: “it may be counted on that when our troops around 
Manila, upon finding out that those in the city are fighting, will attack immediately.”613 
The attack by the regular army is difficult to track. The American reports make no 
mention of any major advances from Filipino troops outside the city but there are hints of 
Filipinos preparing for operations. For instance, a force of Filipino troops tried but failed 
to infiltrate and encircle the Americans stationed in the Marikina waterworks from 19 
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February until 21 February.614 There were also signs that Filipino forces massed in the 
vicinity of San Juan del Monte and unsuccessfully attacked the positions of the First 
South Dakota Infantry on the afternoon of 23 February.615 These were regular Filipino 
soldiers, since the Americans noted their rayadillo or “white uniforms.” 
Filipino forces had apparently infiltrated American lines and attacked the Kansas 
Regiment’s headquarters.616 Funston noted that he and his men faced a “strong 
demonstration against our lines” on the afternoon of the 23rd, but that the attack lacked 
commitment since the Filipinos did not try “to drive home the attack.”617 Funston was 
later surprised to find out about an attack to the Kansas’ rear, and noted that his unit had 
“actually been cut off from our base for hours.”618 If these attacks had been successful, 
the Philippine Army may well have been credited with infiltration tactics almost 20 years 
before their widespread use towards the end of the First World War.  
Fragments of an anonymous Filipino officer’s diary for February 1899 offer some 
clues as to what was happening in the Filipino side.619 The unnamed Filipino officer’s 
diary suggests that there wasn’t a single planned counter-attack as such, but reflect a 
general push back towards Manila with reinforcements from the rear or wherever 
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defeated units could be reorganized. Pio del Pilar, for instance, began probing into the 
areas vacated in the Second Zone, near Makati, and on 17 February, the diarist claimed 
that Del Pilar was attacking from Mandaluyong. In Makati, the Filipinos encountered 
detachments of Americans and skirmished with them indecisively. Del Pilar may have 
been at the very front of this attack, since he sustained an injury in his forearm.  
This account was corroborated by the reports of Maj. J. Franklin Bell, who 
claimed that there were reports of insurgent troops massing in Makati—but found nothing 
more than small patrols of Filipinos that were driven off, with no sign of any larger 
force.620 The main body of Filipino and American troops finally did encounter each other 
on the 20th and the Americans claim to have driven off the Filipinos after a short fight.  
The officer diarist also noted that Luna himself was leading soldiers in the field, 
since he commanded the forces attacking Caloocan and Loma. Like Del Pilar’s attack, 
there were skirmishes and patrols preceding the main push on February 20 itself, but 
Luna’s forces were less active than del Pilar’s. The main attack failed supposedly because 
the Kawit Company refused to follow orders, although the diarist’s notes indicate that the 
defeat may also have resulted from problems in getting all the forces under Luna to fire 
or attack with coordination. 
Thus, the Filipino forces were committed piecemeal, attacking or taking a stand as 
they were sent to the line. The regular army may have been waiting for the uprising in the 
city before initiating its main push, but what fragmentary reports do exist indicate that the 
Filipino regular army was were disorganized and badly handled—sent to fight with what 
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appears to be poor staff work and planning. Luna blamed his defeat on the 
insubordination of the Kawit Company, and he would certainly not be the first 
commander to cover his failures in planning with claims of treachery and 
insubordination.  
There is a little bit more information on the uprising in the city that was supposed 
to coincide with the 22-23 February attacks, but even that information is muddled and 
fragmentary. Prior to the outbreak of the war, a number of sandatahan or militia 
regiments had been formed in Manila. The most notable, and the one on which there is 
the most information, was a unit known as the “Cuerpo de Armas Blancas” or “Corps of 
Cold Steel” which was headed by a certain Col. Luciano Lucas and was centered mainly 
in Tondo. The exact returns of strength of this unit are unknown, and it is also unclear 
whether Lucas had formed a component of a larger unit—his early letters indicate he 
formed two battalions of a larger body, but his later letters seem to indicate he was in 
command of the entire “regiment” or “cuerpo.” This unit was formed only in 9 January 
1899, and it was apparently independent of the main force outside the city. Lucas sent a 
letter to the commander of the Second Zone asking that the commissions of his officers 
be recognized.621  
The mission of the Armas Blancas prior to the outbreak of the war was unclear. 
Lucas claimed that he had formed the unit to exact contributions from the wealthy 
members of Manila, to guard against abuses committed by the Americans and to perform 
“other important services.” He specified that the Armas Blancas were there to keep the 
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peace and tranquility for the native Filipinos in Manila and that they would collect no 
more than the funds needed to sustain their battalion.  
Hints as to what this unit was actually doing after its formation are given in a 
report by Lucas. On 17 February 1899, the Armas Blancas was on its way to an area of 
operations (perhaps to join in some attack) when the unit captured a certain Gregorio 
Martinez who had informed the Americans of their presence. Now aware of the danger, 
the Armas Blancas threw away their arms and abandoned their advance. The fate of 
Martinez is not mentioned.622 Another hint of the operations of the Armas Blancas—and 
other units like it in Manila—can be found in a letter by an agent codenamed “Pipi” who 
wrote that Filipinos seen visiting or accompanying Americans were likely to be 
kidnapped or “ducut” (which literally means “snatched”).623 One gets the impression that 
the Armas Blancas was operating in a manner suspiciously like an extra-legal shakedown 
operation and that Lucas had to defend himself against accusations of wrongdoing.  
Thus, the Armas Blancas and other similar units in Manila were “secret 
organizations,” broadly similar to the earlier Katipunan and theoretically formed to 
enforce the interests of the Malolos Government but operating rather independently of 
high command. There were many other units like the Armas Blancas, and they prefigure 
the Philippine Army’s eventual turn to guerrilla warfare 
These unconventional units interacted with the Philippine Army’s high command 
mainly by letters and communiqués smuggled into the city—an unreliable and sporadic 
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form of communication. These units essentially acted on their own and were only 
nominally commanded and supervised by Aguinaldo or the other senior commanders of 
the Philippine Army. They took almost no part in the Battle of Manila, but played an 
important role in the 22 February uprising. 
Aguinaldo’s headquarters sent a communiqué in Tagalog outlining specific orders 
or tactics that these sandatahan were to carry out on the night of the attack. Their main 
role was to sow confusion and cut off the American’s front from their rear. Prior to the 
attack, the sandatahan were to make a careful reconnaissance to determine the quarters 
and positions of all the American troops in the city, noting secret passages or entryways 
to these locations. The ranking officers of the American units were to be specifically 
targeted. The officers of the sandatahan were supposed to approach them with four men 
pretending to give them gifts, while the rest of the unit hid nearby. Then, once the attack 
began, the sandatahan were to assault the Americans with ferocity and determination. 
Aguinaldo suggested that the sandatahan not be too eager to grab enemy weapons, an 
approach that would decrease the momentum of their attacks. Probably they were to use 
close-quarters weapons like knives or bolos, or literally, armas blancas or cold steel. The 
sandatahan were also to prepare boiling oil, fat, or water to pour on the Americans, and 
to improvise homemade explosives and bombs, with some to be made of bamboo. The 
officers were also to station troops in upper stories of buildings, where they stockpiled 
rocks, furniture or other projectiles that they could throw down on the Americans. 
Aguinaldo assured the troops that these infiltration tactics and close-quarters 
attacks would render American weapons useless, since they ran the risk of hitting each 
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other rather than the Filipinos. Aguinaldo also stressed that the troops must show their 
good order and discipline to foreigners, going so far as to order the officers of the 
sandatahan to send their most trusted soldiers and men to guard the homes and 
businesses of foreigners within the city.624 
Luciano Lucas’s brief report on what happened on 22-23 February 1899 suggests 
that although the Filipinos were successful in causing a lot of chaos and disorder, most of 
these detailed instructions were not followed. To start with, there may have been 
problems organizing for the attack. On the night of the 22nd, Lucas tried to attack with a 
badly understrength unit. He noted in two reports he sent to the Army headquarters 
afterwards, that he attacked with only 26 officers and men out of the entire Armas 
Blancas, a tiny fraction of its full strength.625 
From then on, poor coordination and communication with other units in Manila—
possibly even with members of his own unit that had not managed to join him—caused 
great confusion for Lucas. Upon encountering the Americans, he claimed that they saw 
other Filipinos shouting encouragement to the Armas Blancas, telling them to attack the 
Americans: “Brothers, the time to attack is now!” A bugle was also sounding the signal to 
attack “abance y fuego,” or “advance and fire.” This was apparently not part of the plan, 
and Lucas and his men didn’t know what to make of the situation—Lucas described what 
he saw as a “fantastica drama” and he decided to retreat. This was when he and his men 
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ran into another problem: their own lack of planning. Lucas had ordered some troops to 
set fire to buildings in Mesic that blocked the American axis of retreat, but in their 
confusion, it was found that these fires blocked the Armas Blancas’s retreat instead. The 
Americans fired two volleys at the Filipinos, but caused no casualties and Lucas decided 
that it was better to “die fighting than to burn to death” and the Armas Blancas ran to 
engage the Americans in hand to hand combat. The fight lasted for an hour, and 
according to Lucas, the Armas Blancas managed to get the Americans to retreat in the 
direction of the Railroad Station. At this point, the Armas Blancas disengaged from the 
battle and returned to their homes with only three casualties, but with having 
accomplished nothing at all useful.626  
There are two other fragmentary sources in the PIR relating to the uprising in 
Manila.  One is a telegram to the Secretary of War from a certain Major Tirona in Tondo, 
who sent his message on 23 February.627 He wrote that at 10:08 AM the Filipinos had 
stationed themselves along a tramway, where they had possibly built a kind of 
breastwork. Tirona claimed that the Americans had suffered numerous casualties but that 
the Filipinos needed aid. At 10:42, the Filipinos had the Americans on the run and there 
was a large engagement at Tondo or Binondo. He also noted that the nipa section of 
Tondo was on fire.628 
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This report is either supported by or was the source of an article published on 23 
February in a supplement to an issue of the Heraldo Filipino, which claimed that the 
sandatahan of Tondo under the command of Mariano Ponce were firing on Americans 
along Calle Azcarraga. The account corresponds with the aforementioned one of Luciano 
Lucas’s. It may well be that the mysterious Filipinos the Armas Blancas encountered 
were other sandatahan under Ponce. The Herald also reported that the fire in Tondo had 
been caused by Filipinos—again, this may possibly the fire started by Lucas’s men.  
The Heraldo Filipino claimed too that columns commanded by Gen. Pio del Pilar 
and Col. Hizon—commanders of regular army soldiers in zones outside Manila—had 
managed to occupy parts of Manila or its suburbs, such as Sampaloc, Tondo, and 
Binondo. The Cavite Battalion had also (supposedly) captured the Quartel de Mesic—the 
same unit that Luna blamed for his failure and the same quartel set alight by Lucas and 
the Armas Blancas. Finally, the report claimed that Caloocan was under siege by 
Generals Luna, Mariano Llanera and Pantaleon Garcia.629  
The only firm conclusion one can draw from these contradictory and fragmentary 
reports is that the attacks of the sandatahan were chaotic and confused. It appears as if 
there were great problems with coordination and communication, with units not able to 
determine where all their members were, where other units were, and what everybody 
else was doing.  
The reports from the American Provost inside Manila tend to support the picture 
of absolute chaos in the city. Fires broke out as early as the night of 20 February, when 
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much of Paco was burned down by Filipino insurgents dressed as women.630 Some of the 
contents of the report of what happened on 23 February roughly correspond with the 
Filipino accounts. The Americans did encounter temporary fortifications set up by the 
Filipinos, and they did suffer from rifle fire from all directions.631 The congruence ends 
there, however, since the Americans claim that they advanced in good order, and were in 
complete control of the situation. Interestingly, the Americans claim to have advanced in 
the direction of the tram or train station, precisely the direction that Lucas claims to have 
driven them in retreat.  
The confusion was compounded by masses of panicked civilians crowding the 
streets, and it is rather difficult to believe that the Americans were as calm or efficient as 
they (and Linn) claim.632 John Bowe, who was in a part of Manila not involved in the 
fighting, gives some idea of the chaos of the uprising:  
Was on guard and everything was quiet till midnight, when, all at once, fires 
started up in a dozen places across the swamp, in Tondo and Binonda [sic], then 
yelling and shouting and an occasional explosion. The bursting of bamboo 
mingling with the volley-firing of Americans and insurgents, the shouting of 
combatants, the roaring of the cannon, the dark, illuminated smoke stretching 
heavenward, made a sight impossible to describe and never to be forgotten.633  
With the failure of the sandatahan inside Manila, the Filipino counterattack came 
to an end. There can be no doubt that the Filipinos had failed. The attacks by the regular 
Filipino Army outside the city were not carried out with much efficacy, and Linn is 
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entirely correct in noting that if they had indeed been headed by Luna, the results 
certainly don’t say much about his abilities as a commander.634 The Filipino officers 
showed all the same faults as the earlier Battle of Manila: a lack of planning and 
coordination brought about by poor staff work. The Filipino forces made contact with the 
Americans, but attacked almost haphazardly, withdrawing before accomplishing much.  
The uprising in Manila by the sandatahan successfully caused considerable chaos 
and destruction, but this success was unintended, since it was the product of a lack of 
planning and coordination. Additionally, it is doubtful as to what the uprising would have 
accomplished without a successful attack from the Filipino forces outside Manila, given 
their small numbers and lack of coordination.   
Whatever the case may be, the city was now permanently lost to the Filipinos. 
There would be plans for future uprisings, but none ever came to fruition and Manila 
remained a secure base for American forces thereafter.  
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CHAPTER VII 
THE PHILIPPINE DEFEAT 
 
The Aguinaldo Government was not blind to the problems of the Philippine Army 
that were revealed by the Battle of Manila, and they tried to apply corrective measures in 
an effort to improve tactical performance. In this final chapter, I will discuss the 
consequences of defeat in the Battle of Manila. The Aguinaldo Government had lost its 
last, best chance to defeat the Americans in a single engagement and it also had to deal 
with the failure of trying to avoid conflict in the first place by gaining foreign 
recognition. It therefore tried to find ways of improving its combat performance in the 
face of progressively declining resources and fighting strength. 
The Aguinaldo Government’s attempts to adapt failed and it was eventually 
forced to take to the hills in order to evade the American forces. This was the guerrilla 
phase of the war, and it also marked the end of the indigenous attempt at political 
centralization. 
The General Staff 
The Government first reorganized its command structure.635 The actual running of 
the war was to be delegated to a Sub-Secretary of War and the Secretary of War’s duties 
were further delegated to new command staffs, the most important one of which was the 
newly established Estado Mayor General, or the General Staff. The General Staff was to 
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be headed by Ambrosio Flores, the governor of Manila, who had also been a lieutenant in 
the Spanish General Staff—a military professional.636 The General Staff may be seen as 
the final attempt of the Aguinaldo Government to reform the Army to enable it to fight 
and win while maintaining its Western-style organization and tactics. For instance, the 
General Staff was supposed to have detailed knowledge of reconnaissance reports, plans, 
and sketches for operations and uprisings, the statistics and military details of the various 
towns under Philippine control, and detailed knowledge of materiel and personnel of the 
Army.637 The General Staff was to also manage the movement of soldiers, regulating 
their routes during marches. The Chief of the General Staff, Ambrosio Flores, was 
specifically tasked with all aspects of fortifications, such as directing their construction 
and inspection.638 He also had to handle logistics, which primarily meant organizing 
transport brigades of porters and pack animals and setting up supply dumps in suitable 
locations. 
These new duties of the General Staff all beg the question: why were these tasks 
not undertaken before? Was nobody responsible for working out route marches and the 
basic details of logistics? The results of the Battle of Manila suggests that, in fact, nobody 
was, hence arms and ammunition dumps were placed dangerously close to the frontline, 
where they could be destroyed or captured by the Americans. A logistics net and a supply 
distribution system are not easy things to set up, so the officers of the Philippine Army 
had resorted to simply pre-dumping these supplies in the front line.  
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Why had these problems not been anticipated? Why had the army not created—or 
even thought of creating—a logistics net? Weren’t matters like this the responsibility of 
Antonio Luna? He was supposed to be responsible for organizing the Philippine Army 
along Western lines.  As his letter of introduction to Aguinaldo stated: 
Ever since he has arrived here [Hong Kong] he made a project of the Organization 
of our Army of Liberation [a rare use of the term] and on field fortifications based 
on those used by the French Army: He also knows about military strategy, he has 
been studying these matters of late in Europe…639 
The fact that Luna missed these very basic military necessities does not speak 
well of his supposed knowledge of military affairs. Luna’s problem was that his 
knowledge of military affairs was self-taught, and knowledge of technical matters like 
logistics or route scheduling is difficult to acquire without the benefit of technical 
military training. One reason why Aguinaldo probably commissioned Luna despite his 
lack of a formal military educated was because he impressed by the latter’s status as an 
ilustrado. After all, Luna was a Propagandist, the brother of artist Juan Luna and a 
contemporary of Jose Rizal. Having Luna reform his army would have raised its prestige 
and associated it with a Europeanized elite—two things which would have helped in 
Aguinaldo’s quest for foreign recognition. 
But Luna was otherwise not better trained or not much more knowledgeable than 
Aguinaldo or any other officer when it came to military science. Indeed, Luna did not 
even have Aguinaldo or Malvar’s practical experience in handling, supplying and 
coordinating large bodies of men. Luna’s failure to anticipate these basic, technical, 
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military necessities suggests that the standard image of Luna as the “best” Filipino 
commander, or the only professional in a high command packed with amateurs, is 
overdrawn or inaccurate. Much of what is known about Luna’s activities have been 
derived from Jose Alejandrino’s Price of Freedom, but this work may not be as reliable 
as is commonly thought when it comes to Luna. For one, Alejandrino falsely attributes 
two things to Luna: he claims that Luna was the one who introduced or insisted on 
entrenching as a tactic and that it was Luna who insisted rigid discipline after the 
disasters of February.640 Entrenching was a tactic used as early as the 1896 Revolution—
Luna hardly introduced it. To address the second claim, it was in fact Ambrosio Flores as 
Chief of the General Staff who ordered strict—one might even say draconian—discipline 
after the disasters of February 1899.641 Alejandrino’s claim that the artillery service was 
rudimentary and of no account can also be considered false.642 As the last chapter 
showed, the Filipinos made extensive use of artillery during the 1898 Revolution. 
Luna’s inability to coordinate the movements of Philippine Army units might 
have been excusable, since it may even have been beyond trained professionals like 
Ambrosio Flores. Officers from different units often refused to cooperate with each other, 
or even with their superiors, without existing social ties643 Thus, Malvar was able to 
command his officers in Batangas with a degree of efficiency because he and these men 
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had prior social ties, while other commanders without prior social ties were less 
successful.644 Aguinaldo was aware of the importance of interpersonal ties, and this was 
likely why the high command of the Philippine Army was filled with his partisans.  
Luna was especially disadvantaged in such a personalistic command environment 
since he was an outsider amidst Hong Kong Junta members or Aguinaldo friends and 
kinsmen.645 He made matters much worse by letting his arrogance and violent temper get 
the better of him in his interactions with the officers and men.646 Perhaps in an army with 
an established culture of respect for grade and seniority, Luna would have been able to 
command respect and authority by simple virtue of his rank, but in an ad hoc army like 
that of the Philippines, social ties and personal loyalties were paramount. Luna had no 
networks with the top leadership cadre of the Aguinaldo Government and he possessed a 
grating, overbearing personality that antagonized many people he came into contact with.  
The General Staff was aware of the amateurishness of most of the Filipino 
officers and tried to make up for it by ordering all senior generals, like provincial 
commanders or zone commanders, to designate officers with knowledge of technical 
military affairs as their seconds in command.647 These seconds in command were to help 
their commanders in formulating battle plans and the three senior officers in each 
battalion were to have intimate knowledge of this plan so the Filipinos would not be 
                                                
644 May, Battle for Batangas, 78. 
645 Vivencio Jose, Rise and Fall of Antonio Luna, (Manila: Solar Publishing Corporation, 1972), 124-125. 
646 R8F59D5—Documents regarding a conflict between Luna and Mascardo, for instance.  
647 R6F22E4D9, A. Flores, Direccion de Estado Mayor. 12 March, 1899. 
245 
caught flat-footed again. Essentially, Flores wanted senior commanders to acquire trained 
chiefs-of-staff to overcome their lack of technical know-how. It was an arrangement 
similar to what existed in the Prussian Army—or indeed, in any army at the time that had 
a General Staff system.648 These chiefs of staff had to do many of the same things that 
Flores had to do, such as arranging the logistics of their units and helping the commander 
formulate battle plans.649 Unfortunately for the Philippine Army, there were few such 
trained officers and it does not seem as if this decree made much of a difference. 
The General Staff’s orders and recommendations also suggest that the rank and 
file had problems with military discipline. There was a widespread lack of discipline or 
respect for the superiority of ranks and Flores had to mandate the inculcation of the 
“respect and profound subordination of the inferior to the superior” in order to create 
“cohesion and military discipline.”650 Soldiers had to be reminded to salute officers and 
any breaches of discipline were to be punished severely. Sergeants were also to be 
respected, and soldiers had to be reminded that these NCOs had the authority of the 
president behind them. It must be noted, however, that armies can be successful without 
rigid adherence to military deference.   
The relationship the soldiers had with their officers was likely based on pre-
existing social ties: they listened to or respected officers who had been their patrons in 
civilian life. However, there are also signs that the soldiers tended to respect or listen to 
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officers who possessed spiritual prowess. There is no better example of this spiritual 
dimension than Aguinaldo, who gained support from the ordinary Filipinos from a belief 
that he possessed anting anting in the form of two children who accompanied him in the 
battlefield.651 Even the Americans caught hints of what Aguinaldo’s followers thought of 
him: Captain P.C. March, commander of the Astor Battery, noted that Aguinaldo derived 
much of his authority from the fact that, “the more ignorant of his [Aguinaldo’s] 
followers firmly believe that he is invulnerable, that a bullet fired at him would be 
deflected.”652 
The Philippine Army also had tactical failings that the General Staff tried to 
correct. One such failing was the habit of commanders of placing all of their troops on 
the firing line. The desire to cover every inch of the front is a novice commander’s error 
and the General Staff ordered commanders to leave a small body of men slightly behind 
the lines to act as a reserve to plug holes in the battle line or to act as a “fire base” or 
pivot when the unit had to maneuver.653 In the same decree, the General Staff also 
encouraged the officers in the Philippine Army to abandon close-order drill and disperse 
their troops when under fire. They were to adopt the “orden abierto” or the open order 
“of the guerrillas.” 
Perhaps the biggest tactical failure of the Army was the ordinary soldier’s 
extremely profligate expenditure of ammunition and abysmal marksmanship. The 
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American accounts agree that Filipino soldiers fired indiscriminately, without aiming, 
and at the slightest provocation. The General Staff and the army high command in 
general were aware of this problem and tried to rectify it. However, it is interesting to 
note that the Filipino high command was more concerned with the troops’ poor fire 
discipline rather than their marksmanship. The 12 March General Orders stated that any 
soldier wasting ammunition by firing without need or without having sighted the enemy 
was to be punished with expulsion from the army.654   
The Philippine high command’s solution to the soldiers’ poor marksmanship was 
not more practice, but increased control by the officers. An anonymous document issued 
by the office of the president suggests that troops should only fire after their officer had 
estimated the range of the enemy and spoke against the free fire system of the Spanish, 
“el sistema de los españoles.” The document claimed that the “Spanish system” produced 
a higher rate of fire but fewer results.655 This concern for wasteful firing is 
understandable: as Aguinaldo said, the Philippines did not have any munitions factories 
and could not easily replace any ammunition expended. However, the high command’s 
solution relied on the officers’ ability to estimate range—and it is not at all clear that the 
Philippine Army’s officers were any better at this feat (which is a basic marksmanship) 
than their soldiers. 
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In September of 1899, the Army finally tried to rectify the soldiers’ poor 
marksmanship.656 Each commander was to designate 10 soldiers in each company as 
tiradores or sharpshooters, and these men were to receive higher pay and a special 
shoulder patch and were to be exempted from manual labor—clearly attempts to increase 
the prestige and desirability of the position. The army was also to set up gunnery schools 
that would teach basic marksmanship to the Filipino soldiers. Why it took the high 
command to recommend this course of action is unclear, but either way, it was too late. 
At this point, the Philippine Army was very low on ammunition—probably too low to 
initiate training with live ammunition.  
That the Filipino soldiers proved to be poor marksmen was indicative of their 
general lack of training, or the lack of realism or efficiency in their training. Range 
estimation in particular is difficult to teach and is a common failing among poorly trained 
shooters.657 
However, there is also something decidedly traditional about such fusillades of 
projectiles—it is reminiscent of the prehispanic tactic of barrages of projectiles meant for 
intimidation. Perhaps without any training or guidance, Filipino soldiers simply reverted 
to an ancient cultural default—employing masses of projectiles during combat. The use 
of firepower to intimidate was certainly evident during the 1898 Revolution. 
The Philippine Army’s poor marksmanship was a major failing since it rendered 
any tactics that the officers could have come up with moot. It would not have mattered if 
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the Filipinos had reserves or could maneuver to outflank their opponents if they simply 
could not hit their targets. After all, the Filipinos already had the incomparable 
advantages of being stationary, in ground they knew well (which meant they should have 
had time to estimate ranges) and in the shelter of very good fortifications. The 
Americans, for all of their revised Uptonian tactics, still tended to run across exposed 
ground towards Filipino trenches. The Filipinos should have exacted more casualties than 
they did, but the fact was that American casualties in the Battle of Manila were fairly 
light.658  
Denouement 
Despite the efforts of the General Staff, the Philippine Army never truly 
recovered from the Battle of Manila. The Army had one last chance to inflict a significant 
defeat on the American forces in Calumpit, Bulacan, and this battle showed that while the 
Philippine Army did show signs of improvement, it was not enough to secure a victory.  
The Aguinaldo Government had already abandoned its capital in Malolos, but the 
“confluence of three rivers” in Calumpit offered an “ideal site for defense.”659 Once 
again, the Filipinos set up impressive fortifications: trenches with overhead cover, 
revetments, and firing slits.660 The Americans were in considerable force, attacking with 
two Volunteer regiments, a battalion of infantry, and a squadron of cavalry, supported by 
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3 field guns and an armored train armed with Gatling guns moving along the railway.661 
Antonio Luna commanded the Filipinos and he had three artillery pieces, a machine gun, 
and possibly 4,000 men with which to stop the Americans. If these numbers are accurate, 
this encounter was probably the largest battle in the Philippine-American War since the 
Battle of Manila.  
The Battle of Calumpit began on 24 April, when American forces led by 
Frederick Funston and the Kansas Volunteers approached the Bagbag River. The 
Americans advanced across the open and even tried to cross a ruined bridge spanning the 
river while, being covered by rifle fire from infantry from two brigades and by artillery 
fire from the armored train and the field guns. This fire so suppressed the Filipinos that 
“very few shots [were] fired” at the Americans as they traversed open ground and even 
attempted to cross the ruined bridge.662 Most of the American infantry was able to ford 
the Bagbag River unmolested—apparently the Filipinos had abandoned their defenses 
when the Americans were halfway across the river. The Americans arrived at the second 
river, the Rio Grande, and faced more elaborate Filipino entrenchments. Once again the 
bridge across this river had been partially disassembled, and this time the Americans 
were unable to ford the river. The two sides traded fire for the rest of the day, ceasing 
their activity only when darkness fell.  
The next day, Funston managed to cross the river when he found a raft that the 
Filipinos had unaccountably not destroyed. He sent two of his men across the river and 
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the two privates swam the river completely naked, taking a rope with them to act as a tow 
cable for the raft. Once again the Americans completely suppressed the Filipinos with 
heavy fire from their rifles, machine guns and artillery. The Americans had to stop giving 
covering fire when the two swimmers made it across, but these men apparently scared off 
the Filipinos in their trenches by throwing mud balls at them.  
Funston was able to cross the river on the raft and found that the Filipinos had 
abandoned the trenches closest to the river. However, in a marked change from the Battle 
of Manila, the Filipinos had set up a secondary line of trenches and caught the Americans 
by surprise. As usual, the Filipinos opened up on the Americans with their rifles and even 
used their Maxim machine gun, but they failed to make much impression on the 
Americans. The Filipinos also tried a counter-attack in “a deployed line, extended 
order”—again the lessons of the Battle of Manila seem to have been internalized 
somewhat.663 Unfortunately, the Americans brought their own artillery to bear and the 
Filipino counterattack failed. The Americans suffered very lightly—for instance, Funston 
lost only 3 killed and 5 wounded, despite having to ford two rivers and confront trenches 
while under fire.664 
The Filipino side of this battle was conducted by Luna, and this author has found 
a telegram summarizing the engagement that was very likely written by Luna himself.665 
The report is quite short, and spare on the details, but it more or less corresponds with the 
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American narrative. A point of divergence between Luna’s and the Americans’ accounts 
was that Luna insisted that he abandoned his positions in good order and only due to 
ammunition exhaustion. In light of the fact that his forces kept a continuous fire on the 
Americans to the very end, this is a rather dubious assertion. Luna further claimed that 
the Filipinos suffered only moderate casualties—which cannot be disproven—but he then 
went on to declare that the Americans had suffered 700 dead. Ultimately, one gets the 
impression that Luna was indeed brave, but his generalship did not display any marked 
superiority over any other Filipino commander. He too was unable to hold well-built 
trenches and advantageous terrain despite having a fair amount of weaponry on hand. 
The Battle of Calumpit shows the Filipinos trying to implement positive changes 
since the Battle of Manila: improved trenches and attacks in dispersed order. However, 
Filipino marksmanship remained poor—so poor it probably cost the Filipinos the battle. 
The Filipinos also made poor use of their heavy weapons. They had fired their machine 
gun on Funston and his men, who had been caught in the open, and were flat-footed, but 
failed to inflict a single casualty. The Filipinos also remained supine in their trenches and 
were quickly routed. Morale had thus worsened. 
Defeat in battle had fatal consequences for Luna. Because of his overbearing 
personality and lack of personal networks in the high command, he had made many 
enemies among Aguinaldo’s closest followers. In fact, he had feuded with Tomas 
Mascardo, a high-ranking Filipino officer, shortly before the Battle of Calumpit.666 After 
the battle, he was arrested and executed on Aguinaldo’s orders on suspicion of trying to 
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seize the presidency.667 Perhaps his many enemies simply used the opportunity to get rid 
of him, and his defeat proved he was not the general he made himself out to be and was 
no longer useful to Aguinaldo.  
The Battle of Calumpit was the last major engagement in the Philippine-American 
War. There were plenty of other actions, but by and large, the Philippine Army suffered 
defeat after defeat in the 10 months after the Battle of Manila. The one good thing that 
might be said about Aguinaldo’s military arrangements was that his forces were quite 
capable of replacing losses and pitching men into combat, so the Philippine Army was 
able to offer resistance to the Americans for quite some time. Unfortunately, the Army’s 
officers and men never improved and the Army was unable to fight to win. Towards the 
end of 1899, Aguinaldo disbanded the regular army and resorted to guerrilla warfare. 
This was not an overly radical shift: as the Armas Blancas showed, the Philippine Army 
had units that were engaging in unconventional warfare from the start. The conventional 
phase of the Philippine-American War came to an end. 
The Conventional Phase: In Conclusion 
One point bears repeating another time: the Aguinaldo Government’s attempt to 
reform the Philippine Army and remake it into a regular, centralized, and Europeanized 
force was in line with its general strategy of seeking recognition from foreigners and 
consolidating its hold on the Philippines. The Aguinaldo Government did not think it 
could win a war with a foreign power like America and therefore decided that its best 
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strategy was to seek recognition and support from foreign powers. Concurrently, the 
Aguinaldo Government wished to gather domestic power into its hands, and this meant 
controlling violence and force in the Philippines. The various armed bands that had 
defeated the Spanish in 1898 were therefore reformed and integrated into a centralized 
Philippine Army—on the surface of it, quite successfully. The Aguinaldo Government 
used external threats to justify its consolidation of political and military power, arguing 
that Western powers would only recognize a country with a disciplined, regular armed 
force. This was the “Bagong Digma,” and Aguinaldo and his Government worked to turn 
their army into what they imagined a Europeanized army was like.  
The strategy of recognition failed. No country was willing to recognize the 
Philippines and the Americans still attacked the Aguinaldo Government’s forces. 
Aguinaldo therefore went to war with his reformed army, and failed. To say that the 
Philippine Army failed is not to hold it up to a universal standard of military efficiency. 
The Philippine Army failed in its self-appointed task, which was to uphold the Aguinaldo 
Government’s hegemony in the face of internal and external threats. The Philippine 
Army’s reformation meant that it fought the war symmetrically, meeting the Americans 
head on. The example of the Cuerpo de Armas Blancas shows that it was willing to use 
unconventional tactics from the beginning, but the bulk of the Philippine Army’s fighting 
strength lay in its uniformed, regular forces.  
The Philippine Army was unable to stand up to the Americans despite several key 
advantages at the start of the Philippine-American War. In the Battle of Manila, the 
Americans had no choice but to attack the Filipino forces surrounding the city if they 
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were to gain room for operational maneuver. The Filipinos were therefore on the tactical 
defensive in an era when technology had made infantry attacks difficult or even nearly 
suicidal. Throughout this period, infantry unsupported with heavy artillery fire generally 
failed when they came up against entrenched infantry armed with clip-fed, bolt-action 
rifles. In theory, the Filipinos had many advantages, even if their forces were stretched. 
They had had time to construct defenses, like trenches or strong points; they knew the 
ground; they were used to the climate and they may have marginally outnumbered the 
American forces. They were also armed with an excellent clip-fed rifle in the form of the 
German Mauser, and the evidence showed that they had plenty of ammunition. The 
Americans, on the other hand, had very little artillery support outside of two small 
batteries, and while they had the naval guns of Dewey’s fleet, these pieces could not 
provide fire support beyond the coastal areas.  
Despite their tactical advantages, the Filipinos were unable to stop the Americans. 
They did not even inflict any serious casualties. At this very early stage of the war, 
American successes could not be attributed to an overwhelming advantage in numbers of 
weapons: the Filipinos had plenty of rifles, a comparable number of artillery, and a fairly 
large stock of ammunition.  
The Filipinos’ defeat in the Battle of Manila explains their defeat in the 
conventional phase of the Philippine-American War in general, since this was the best-
equipped, best-organized, and possibly even the best-trained army that the Filipinos 
fielded. There would be no real difference between the Filipino soldiers in the Battle of 
Manila and in later engagements. There were no real improvements. Indeed, the Filipinos 
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faced a steady diminution in fighting power as their morale collapsed and their stocks of 
weapons and ammunition were depleted. 
Perhaps the most important reason for the Philippine Army’s failure in the Battle 
of Manila and in subsequent engagements was that it was not ready to engage the 
Americans in a frontal confrontation, even when on the defensive. The Army’s 
organization and training had several important weaknesses. The most glaring one was 
the utterly abysmal marksmanship of the Filipino soldiers: they were incapable of 
inflicting casualties on the Americans. The Filipino soldiers tended to fire off 
ammunition wildly, inaccurately, and in massive quantities.  
Finally, the Philippine Army’s officers proved less than able at their jobs. These 
men were generally brave and dedicated, but had little to no knowledge of the technical 
aspects of military operations, like handling logistics or coordinating movements. They 
also had problems respecting the chain of command or cooperating with other officers. 
Some were negligent, failing to devise plans or supervise their units properly. 
These failures suggest serious flaws in Aguinaldo’s reorganization of his army. In 
many respects, the Philippine Army only superficially resembled a European one. Too 
much attention was paid to appearance. The Philippine Army did have uniforms, colonels 
and generals, and it even marched and drilled in parade formation, but it retained many of 
the qualities of the revolutionary forces of 1896—or even of armed forces from 
prehispanic times. Despite Aguinaldo’s attempts at centralization and control, the army 
was still marked by multipolarity, and the relationships between the officers and men still 
relied on charisma and personal ties. The poor marksmanship of the Filipinos might even 
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be explained away as a vestige of spiritual prowess in combat: the high volume of 
unaimed fire was meant to intimidate and impress, rather than kill.  
Thus, Aguinaldo’s attempt to field an army to fight the “Bagong Digma” was a 
failure. The Philippine Army was unable to overcome its origins as a revolutionary force 
raised by rural elites with little to no horizontal integration or cohesion among its 
command cadre. This sort of army had a difficult time facing conventional forces like the 
Spanish Army or the American Army unless circumstances were greatly in its favor, as 
they were in the 1898 Revolution. The American Army of 1899 was not the dispersed, 
poorly-led, and isolated Spanish Army of 1898, and the typical Filipino tactic of a loose 
siege and massive bullet barrage no longer worked. The Filipinos also lost control of the 
sea, which meant that they were unable to prevent American reinforcements and 
resupply, and they were no longer able to import weapons and ammunition.   
Perhaps it was a mistake for the Aguinaldo Government to attempt fight in the 
style of the “Bagong Digma” given the handicaps with which it had to work. The biggest 
one was that military expertise was a rare commodity among the people who became this 
Army’s leadership cadre. The person Aguinaldo brought in to reform the army, Antonio 
Luna, had a superficial, amateur’s knowledge of military affairs. The other officers that 
Aguinaldo had to use were former landowners or local officials—not professional 
officers. Aguinaldo did have a few former Spanish army officers, Manuel Sityar and 
Ambrosio Flores were the most prominent. But they either did not ascend to positions of 
importance, like Sityar, or did so when it was too late, like Flores. Why this was so is 
258 
difficult to explain: perhaps they simply did not have close personal ties to Aguinaldo or 
their social credentials were insufficient. 
In sum, it can be said that the Filipinos fought hard, but not well. Perhaps it was a 
mistake to choose to fight in the manner of the “Bagong Guerra,” but Aguinaldo chose to 
do so because of the strategy of recognition. The strategy of recognition was not illogical, 
and it had been based on experience and a realistic appraisal of Filipino military ability. 
Pursuing the strategy of recognition was therefore an intelligent way of trying to avoid 
combat while still maintaining Filipino independence. It is therefore especially ironic that 
in trying to gain foreign recognition, Aguinaldo reformed his army in such a way that it 
was incapable of winning when war unexpectedly did break out.  
The Guerrilla War 
By the end of 1899, Aguinaldo had been forced to abandon successive capitals 
and was on the run from the American forces. Taylor gives the date of the Filipino switch 
to guerrilla warfare as November 1899. This date was based largely on American views, 
since it was when Gen. Arthur McArthur sent a telegram to the commander of the 
American forces, Gen. Ewel Otis, declaring that the “the so-called Filipino republic is 
destroyed.”668 Taylor was perhaps not entirely accurate, and pegging the start of the 
guerrilla phase of the war to an exact date should probably not be attempted since the 
Aguinaldo Government does not seem to have released a document ordering such a 
switch. Indeed, guerrilla tactics had been practiced by the Filipinos from the beginning of 
the war, as evidenced by the Cuerpo de Armas Blancas. 
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There has always been some conceptual fuzziness with the definitions of such 
terms as “guerrilla warfare” and “insurgencies.” It is possible for the armies of nation-
states to engage in guerrilla warfare, which can probably best be described as the tactic of 
non-concentration, and evasion. Likewise, it is also possible for an insurgency to fight 
with a uniformed army, facing enemies frontally, since this is a political label, denoting 
rebellion or resistance. The Americans described the Philippine forces as an insurgency 
precisely because of their refusal to recognize the legitimacy of the Aguinaldo 
Government. The guerrilla phase of the Philippine-American War therefore began not 
only when the Filipinos had to assume the indirect tactics of dispersion and evasion, but 
also when the Aguinaldo Government lost its politically primacy and had to compete 
with another political system. Thus, in some parts of the Philippines the guerrilla war 
began quite early on. For instance, the Filipinos in Manila were engaged in guerrilla 
warfare from the very start of the war, since the Americans had established a working 
government there and the Filipino forces inside the city were never able to operate 
openly. Antonio Luna may have organized some guerrilla units as early as June of 
1899.669 In the province of Bulacan, Pio del Pilar proposed a “plan de guerrilla” in 
September.670 On the other hand, in January of 1900, the Filipino forces in the province 
of Batangas still had a centralized government that adhered to the national government, 
and they initially fought in a frontal, conventional manner.671 Likewise, the Filipinos in 
Ilocos Norte fought from trenches and even engaged in an artillery duel with the 
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Americans in 14 January 1900.672 Giving an exact date to the start of the guerrilla war is 
therefore impossible, as it varied from region to region. 
What is undeniable is that the dissolution of the Philippine national government—
i.e., the Aguinaldo Government—was an important event. The Aguinaldo Government 
could no longer work openly and it was now a “guerrilla government,” or one that had to 
work in the shadows. In this case, McArthur’s November date does have some merit, 
since November was when Aguinaldo was forced to evade the Americans and become 
increasingly nomadic. Aguinaldo had been the center of the interpersonal relationships 
that held the government together and his prestige and position had also been important 
in keeping the system unified. With Aguinaldo marginalized, the “national” element of 
the Government diminished. 
Up until September or October of 1899, the Aguinaldo Government was probably 
still functional. It was still answering correspondence, planning finances, and debating 
strategy.673 It had lost a lot of its power and influence, but its central bureaucracy was still 
intact (if much reduced) and it therefore could still claim to be a source of authority. It 
had not yet been completely marginalized. For instance, despite defections and captures, 
the Aguinaldo Government tried to keep the Congress in existence even if it had to 
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appoint some members.674 When Aguinaldo was forced into flight, the activities of the 
central government were much curtailed and Aguinaldo himself was rendered powerless. 
According to one of his aides, Simeon Villa,  
The Honorable President has decided to descend into the plain as soon as the 
rainy season commences… He has also another motive for doing this, namely, the 
establishing of his communications; for really, from the time that we fled toward 
the mountains until now we have remained in complete ignorance of what is 
going on in the present war.675 
Aguinaldo eventually re-established contact with the rest of the Philippines, but 
his communications remained unreliable and sporadic. He maintained some of his 
authority, however, especially his moral authority. According to Villa, Aguinaldo still 
received or dispatched messages to surviving guerrilla groups or to the still-extant Hong 
Kong Junta.676 In many ways, Aguinaldo resembled the cult leaders of the 19th century, 
complete with an adoring entourage who gave him a largely symbolic title—“Honorable 
President.” Aguinaldo was now the messiah of the “religion” of Philippine independence. 
Like other cultists, his “religion” was heretical, since it was certainly not the accepted 
dogma of the period, which was now American rule. 
Elsewhere in the Philippines, governance and the prosecution of war devolved 
into local hands. Again, this change did not happen by surprise. It must be remembered 
that the 1896 and 1898 Revolutions had been regional, local affairs, and the Aguinaldo 
Government had simply built its structures on top of these local government units. 
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Additionally, when the Philippine-American War began, the Aguinaldo Government set 
up mechanisms of local support and resistance—although these actions might simply 
have been formalizing what had been common practices anyway.677 
It cannot be denied, however, that by 1900, the Filipino forces had become 
guerrillas in every sense: politically and militarily. They may have occasionally fought 
the Americans in a tactically frontal, conventional manner, but in a strategic sense the 
Filipinos had now dispersed their forces and avoided contact with the Americans. The 
guerrilla leader Jesus Villamor stated this new state of affairs with remarkable elegance 
in his memoirs: “guerra de montaña—es la propia del pequeño contra otro mayor”—or 
“the mountain war—fit for the small against the big.”678 
Essentially, the Philippine Army had become remontado. Like the remontado, 
they were resistance groups who had decamped from the towns and villages of the 
lowlands to avoid a stronger enemy. Also like the remontado, they were an alternative to 
the dominant political authority (the American colonial regime, in this case). The 
guerrilla’s continued survival represented their main challenge to the colonial authorities, 
since the mere fact of their existence rendered questionable the American claims of 
universal and unchallenged hegemony in the Philippine Islands.  
Indeed, the Filipino decision to decamp to the mountains looks very much like 
what happened during the Spanish conquest. The datu of the coastal barangay had also 
been defeat in frontal confrontations by a superior force. Like the guerrillas, the datu fled 
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to the mountains, occasionally raiding the Spaniards, but generally content to merely 
survive and wait for the situation to change or for the Spanish to leave. 
 This is not to say that the Filipino guerrillas became bandits or savage tribes, 
something that the Americans liked to claim in order to de-legitimize the Filipino cause. 
Witness Taylor’s racist and derogatory description of guerrillas as “half-naked men” and 
“robber bands” whose “sole excuse for its existence was plunder, and the pompous titles 
of its commanders.”679 
Taylor’s comments give some idea of the frustrations that the guerrilla tactics and 
the continued Filipino resistance engendered. His comments also show a lack of 
understanding of greater trends in Filipino military history. The guerrillas were not 
“bandits,” even if they practiced the same tactic of decampment and flight into hills and 
mountains. Rather, the Filipino forces had simply reassumed the age-old tactics of 
resistance against a stronger power by detaching themselves from the ruling body politic. 
They were still fighting for nationalistic reasons: for independence. As one Hong Kong 
Junta member wrote to Juan Cailles in 1900, the Filipinos were fighting because of the 
“oppression, arrogation of our nationality, our sure death.”680 The bandits of the 
Philippines did not have this centralizing, nationalistic goal. 
The Filipinos’ general strategy during the guerrilla phase was to outlast the 
Americans, to slowly “attrite” them. Aguinaldo wrote to some of his local presidentes—
men who again were at the forefront of revolutionary struggle—that they had to kill or 
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capture small parties of Americans, saying that if this was done in a large enough scale, it 
would secure victory.681 As early as May of 1899, Teodoro Sandico was of the opinion 
that the Americans were inspired by “sentimiento mercantile” or “mercantile sentiments” 
and this would impel them to concede the war because of its rising costs.682 
The Filipinos were also hoping for favorable political circumstances and the 1900 
presidential elections in America seemed to provide them with a possible turning point. 
The Aguinaldo Government constantly told Filipinos that the war was the fault of a small 
section of American society headed by the William McKinley and an “imperialist 
party.”683 The Filipino leadership further promised that if the anti-war William Jennings 
Bryan won, he would end the war.684 Bryan consequently became the unlikeliest figure 
around which the Filipinos rallied. A festival was even held in Bryan’s honor, and here 
he was cheered as the savior of the Philippines. This festival does not seem to have been 
aimed at American audiences, and it does not seem to have been an attempt to influence 
the presidential election. Rather, it was most likely aimed at Filipinos, to encourage 
continued fighting and to raise morale.685  
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The Filipinos’ attitudes towards Bryan are also remarkably similar to the cult 
leaders’ ideas on salvation and “paradise.” Like the cultists, the Aguinaldo Government 
promised a better world with independence. Like them, this paradise was to be achieved 
after a salvific moment: the American election. Bryan assumes the role of a sort of 
triumphant deity, offering the Filipinos new hope with his impending victory.686 
Unfortunately for the Filipino guerrillas, Bryan lost and the war continued. 
Tactically, the guerrilla phase allowed the Filipinos to resist for much longer than 
a conventional war would have, largely because they no longer presented the Americans 
with concentrations of soldiers to defeat. The guerrillas had the advantage of working in 
small units, something to which their amateur commanders were much better suited. The 
Filipino forces up in the mountains could also regulate when and where they established 
contact with American soldiers, which often meant that they could choose situations 
favorable to them, usually ambushes or surprise attacks. For instance, in Pampanga, a 
local guerrilla commander named Jacobo Fajardo—an Artillery officer in the Philippine 
Army—surprised a small detachment of American soldiers by dressing 8 soldiers as 
peasants who managed to approach the Americans by hiding their bolos and daggers in 
umbrellas. 25 rifle-armed soldiers also gave them covering fire. The ambushers killed an 
unspecified number of Americans, stole away 4 Mauser rifles with ammunition, and 
managed to evade pursuit.687 The commander of the guerrillas in Nueva Ecija issued 
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instructions to one of his local commanders, telling him to ambush American convoys but 
to avoid combats that promised no gain or results.688 
The most famous of all the guerrilla actions was the Balangiga Massacre in Samar 
in September 1901, when a garrison of 74 American soldiers was caught by surprise by 
some Filipino guerrillas and lost 44 killed and 22 wounded.689 They were led by their 
local mayor, but the overall commander of the forces in Samar was that stalwart of the 
cause of Philippine independence, Vicente Lukban. The American commander of the 
Visayas, Gen. Jacob H. Smith reacted in the worst possible way for a counterinsurgent: 
he ordered the massacre of almost all the men in the town of Balangiga. He also imposed 
harsh punitive measures in the province of Samar. Terrible as all of these were for the 
people of Samar, the Balangiga Massacre and its aftermath produced nothing but 
negative publicity for the Americans. Cynically speaking, this was exactly the sort of 
media coverage that the Filipinos needed and a strategy of provoking American rage and 
overreaction would have been good for the guerrillas. 
Unfortunately, such successes were rare and it is apparent that the Filipinos did 
not inflict much in the way of casualties. William Henry Scott makes the remarkably 
depressing statement that in Ilocos Norte, “only twice during the whole war were more 
than two Americans killed in the same action—five one time, and eleven another.”690 In 
fact the Americans suffered very few killed in action during the guerrilla phase. The 
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American commander Ewell Otis reported that from August 1899 until 1 May 1900, the 
Americans lost 258 killed in battle, which includes the wounded who eventually 
succumbed to their injuries. Arthur McArthur, the commander who succeeded Otis, 
reported that from 5 May 1900 to June of 1901, the Americans suffered only 245 killed. 
To put this in perspective, the Americans suffered 351 killed and 1,412 wounded from 
February 4 until 31 August 1899—this was the conventional phase of the war.691 By the 
metric of kills, the Filipinos were therefore less successful in their guerrilla combats than 
in their “conventional” battles of 1899.   
Thus it does not seem as if the Filipinos tactical performance improved much 
during the guerrilla phase. And there is little to suggest that Filipino tactical performance 
should have improved. Without access to foreign sources, Filipino stocks of weapons and 
ammunition would have slowly dwindled without hope of replacement. The resulting 
shortages would have prevented the Filipinos from practicing their marksmanship, which 
is tragic since the Filipino high command only realized their deficiencies in this regard 
just at the end of the conventional war period. Additionally, the Filipinos never gained 
access to professional military officers or men who could have instructed them in tactics 
or marksmanship. Indeed, with the isolation and dissolution of the General Staff in 1900, 
what little military expertise that remained in the Philippine Army was effectively 
neutralized. Ambrosio Flores, for instance, surrendered to the Americans in 1900.692 
                                                
691 War Department, Annual Report 1899, 1: 4: 192.  
692 National Historical Institute, Filipinos in History, 1:192-193. 
268 
There is also the fact that the Americans were not the Spanish of 1896 or 1898. 
The Americans did not have poor morale, they were not isolated, they could be 
resupplied and reinforced because of sea control, and they initiated aggressive patrolling 
and intelligence gathering. They also concentrated Filipinos into villages and rigorously 
guarded the movement of food and other basics. Offensively, the Americans engaged in 
“punitive actions,” like “crop and property destruction.”693  
In many ways, the American soldiers resembled the Spanish conquerors of the 
16th and 17th centuries.694 Like the Spaniards, the Americans controlled the towns and 
villages. The Americans even “concentrated” the Filipinos into more compact settlements 
to better control the movement of food and people—a remarkable echo of the Spanish 
practice of reducción. In the towns and villages, the American soldiers acted much like 
the Spanish priests: they educated the children, they dispensed justice, they took care of 
basic sanitation, and they reordered local politics. Like the Spanish priests and friars, the 
American soldier was often the only representative of his government that the Filipinos 
ever saw. Occasionally, the Americans would send patrols out into the bush, where they 
often burnt or confiscated food or crops—another remarkable echo of Spanish practice, 
this time, the practice of the entrada. Thus, if the Filipino guerrillas had become 
remontado, the Americans had become friars and conquistadores. 
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Filipino tactical failure meant that the Filipinos were unable to constrain these 
American actions. Merely surviving and existing as remontado was not enough—since 
the Filipinos wanted recreate the Philippine nation, they had to make the Americans 
leave, and not just passively offer a challenge to colonial hegemony. The Filipinos 
therefore had to actively disrupt the workings of American colonial society. But because 
the Filipino were tactically incapable, they were unable to hem the Americans in their 
garrisons, to prevent or seriously impede the reinforcement and resupply of detachments, 
and to ambush American soldiers who were out on patrol or who were out protecting the 
mechanisms of American rule.  
This failure to constrain the Americans in turn impeded Filipino freedom of 
action, which prevented them from gathering food and supplies from locals or shifting 
their operations. Whatever else may be said about “winning hearts and minds,” both 
guerrillas and counterguerrillas require a minimum of physical security to go about their 
business, and this physical security can only be secured by successful military action. 
Because the Filipinos could not kill enough Americans to increase their rate of 
attrition and constrain their freedom of action, their only hope of victory lay in outlasting 
the American forces. Essentially, the war became a contest of wills. There were three 
things the Filipinos hoped for: disease to waste away the American forces, the cost of 
continuing the war to erode American will, and a fortuitous event to occur, like a foreign 
power intervening on their behalf. 
The third point can be dismissed right away: despite some Filipino attempts at 
diplomacy, nothing ever happened that compelled the Americans to leave. The Filipinos 
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briefly hoped that the Boxer Rebellion would force the Americans to reduce their 
commitments in the Philippines, but this never happened. Neither did any foreign power 
ever intervene on the Philippines’ behalf. 
The war did cost the Americans a lot of money. James Blount claimed that, “It 
used to be said in the early days that we paid $20,000,000 for a $200,000,000 
insurrection.”695 He went on to claim that the war ultimately cost the Americans about 
$300,000,000. But this cost was not enough to make the Americans give up on their 
imperial dreams. 
Waiting for disease to kill the American soldiers was a somewhat better option 
since disease did take a heavy toll on the American forces. From 31 July 1898 until 24 
May 1900, the Americans lost 1,138 men to disease, which was more than was lost to 
combat.696 Again, the death toll from disease was not enough to discourage the 
Americans and force them to leave.  
The strategy of outlasting the Americans was risky, since there was no guarantee 
that Philippine will would not collapse first. The guerrillas themselves had to have the 
willpower to keep on living in the mountains, risking their lives to disease and hunger 
and sometimes facing the occasional American patrol or raid. The willingness of non-
combatants, like farmers, fishermen, or municipal officials, was also crucial to the 
survival of the guerrillas, since they relied on these people for their food and information. 
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The most important non-combatants were the rural municipal officials and elites, since 
these people controlled most of the resources in the Philippine countryside. 
 The Filipino guerrillas evinced a considerable level of stamina and adherence to 
their cause in the face of great hardship and constant defeats. Why did they display such 
endurance? The most obvious answer is simply that these guerrillas—or at least their 
leaders—were committed and believed in the cause of Filipino independence.697 Life up 
in the mountains and forests was not easy—food was scarce, conditions uncomfortable, 
and the threat of death was always present so their persistence suggests that there was a 
degree of belief in the cause involved. 
 Another possible reason why these guerrillas kept up the struggle—and why 
ordinary Filipinos supported them—was fear of Americans. The Aguinaldo Government 
both received and spread word of American abuses.698 For instance, the official 
newspaper, the Independencia, published stories recounting American atrocities and 
brutality.699 Teodoro Sandico even gave dire warning to the Filipinos about the fate of 
American Indians, who were hungry and had been reduced in numbers after having been 
subjugated by the Americans.700 
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Finally, the Aguinaldo Government tended to overstate American casualties, thus 
giving the impression to the Filipinos that they were more successful than they were. For 
instance, Pantaleon Garcia, the new head of the General Staff, claimed in September of 
1899 that the Americans had suffered over 1,400 combat-related casualties in the month 
of August—a gross exaggeration.701 Leaving aside the fact that overstating enemy 
casualties is something many armies do, there are a few possible reasons why the 
Filipinos miscounted their kills.  Such exaggeration may have been calculated policy, to 
keep people invested in the war, or it may have been wishful thinking, or it may have 
been local commanders inflating their casualty reports in shame or for prestige reasons, 
or it may simply have been a lack of accuracy in counting enemy casualties. Whatever 
the case may be, overestimating their success might have induced the Filipinos to hold 
out longer in the mistaken belief that they were somehow winning. 
Why the Americans persevered in this war is beyond the scope of this study, 
which deals with the Filipino side. But one question that should be asked is why the 
Filipinos did not do more to help undermine the will of the American public. The 
successful insurgencies of recent decades have employed propaganda campaigns 
targeting their enemy’s populace and decision-making bodies. The Filipinos had a well- 
conceived plan of diplomacy that they could have used to propagandize during the 
guerrilla phase, and Filipino elites had experience in lobbying and publicizing Filipino 
issues to foreign presses. Unfortunately, however, Filipino diplomacy tapered off after 
1899 and the PIR does not give any hints as to why. My own suspicion is that it was 
largely due to a lack of resources. This failure to propagandize was especially unfortunate 
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since there was an anti-war movement in America the Filipinos could have readily 
exploited.702  
Unfortunately, in this contest of willpower, the Filipino will broke first. 
Specifically, the Filipino guerrillas lost the support of the rural elites, without whom no 
resistance was possible. The turning point of the war may to have been the passage of a 
Municipal and Provincial Government Act in February 1901. This act, modeled to some 
extent on the post-Maura Reforms of the Spanish, devolved considerable authority into 
local hands.703 Elections were held to set up these local governments and the elites—the 
only people who were actually eligible to vote—did so in large numbers. This event was 
soon followed by Aguinaldo’s capture and there was a spike of surrenders in February-
May of 1901 that crippled the guerrilla movement.704 The movement limped on, and 
Miguel Malvar assumed the presidency of the Philippine Republic, but the spate of 
surrenders in 1901 was the beginning of the end.  
The Municipal and Provincial Government Act took the sails out of the resistance 
movement since it appealed to the rural, municipal elites—the people whose support was 
crucial to the survival of the independence movement. A lot of the elites’ impulse to 
resist was now gone—the Americans had essentially given them back the power they had 
enjoyed under the Spanish, with the added bonus of having gotten rid of the friars, and 
promised Filipinos a larger role in national politics. The American’s creation—and 
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successful defense—of a working civil government in the Philippines also undercut many 
of the Aguinaldo Government’s claims of authority with the ever-so-important municipal 
elites. The Americans now offered these elites protection from bandits.  The Americans 
also promised to uphold the economic order from which these rural elites benefited. And 
with the new municipal government, the Americans could now legitimize the municipal 
elites’ positions of authority. The Aguinaldo/Malvar Government could do none of these 
things and, with their exactions of food and wealth and their disruption of the economy, 
the guerrillas were in fact impediments to the continued prosperity of the rural elites. The 
Aguinaldo/Malvar Government could offer little in return for their demands beyond a 
vague promise of independence sometime in the future. There was now little reason for 
these rural magnates to support the guerrillas, and more reasons for them to turn to the 
Americans—who were also strong enough to defend the rural elites from guerrilla 
reprisals.  
The collapse of the independence movement suggests why the Aguinaldo 
Government could not resort to guerrilla tactics right away—or at least it could not do so 
easily. Guerrilla warfare in the Philippines would have entailed decampment in order to 
avoid the American forces and not present them with a concentration of Filipino military 
strength to destroy. Dispersal of this sort would have entailed giving up the lowland 
centers of power, of losing contact with the municipal elites and leaving them to interact 
with the Americans. The Americans would have been able to set up governments much 
sooner, which would have challenged the basis of the Aguinaldo Government’s power 
much sooner. Giving up the lowlands would have made the Aguinaldo Government 
appear incompetent, unable to govern or exercise sovereignty in its chosen jurisdiction. 
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Decampment was a strategy of decentralization—it could not have worked for a 
government whose goal was the complete opposite. 
The war was officially declared won by the new American president Theodore 
Roosevelt on 4 July 1902. The Malvar Government had been dissolved and American 
colonial hegemony had no competitors left in the Philippines. Some resistance would 
continue for a few more years, but it did not stop American agents of empire from 
collecting taxes, enforcing the law or doing business. The burden of “pacification” fell on 
the newly established Philippine Constabulary, but for all intents and purposes, the 
Philippine-American War had come to an end. 
Thus died the first Philippine attempt at nation-building. Emilio Aguinaldo had 
dreams of a “Philippines for Filipinos” but in the end, “his capacities did not come up to 
his dreams.”705 
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION 
 
A long view of Philippine history from the Spanish Conquest until the Philippine-
American War shows a slow, halting process of political centralization. The political 
landscape of the Philippines began with the multipolar environment of the prehispanic 
barangays and ended with a unitary, centralized American colonial state. The road to 
centralization was complicated and the end result not at all preordained or inevitable. For 
a variety of reasons, a tendency towards political fragmentation or decentralization was 
strong in Philippine history. The geography was probably the most important reason why 
it was so difficult to consolidate power in the Philippines: it is an archipelago, and the 
islands are often hilly or mountainous, and densely forested. Centralizing power in the 
Philippines therefore required a concerted effort, and the Spanish only tried to do so in 
the 19th century. 
Filipinos, whether full blooded natives or mestizos, played a role in the eventual 
centralization of the Philippines. Throughout the period I discussed in this study, Filipino 
society was very strongly inclined towards localism; but by the end of the 19th century a 
small number of Filipinos had internalized the concept of nationalism. Thus, by the end 
of the 19th century, there were a few Filipinos who wanted to centralize the Philippines 
under the aegis of a Filipino government, one ruling over an indigenous nation-state. 
These nationalist Filipinos revolted against Spain in 1896, precipitating a period of unrest 
and violence that lasted until 1902. Unfortunately, there was no wave of nationalist 
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sentiment, but only a sense of common grievance against the Spanish domination and 
exploitation of the Philippines.The Filipino nationalists also had to deal with the 
multipolar tendencies of Philippine politics, which affected the kind of government and 
army they ended up creating. This experiment in nation-building came to an end when 
the Filipinos were defeated in the Philippine-American War. Filipinos thereby lost the 
chance to centralize the archipelago entirely on their own terms. 
The two competing trends of centralization and fragmentation were reflected in 
similar trends in Philippine military history. On the one hand, the various central 
governments deployed military force to fight for their interests and to uphold their 
authority. The Spanish were the ones who introduced these centralized military systems, 
which gave them a European flavor in the Philippines. The military forces of the 
centralized governments were usually organized, bureaucratized, and uniformed armies—
“regular” armies (even if they did not start out that way). They fought to defend territory 
against foreign invaders and to suppress internal dissent or resistance towards the 
political system. 
On the other hand, there was physical, forcible resistance to centralization. 
Resistance generally took the form of decampment, or flight into the mountains and 
forests in the interiors of the islands of the Philippines. Decampment was an evolution of 
military practice that dated from prehispanic times, and it remained a viable tactic even 
during the Spanish period because of the peculiarities of the Spanish colonial system. 
Decampment can be called remontado warfare, from the Spanish term for Filipinos who 
abandoned the mainstream of colonial society to literally “return to the mountains.” 
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Remontado warfare was inherently decentralizing, since its practitioners intentionally 
isolated themselves. Survival was a form of victory, since the continued survival of the 
remontado represented a challenge to the dominant system of the centralized government 
of the lowlands. The remontados sometimes raided the lowland settlements and they 
occasionally had to fight off attempts by the centralized government to defeat them and 
reintegrate them into society so it wasn’t a completely passive form of war—it did 
involve the active use of force. 
Therefore, one can say that there is a dialectic between centralization and 
fragmentation in Philippine politics and warfare. The general trend has been towards 
centralization, but because of the nature of the geography and culture of the Philippines, 
fissiparous tendencies persist even to this day.  
The dialectic was played out during the Philippine-American War. During this 
conflict, we saw two groups, the Aguinaldo Government and the Americans, contend 
with the problems of mulitpolarity and attempt to centralize the Philippine archipelago on 
their terms. The study focused on the Filipino side, since there are already studies of the 
American attempts to conquer and “pacify” the archipelago. 
The Aguinaldo Government faced two problems in its quest to build a nation-
state: the familiar one of overcoming localism in the Philippines, and the new problem of 
trying to secure foreign recognition of its sovereignty. Its answer to both problems was to 
create an outwardly Westernized or Europeanized political system and army. The 
political system was a constitutional republic with executive and legislative branches and 
direct representation, while the army was a regular, uniformed military force with a 
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hierarchic structure and European-style tactics. The Aguinaldo Government’s hope was 
that by appearing Europeanized, foreign governments would recognize the Filipinos’ 
suitability for self-rule. This may be called Aguinaldo’s “strategy of recognition,” or his 
attempt to prevent war through diplomacy or, indeed, through a show of prowess. 
However, the kind of government and military that Aguinaldo created consolidated 
power into his hands, so it also served to centralize authority. 
Unfortunately for Aguinaldo, the strategy of recognition failed. In trying to 
reform the army and politics of the Philippines, Aguinaldo also fought the Americans in a 
way that maximized Filipino weaknesses and American strengths. When the central 
government and reformed army were defeated, Aguinaldo and the other revolutionaries 
reverted back to remontado warfare. Once again the dialectic of centralization and 
fragmentation came into play, and because the remontado form of warfare was inherently 
decentralizing, the Aguinaldo Government’s nationalist aspirations came to naught. More 
specifically, the nationalist guerrillas in the mountains lost contact with the rural elites in 
the towns and villages of the lowlands. This gave the Americans the opportunity to gain 
their loyalty, and the guerrillas’ tactical ineptitude meant they were unable to do anything 
about it. So in the Philippine-American War, the Aguinaldo Government was unable to 
overcome the challenge of political fragmentation and they were eventually defeated.  
This study began by saying it wished to place the Philippine-American War into 
the indigenous context. In doing that, I ultimately analyzed 300 years of Philippine 
history. The scope of this study expanded because I was desirous of finding out why the 
Filipinos fought the way they did during the Philippine-American War. Some of their 
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decisions seemed nonsensical—why fight the Americans in a conventional war?  The 
answer, I discovered, was that the whys and wherefores of the Philippine-American War 
have their roots in larger trends of Filipino history. There were, in fact, very good reasons 
for the decisions the Filipinos made. War is not an act that happens in isolation—it is 
necessary to consider the larger picture of a society’s culture and history in order to fully 
understand it. 
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